

**FOLLOW THE YELLOW BRICK ROAD: PERUSING THE PATH TO
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE REPARATIONS FOR
SLAVERY AND JIM CROW ERA GOVERNMENTAL
DISCRIMINATION**

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Article Abstract

A growing body of scholarship has developed around the issue of reparations for the Holocaust, slavery, and other social injustices. Numerous articles have proposed reparations programs for America's legacy of race based slavery and segregation, but the constitutionality of those programs has largely been ignored in the literature. Instead, most scholarship focuses on the legal or political justification for existing or new reparations proposals. This Article charts new ground in the area by examining prototypical reparations proposals by the leading scholars in the field for compliance with the Court's equal protection requirements. The Supreme Court's affirmative action jurisprudence represents the legal terrain that a reparations program must traverse to comply with the Court's equal protection requirements. As a chief contribution to existing scholarship, the Article maps a path to constitutionally permissible reparations for slavery and governmental segregation. Using this map, the Article determines whether prominent reparations proposals are on the road to a constitutional determination or stuck in the woods.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Wizard of Oz represents one of America's most beloved films.¹ Drawn from L. Frank Baum's series of novels written in the early 1900s regarding the Land of Oz, the film quickly became an American classic. Since its television premiere in 1956,² the film aired annually for decades on network television. The musical follows the journey of Dorothy in a magical Land of Oz. One of the best-known features of the film is a road paved with yellow bricks that Dorothy must follow to reach a powerful wizard in the Emerald City. That wizard, Dorothy is told, is the only person with the ability to return her back home. The yellow brick road provides the only path to the wizard. The road also provides her protection from a wicked witch who means her no good. If Dorothy veers from the road, she faces the double peril of not reaching the wizard and of being captured by the witch. Along the road, three companions, who also want the wizard to grant them a request, join Dorothy. Journeying together, the band encounters a multitude of challenges, but ultimately presents their request before a fearsome wizard who

1. THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro Goldwyn Mayer 1939). In 2007, the American Film Institute rated it as one of the top ten American movies of the last 100 years. American Film Institute, Welcome to the 100 Years – Top 100 Movies Official Site, http://connect.afi.com/site/-PageServer?pagename=micro_100landing (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).

2. See The Internet Movie Database, The Wizard of Oz, <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0032138/trivia> (last visited Jan. 22, 2009) (discussing the “stroke of genius” programming decision to air it annually as a Christmas special).

requires that they return with the witch's broomstick to gain his assistance. When they return with the broomstick they are amazed to discover that the wizard is merely a peddler of gimmicks and that the things they sought from the wizard were always within their own power to grasp.

In considering the story, the viewer's initial response may be to view the peddler's deception and the journey to the Emerald City as an impediment to the group's ability to achieve its goals. Upon reflection, however, the peddler serves as the perfect foil to enable the group's members to recognize and realize their own potential. Without the journey to the Emerald City and the challenges they faced, the group's members may have resigned themselves to what seemed to be their fated lot: a brainless scarecrow, a heartless tin man, a cowardly lion, and a lost young girl unable to return home. Through their struggle to achieve a near impossible challenge, they each found the power within themselves that they needed to achieve that for which they dreamed.

Like the outcome for Dorothy and her companions, Randall Robinson maintains in *The Debt*, his popular book about reparations, that regardless of whether reparations are achieved African Americans will benefit greatly from their pursuit.³ This Article seeks to explore the subject of reparations through the lens of a legislative enactment to provide redress to African American victims of governmental racial discrimination during the Antebellum and Jim Crow eras of American history. The Article eschews argument regarding the warrant for such a reparations program in favor of an investigation of the constitutionality of reparations under contemporary Supreme Court Equal Protection jurisprudence.⁴

Reparations commentators propose myriad approaches to redress for America's enslavement and legal subjugation of blacks.⁵

3. RANDALL ROBINSON, *THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS* 242-43 (2000).

4. See BORIS BITTKER, *THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS* 105-27 (1973) for an analysis of the issue in the early 1970s. See also ALFRED L. BROPHY, *REPARATIONS PRO AND CON* 158-64 (2006) [hereinafter BROPHY, *REPARATIONS*] and Borris Bittker & Roy L. Brooks, *The Constitutionality of Black Reparations*, in *WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH* 374, 374-89 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999) for more abbreviated considerations of the question.

5. See generally Roy L. Brooks, *Models of Reparations for Slavery: Toward a Perpetrator-Focused Model of Slave Redress*, 6 *AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP.* 49, 51-69 (2004); Alfred L. Brophy, *Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery*, 58 *N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.* 497, 501-25 (2003); Rhonda V. Magee, *The Master's Tools, From the Bottom Up: Responses to African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse*, 79 *VA. L. REV.* 863 (1993); Mari J. Matsuda, *Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations*, 22 *HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.* 323, 388-92 (1987); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., *Addressing the*

The proposals range from individual or collective financial payments to the creation of trust funds to be used for institutional development within black communities.⁶ This Article analyzes the varied proposals for their ability to survive a likely challenge under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Rather than advocate for any particular approach to redress on its merits, this Article attempts to focus on the legal hurdles facing potential legislative reparations programs.

Some commentators argue that American reparations for slavery ought to be distinguished and differentiated from reparations for Jim Crow Era injustices.⁷ Specifically, this Article considers legislative redress for governmental discriminatory practices against blacks from the Antebellum period of American history to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. While most reparations theorists argue that slavery is the necessary antecedent to Jim Crow and continuing racial discrimination, this Article examines enslavement and other forms of racial discrimination as potentially independent bases for reparations. Commentators argue that slavery established the foundation for the racial bias against blacks that spanned three centuries. While, as a matter of law, formal American enslavement ended in the late 1860s,⁸ the damage it caused would be felt over generations to come. However, as Boris Bittker made clear in his early work on reparations, the governmental and social responses to blacks following the end of slavery did as much to shape the next century as the preceding centuries of slavery.⁹

The racial peonage of the South and the second-class citizenship

Racial Divide: Reparations, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 115 (2004); Natsu Taylor Saito, *Beyond Reparations: Accommodating Wrongs or Honoring Resistance?*, 1 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 27, 27-51 (2003); Eric K. Yamamoto, *Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American Claims*, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 477, 487-93 (1998); Robert Westley, *Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?*, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 429, 468-76 (1998) (suggesting different models of redress for enslavement and legal subjugation of blacks and other minority groups).

6 See BROPHY, REPARATIONS, *supra* note 4, at 7-18.

7 See generally IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 157-58 (2005); BITTKER, *supra* note 4, at 8-29; ROY L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 155-63 (2004) [hereinafter BROOKS, ATONEMENT], reprinted in ECONOMIC JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER, IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS 1167-74 (Emma Coleman Jordan & Angela P. Harris eds., 2005); Emma Coleman Jordan, *A History Lesson, Reparations for What?*, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 557-59 (2003) (each text suggesting a focus on this period as well).

8. Recent research shows that many blacks continued in a state of servitude well into the twentieth century. See generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME (2008).

9 BITTKER, *supra* note 4, at 8-29.

experienced in the North greatly shaped the lives of the first and subsequent generations of blacks born after slavery's end.¹⁰ These acts of injustice, in the form of discrimination, exclusion, and subordination arguably warrant a legislative response on their own. Moreover, the principal victims of the governmental and private practices of racial discrimination carried on in this era remain with us today. Unlike the twelve generations of Africans who suffered through colonial and American slavocracy, who have since perished, a forgotten and neglected group of African Americans who bore the brunt of Jim Crow Era animus remain. In fact, the vast majority of African Americans over seventy years old lived through open racial exclusion, mistreatment and discrimination at all levels of government and much of the private sector.¹¹ In banking, commerce, religion, military service, housing, education, entertainment, sports, travel, and every other aspect of life, they faced open discrimination. From 1900 to 1964, millions of black adults and children were denied educational, political, and economic opportunities.¹² Neither the 1954 decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* nor the passage of the *Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1965, and 1968* remedied the harms suffered by blacks whose lives had largely been defined over the preceding decades by denial and exclusion.¹³ Instead, the legislation sought and achieved the prospective reform of American society.¹⁴ An entire generation of prior victims, however, was largely neglected by this legislation which failed to offer remedial aide for the African Americans who were too old to benefit from the new employment and educational opportunities that were being created.¹⁵ After more than one half century of being denied opportunities based on their race, these African Americans were left without viable relief for the educational and economic deficiencies that resulted.¹⁶

Japanese American victims of a wrongful three year government internment during World War II were similarly forgotten until the

10. See KATZNELSON, *supra* note 7, at 1-25 (discussing the plight of blacks in the Johnson administration).

11. See Carlton Waterhouse, *Avoiding Another Step in a Series of Unfortunate Legal Events: A Consideration of Black Life Under American Law From 1619 to 1972 and a Challenge to Prevailing Notions of Legally Based Reparations*, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 207, 247-49 (2006).

12. See *id.* at 230-33.

13. *Id.* at 247-49. This article takes no position regarding the past acts of private citizens during the Jim Crow Era, but instead presumes a Congressional finding of culpability of the federal and state governments to blacks who lived under the racially discriminatory practices that defined the period.

14. See *id.*

15. See *id.* (stating that the new laws failed to remedy the previous seventeen generations of African Americans).

16. See *id.*

late 1980s when Congress acted to redress the governments past conduct.¹⁷ Although the war time conduct was challenged and examined by the Supreme Court in *Korematsu v. United States*, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Court upheld the executive branch internment of Japanese Americans despite the discriminatory nature of the policy. It was over forty years later when the federal courts and the U.S. Congress revisited the question.¹⁸

In the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, the U.S. Congress approved a reparations program for surviving internees that included a \$20,000 cash award and an educational fund.¹⁹ Prior to the legislation, the federal courts examined the *Korematsu* opinion through a series of decisions.²⁰ Following the congressional action, the D.C. Circuit weighed in through its rejection of an equal protection challenge to the Act in *Jacobs v. Barr*.²¹ In the case, the Court provides the rationale upon which the federal government may base a reparations program.²² This Article examines the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence, through the prism of this case to set a legal framework through which legislative reparations programs may be reviewed. In that regard, the Supreme Court of the United States, through its affirmative action jurisprudence provides the framework upon which state and federal reparations programs can be constructed.²³ In *Jacobs v. Barr*, the U.S. Court of Appeals considered a challenge to the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which provided monetary and other forms of redress to persons of Japanese descent who were wrongfully interned during World War II.²⁴

This Article envisions three occurrences. First, it anticipates that the United States Congress will commission a study of reparations regarding slavery and segregation, as well as other discriminatory practices of the federal government against African

17. See LESLIE T. HATAMIYA, RIGHTING A WRONG: JAPANESE AMERICANS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL LIBERTIES ACT OF 1988 38-56 (Gordon H. Chang ed., 1993); see generally Dean Masaru Hashimoto, *The Legacy of Korematsu v. United States: A Dangerous Narrative Retold*, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 72 (1996) (discussing *Korematsu v. United States*); see ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT (2001).

18. See HATAMIYA, *supra* note 17, at 130-36.

19. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1989b-1 – b-4(a)(1988).

20. See *Hirabayashi v. United States*, 828 F.2d 591, 603 (9th Cir. 1987); *Korematsu v. United States*, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984); *Hohri v. United States*, 847 F.2d 779, 781-83 (Fed. Ct. 1988) (per curiam) (Baldwin, J., dissenting in part); *Hohri v. United States*, 793 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam). These cases discuss the decision and validity of the *Korematsu* Court.

21. *Jacobs v. Barr*, 959 F.2d 313, 321-22 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

22. *Id.* at 318-19.

23. Bittker & Brooks, *supra* note 4, at 381.

24. 959 F.2d at 315.

Americans prior to 1968.²⁵ Secondly, the Article expects that the United States Congress and one or more state legislatures will provide some form of redress for governmental race discrimination during those periods. Finally, the Article foresees one or more court challenges to federal and state governmental reparations as violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In anticipation of each of the above, the Article provides a legal analysis of legislative reparations programs under an equal protection challenge. The basis of this framework rests in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence defining the role that the government may play in addressing past racial discrimination in the context of affirmative action.²⁶

At different times and in distinctive ways, legal scholars Boris I. Bittker, Roy L. Brooks, and Alfred L. Brophy have all considered the question of the constitutionality of reparations for African Americans.²⁷ This Article builds on, expands, and updates the efforts of these scholars based on recent Court decisions under the Equal Protection Clause. Building on Brooks' identification of affirmative action jurisprudence as the proper framework for assessing reparations programs, it argues that the Supreme Court's past and most recent affirmative action jurisprudence suggests that a passable road may exist to reach constitutional reparations.²⁸ One of the Article's chief contributions is its analysis of recently proposed reparations programs for constitutionality.²⁹ As a general matter, the Article finds that reparations proposals are neither uniformly consistent nor uniformly inconsistent with equal protection requirements. Programs instead fall into four categories: presumptively unconstitutional, presumptively constitutional, likely constitutional, and likely unconstitutional.³⁰ While some types of reparations programs clearly run afoul of the Court's past decisions, the Article maintains that other types fall squarely within the parameters articulated by the Court. The third and fourth categories

25. Comparable action by one or more state governments serves as an additional expectation of this Article.

26. See generally *WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE* 374-89 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999) [hereinafter *WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH*] (discussing the constitutionality of black reparations).

27. BITTKER, *supra* note 4, at 105-27; BROPHY, *REPARATIONS*, *supra* note 4, at 158-64; *WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH*, *supra* note 26, at 374-89.

28. See *Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1*, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), *Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and *Gratz v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) for the Court's past and most recent affirmative action decisions.

29. See *infra* Part IV.

30. See *infra* Part V.

describe those programs less clearly within or beyond the Court's interpretation of Equal Protection Clause requirements.

Part II of the Article lays out the likely challenges to the envisioned legislation. In anticipation of likely claims by plaintiffs, this section of the Article considers the probable allegations of such suits. The Article introduces the standard of review that courts should use in reviewing federal and state legislative reparations in Part III; the issue is revisited in Part IV. Part III also explores the arguments for and against a strict scrutiny analysis for an envisioned program and the means by which strict scrutiny could be avoided. The bulk of Part III examines the Court's recent Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence and then builds a framework of the requirements likely to be required by the Court under a strict scrutiny analysis—the governing standard used by the Court when examining racial classifications by state actors. In Part IV, the constitutionality of a congressional or state based reparations program is examined using strict scrutiny. This part consists of two sections. The first section articulates the compelling state interest that the Congress and state legislatures will have to show exists to enact reparations programs. As a fundamental part of the compelling interest tests, the Court places an evidentiary burden upon the Congress and state legislatures to support a claim that the programs relate to specific acts of racial discrimination. The Article addresses this requirement as part of its discussion of the compelling interest that the Court requires to uphold racial classifications. The second section describes the narrow tailoring and close relationship between the past discrimination and the proposed remedial program required. Part V of the Article evaluates four types of reparations proposals for their ability to withstand the “searching examination” the Court is likely to apply.³¹ The Article concludes by categorizing reparations programs based on their likelihood of surviving an equal protection challenge.

II. LIKELY CHALLENGES

A. *Case A: Native Americans, Latinos, Asians, Black Immigrants, etc.*

Likely plaintiffs in an equal protection challenge to reparations would be racial or ethnic minorities claiming that the federal or state government had racially discriminatory policies that harmed them but that they were excluded from a congressional or state reparations scheme. This claim loosely follows the complaint in *Jacobs v. Barr*.³²

31. *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña*, 515 U.S. 200, 210 (1995) (citing *Fullilove v. Klutznick*, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980)).

32. *Jacobs v. Barr*, 959 F.2d 313, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

In that case, a young man interned along with his father, who was a German immigrant/national, claimed that he was barred from receiving reparations along with Japanese internees.³³ The appeals court dispensed with the case based on the conclusion that the young man's father was interned pursuant to an interview rather than a mass internment.³⁴ The court found that the young man was not excluded based on his race in violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights.³⁵ Instead, the court ruled, the young man's internment along with his father was based on a personal interview and subsequent determination that his father individually posed a threat while most other German nationals/immigrants did not.³⁶

Courts will likely dispense with these claimants as long as evidentiary findings precede the development of a reparations modifying scheme that identifies particular acts of racial discrimination carried out by the federal and state governments against blacks in particular.³⁷ Rather than random or particular instances, findings should go to systematic exclusions or discriminatory practices carried out, authorized, or sanctioned by the federal or state governments.³⁸

B. *Case B – Whites*

A white plaintiff may challenge the reparations program as a violation of his equal protection rights if racial classification is required for participation.³⁹ This claim offers a greater threat than Case A because it goes to legislative authority to institute a racial reparations program rather than legislative discretion to choose which victims of past governmental discrimination will be its beneficiaries.⁴⁰ This complaint would pose the most significant challenge to reparations.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

In evaluating legislation and other state action under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court applies different levels of scrutiny.⁴¹

33. *Id.* at 314-15.

34. *See id.* at 319-21.

35. *Id.* at 321.

36. *Id.* at 319-21.

37. *See* *Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989); *see also* *United States v. Paradise*, 480 U.S. 149, 165-67 (1987).

38. *J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. at 506 (1989); *Paradise*, 480 U.S. at 164-66.

39. *See* *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña*, 515 U.S. 200, 224-25 (1995).

40. *See id.*

41. *See* *United States v. Carolene Products*, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (comparing levels of scrutiny); *see also* *Loving v. Virginia*, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (subjecting racial classification to strict scrutiny).

Each level of scrutiny corresponds to a degree of deference exercised by the Court.⁴² The use of the standard recognizes the separation of powers doctrine.⁴³ Through deference to the decisions of the legislative or executive branch of government at issue, the Court respects the powers of its coequal branches.⁴⁴ Accordingly, the Court limits its intrusion into the activities of coordinate branches.⁴⁵ Legally challenged “state action” is subject to judicial review to determine its constitutionality.⁴⁶ In carrying out the review, the Court employs levels of scrutiny that correspond to the intensity of the Court’s analysis and corresponding deference to the coordinate branches’ actions.⁴⁷ Actions based on race and gender classifications receive a higher level of scrutiny from the Court.⁴⁸ As a consequence, these challenged actions require more pronounced justifications to meet constitutional muster. Concern that similarly situated persons receive equal treatment from government actions rests at the core of the judicially created reviewing standards.⁴⁹

A. *Rational Basis*

At the lowest level, legislative and executive actions must serve a rational basis.⁵⁰ This means that classifications used must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.⁵¹ When a court finds that a rational relationship exists, then the challenged action meets the requirements of constitutionality.⁵² The court provides the highest level of deference to the coordinate branches under this

42. See Sheila Foster, *Intent and Incoherence*, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065 (1998); Daniel R. Ortiz, *The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection*, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (1989); George Rutherglen, *Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested Concept of Equality*, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2006); David A. Strauss, *Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown*, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989); Michael Selmi, *Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric*, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 284-85 (1997); Samuel Issacharoff, *Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal Protection Law*, 92 YALE L.J. 328 (1982).

43. See Foster, *supra* note 42, at 1100-05.

44. *Id.*

45. *Id.*

46. Strauss, *supra* note 42, at 966-69.

47. Foster, *supra* note 42, at 1100-03.

48. Bittker & Brooks, *supra* note 4, at 381-83.

49. See *id.* at 382.

50. *Schweiker v. Wilson*, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981); *U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz*, 449 U.S. 166, 174-76 (1980); *Vance v. Bradley*, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); *New Orleans v. Dukes*, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).

51. Michael J. Higdon, *Queer Teens and Legislative Bullies: The Cruel and Invidious Discrimination Behind Heterosexist Statutory Rape Laws*, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 231-32 (2008) (citing *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.*, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).

52. *Id.*

test.⁵³ In examining social or economic based actions, the court provides wide latitude.⁵⁴ The Constitution, in those instances, allows even unwise decisions to proceed with the presumption that the democratic process will resolve them.⁵⁵ As long as the rational relationship between a legitimate governmental interest and the challenged action exists then no equal protection violation exists.⁵⁶

When quasi-suspect classifications of people underlie government action, then heightened reviews may be required.⁵⁷ The court has also used a “second order” rational basis review when quasi-suspect classifications motivate government action.⁵⁸ This review is below an intermediate level of scrutiny, but more demanding than the first order rational basis test.

B. *Intermediate Scrutiny*

When suspect classifications appear in legislation or provide the basis for executive action, courts raise the level of scrutiny.⁵⁹ Through the increased scrutiny, courts seek to determine whether an appropriate basis underlies the challenged governmental action.⁶⁰ Race, national origin, gender, and family status all represent suspect classifications.⁶¹ The use of any suspect classification necessitates more intensive analysis by a court when reviewing the actions of coordinate branches under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.⁶² While race, national origin, and similar classifications necessitate a strict scrutiny analysis, gender receives an intermediate level of scrutiny.⁶³ The Court has rejected gender-

53. *See id.*

54. *See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.*, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).

55. *Id.*

56. *Id.*

57. *See United States v. Carolene Products*, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (comparing levels of scrutiny); *see also Loving v. Virginia*, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (subjecting racial classifications to strict scrutiny); *Craig v. Boren*, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (analyzing gender-based classifications).

58. *Cleburne Living Ctr.*, 473 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, Brennan, & Blackman, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (pointing out that the Court's application of rational basis in this case closely resembles heightened scrutiny).

59. *See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989); *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña*, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995).

60. Sheila Foster, *Intent and Incoherence*, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1108-10 (1998) [hereinafter Foster, *Intent*].

61. John W. Whittlesey, *Private Judges, Public Juries: The Ohio Legislature Should Rewrite R.C. § 2701.10 to Explicitly Authorize Private Judges to Conduct Jury Trials*, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 543, 556 (2008).

62. Foster, *Intent*, *supra* note 60, at 1108-10.

63. *Cleburne Living Ctr.*, 473 U.S. at 440-41.

based classifications unless they are "substantially related" to a sufficiently important governmental interest.⁶⁴

Prior to *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña*, intermediate scrutiny also characterized the standard of review applied to benign racial classification used by the United States Congress.⁶⁵ Under this level of review, a court determines if an important governmental objective motivates the challenged action and if the classification is substantially related to that objective.⁶⁶ Based on Congress's unique enforcement power provided by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, congressional action designed to address the effects of past discrimination avoided strict scrutiny analysis.⁶⁷ In *Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC*, the Court upheld a congressional plan that used racial classifications in order to promote diversity in broadcasting.⁶⁸ The Court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny.⁶⁹ They found that the benign race-conscious measures used by Congress were constitutionally valid.⁷⁰ As a basis, the Court explained that they served important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and were substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.⁷¹ The Court majority rejected this approach five years later in *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña*, in favor of one standard for the review of all race-based classifications.⁷²

C. *Strict Scrutiny*

In reviewing governmental action at the state and federal level, courts make a "searching examination" of governmental actions employing racial classifications.⁷³ In *Adarand*, the Court determined that the same standard of review required for state actions employing racial classifications under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied to federal action under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause.⁷⁴ The congressionally devised

64. *Craig v. Boren*, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).

65. *Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC*, 497 U.S. 547, 596-97 (1990); *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña*, 515 U.S. 200, 219 (1995).

66. *Adarand*, 515 U.S. at 227.

67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see *Fullilove v. Klutznick*, 448 U.S. 448, 472-73 (1980).

68. 497 U.S. at 600-01.

69. See *id.* at 584 (finding that minority ownership policies are substantially related to the governmental goal of promoting diversity).

70. *Id.* at 596-97.

71. *Id.* at 568-70.

72. 515 U.S. at 227. The Court endorsed a uniform approach to all race conscious measures. The Court decided that Congress warranted no more deference than any other governmental body at the state or federal level. *Id.*

73. *Id.* at 223 (quoting *Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.*, 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986)).

74. *Id.* at 235.

small and disadvantaged business program at issue in that case used race as a rebuttable means of showing disadvantage.⁷⁵ Writing for the majority, Justice O' Connor wrote that "any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest of judicial scrutiny."⁷⁶ This represented a significant shift for the majority, which had upheld a congressional based program using racial classifications to promote minority ownership of the broadcast media a few years earlier.⁷⁷ O'Connor argued that the standard for the federal and state governments had to be the same to ensure the protection of individual rights from the improper actions of government; she held in the case that the Court needed to perform a "searching examination."⁷⁸

This analysis is necessary whenever the government uses a racial classification for a governmental program.⁷⁹ The justification is that race should never serve as the motivation for governmental action unless that action is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.⁸⁰ In this section, the Article considers the arguments for and against using a strict scrutiny analysis for a racially specific reparations program and the types of programs that should avoid a strict scrutiny evaluation by the courts.

The plaintiff in *Adarand* complained that they lost a subcontract because the general contractor received a financial benefit under its federal construction project for choosing a certified disadvantaged business, as defined by the Small Business Administration ("SBA").⁸¹ While the SBA program allowed disadvantaged businesses to qualify on economic and other non-racial grounds, it also included a rebuttable presumption that racial minorities were disadvantaged.⁸² *Adarand* challenged that aspect of the program as a violation of the

75. *Id.* at 208.

76. *Id.* at 224.

77. *Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC*, 497 U.S. 547, 600-01 (1990). This case followed a lengthy battle over the standard of review required for congressionally based programs seeking to remedy past discrimination. From the Court's 1980 plurality decision in *Fullilove* to the 1990 majority ruling in *Metro Broadcasting*, both of which O'Connor wrote dissenting opinions in, O'Connor and others had argued for greater scrutiny for congressional action. In theory, if not in practice, the *Adarand* decision represented one of the last nails in the coffin of federal affirmative action programs.

78. *Adarand*, 515 U.S. at 223 (1995) (quoting *Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.*, 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986)).

79. *See Loving v. Virginia*, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (noting that a state's miscegenation statute must be subject to strict scrutiny).

80. *See id.*

81. *Adarand*, 515 U.S. at 209-10.

82. *Id.* at 207-08.

government's Fifth Amendment obligation not to deny persons equal protection under the law.⁸³ Specifically, Adarand claimed that it would have received the subcontract if the general contractor had not been financially rewarded for hiring an SBA-certified disadvantaged business.⁸⁴

The Court rejected the reasoning it applied in *Metro Broadcasting* and *Fullilove* and ruled that congressional programs using racial classifications required strict scrutiny to determine if they violated the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.⁸⁵ Unlike the affirmative action program upheld in *Fullilove*, however, this program included a rebuttable presumption of disadvantage based on race.⁸⁶ In *Fullilove*, membership in a congressionally identified racial group enabled participation in the program.⁸⁷ Some commentators took issue with this decision by the Court, categorizing it as a way to derail federal government efforts to address centuries of racial discrimination through a very modest set aside program for disadvantaged businesses.⁸⁸ Others focused attention on the contemporary use of racial classifications in government programs and branded efforts to the contrary as violative of the individual protections provided by the United States Constitution.⁸⁹ To understand how courts might view a congressional reparations scheme for blacks, more attention must be paid to the Courts' decisions running from *Fullilove v. Klutznick* to *Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District*.⁹⁰ This Article surveys those cases for their relevance in evaluating the constitutionality of reparations schemes for African Americans.

83. *Id.* at 204.

84. *Id.* at 205.

85. *Id.* at 225-27, 232-35.

86. *Id.* at 259-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

87. *Fullilove v. Klutznick*, 448 U.S. 448, 453-54 (1980).

88. See Koteles Alexander, *Adarand: Brute Political Force Concealed as a Constitutional Colorblind Principle*, 39 *HOW. L.J.* 367 (1995) ("For the majority of the Court, *Adarand* has called into question any attempt by the federal government to address the injustices of past discrimination, and it has proclaimed that such remedial actions are just as suspect . . . malevolent discrimination."); *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña: Turning Back the Clock on Minority Set-Asides*, 23 *S.U. L. REV.* 79, 90 (1995) ("As a matter of public policy, *Adarand* dealt a sweeping blow to the progress of minority set-asiders . . .").

89. See George R. La Noue & John C. Sullivan, *Gross Presumptions: Determining Group Eligibility for Federal Procurement Preferences*, 41 *SANTA CLARA L. REV.* 103, 159 (2000) (arguing that eligibility should be targeted towards business owners who can demonstrate actual disadvantage, regardless of race); L. Darnell Weeden, *Creating Race-Neutral Diversity in Federal Procurement in a Post-Adarand World*, 23 *WHITTIER L. REV.* 951, 952-53 (2002) (arguing that childhood poverty is a better measure of social disadvantage than race).

90. See 551 U.S. 701 (2007); *Fullilove v. Klutznick*, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).

The majority decision in *Adarand*, written by Justice O'Connor, provides important lessons that should serve as significant guidelines for a congressional reparations program for past governmental racial discrimination. Taken together with insights gained from the Court's decisions in *Metro Broadcasting v. FCC*, *Fullilove v. Klutznick*, *United States v. Paradise*, and other cases, these lessons provide a critical framework for evaluating potential reparations programs.⁹¹ In *Adarand*, the Court made two significant decisions that departed from its past decisions: 1) congressionally based remedial programs employing racial classifications require strict scrutiny; and 2) congressional motivation to remedy past discriminatory conduct does not change the Court's bias against race based remedies and no longer receives the deference from the Court previously recognized in *Fullilove*, *Croson*, and *Metro Broadcasting*.⁹²

IV. NARROWLY TAILORED TO MEET A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST

A. *Section One: Compelling State Interests*

The Court's Equal Protection Jurisprudence articulates two distinct bases for the use of racial classifications relevant in the reparations context.⁹³ The Court has affirmed remediation of past discrimination and diversity as legitimate grounds for the use of racial classifications.⁹⁴ This section examines the Court's requirements for each of the motivations and their relevance for reparations programs. The section begins with a review of the most recently affirmed basis: diversity.

The University of Michigan Law School devised an admissions program that considered race along with other factors to decide admissions.⁹⁵ The policy adopted by the school's faculty allowed the use of applicant's racial identity, along with academic ability, experience, potential, and other factors to fashion the incoming first year class.⁹⁶ A commitment to ethnic and racial diversity in addition to other types of diversity was an express feature of the challenged policy, which included a "special reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been historically discriminated

91. See *Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC*, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); *United States v. Paradise*, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); *Fullilove*, 448 U.S. 448.

92. *Adarand*, 515 U.S. at 227-28, 225-37.

93. *Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). "But we have never held that the only governmental use of race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past discrimination." *Id.*

94. *Grutter*, 539 U.S. at 328; *Paradise*, 480 U.S. at 166.

95. *Grutter*, 539 U.S. at 314-16.

96. *Id.*

against, like African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans.”⁹⁷ Without the commitment, the policy noted, students from the aforementioned groups “might not be represented in our student body in meaningful numbers.”⁹⁸ Accordingly, the law school sought to maintain “a critical mass” of underrepresented minorities in implementing its policy in order to cement those students ability to make particular contributions to the school’s character.⁹⁹ Using educational benefits as its justification, the school maintained that diversity enhanced the education of its students through the increased exposure to the range of perspectives that it allowed.¹⁰⁰

Foremost, the Court’s analysis required a determination of whether the law school had a compelling interest in the attainment of a racially diverse class.¹⁰¹ To make its determination the Court deferred to the school’s educational judgment and the evidence presented that the school’s admissions policy promoted “cross-racial understanding,” helped to break down stereotypes, and enhanced students’ ability to understand people of different races.¹⁰² Amici played a prominent role in the Court’s decision.¹⁰³ Parties ranging from the Association of American Law Schools to Fortune 500 companies and the United States Military petitioned the Court to emphasize the critical role of diversity in developing future leaders of American society.¹⁰⁴ Drawing from these diverse sources along with educational studies and the law school’s experts, the Court held that the school had a compelling state interest in the attainment of a diverse student body.¹⁰⁵ Four years later, the Court’s holding in *Grutter* would be tested at the primary and secondary levels of two state public school systems.¹⁰⁶

In *Parents Involved*, the Court assessed the constitutionality of two school assignment and transfer programs employing racial classifications.¹⁰⁷ The challenged program from Seattle used students’ race in an effort to achieve and promote diversity in its ten public high schools.¹⁰⁸ Although the school system allowed incoming

97. *Id.* at 316.

98. *Id.*

99. *Id.*

100. *Id.* at 319-20.

101. *Id.* at 327.

102. *Id.* at 330.

103. *Id.* at 330-33.

104. *Id.*

105. *Id.* at 328.

106. *Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1*, 551 U.S. 701, 709-10 (2007).

107. *Id.*

108. *Id.* at 710-11.

ninth graders to select preferred schools, when the demand for a school exceeded the spaces available, the school system used a series of tiebreakers—the second of which considered the students' race and the racial makeup of the school selected.¹⁰⁹ Under the program, students were classified as white or non-white.¹¹⁰ Oversubscribed schools were assessed to ascertain if they were integration positive or negative.¹¹¹ Integration positive schools accepted whites or nonwhites, under the racial tiebreaker, whom otherwise may have been denied a space.¹¹² The Jefferson County program in Kentucky set guidelines for the racial makeup of its non-magnet public schools.¹¹³ The guidelines set black student enrollment at a minimum of fifteen percent and a maximum of fifty percent.¹¹⁴ Assignment requests for students to schools at either extreme risked denial if the student's race would place the school outside the Jefferson County Public Schools' guidelines.¹¹⁵ The program applied to both initial student assignments and student transfer requests.¹¹⁶

In assessing the two cases, the plurality rejected the defendants' claims that a compelling state interest existed to attain diversity in their public schools.¹¹⁷ The Court stated:

The principle that racial balancing is not permitted is one of substance, not semantics. Racial balancing is not transformed from "patently unconstitutional" to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it "racial diversity." While the school districts use various verbal formulations to describe the interest they seek to promote – racial diversity, avoidance of racial isolation, racial integration – they offer no definition of the interest that suggests it differs from racial balance.¹¹⁸

The Court distinguished the school system programs from the plan upheld in *Grutter v. Bollinger* based on the use of race as one of many equally weighted factors used in fostering diversity at the University of Michigan Law School.¹¹⁹ Unlike in *Grutter*, the Court found that the challenged system in Michigan rested solely on

109. *Id.* at 711-12. Sibling attendance and geographical proximity represented the first and third tiebreakers. *Id.*

110. *Id.* at 712.

111. *Id.*

112. *See id.*

113. *Id.* at 715-16.

114. *Id.* at 716.

115. *Id.* at 715-18.

116. *Id.* The plaintiff parent was denied a transfer request, which asked that her son be able to attend kindergarten at a school a mile from her home rather than at the school in the district, ten miles away. *Id.* at 717.

117. *Id.* at 731-33.

118. *Id.* at 732; *see also* Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

119. *Parents Involved*, 551 U.S. at 722-26.

students' racial identity—an impermissible basis according to the plurality.¹²⁰

Reminiscent of Powell's opinion in *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke*, Justice Kennedy did not concur in the plurality's rejection of racial diversity/racial integration as a compelling state interest for primary and secondary education.¹²¹ In a separate opinion on this issue distinct from the majority and the dissent, Kennedy decided, “[i]n the administration of public schools by the state and local authorities it is permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools and to adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is its racial composition.”¹²² At the core of Kennedy's concurrence is his determination that racial diversity can serve as a compelling governmental interest for public school systems to use racial classifications when sufficiently tailored to comply with the strictures of *Grutter*.¹²³

The dissent also found that a compelling state interest existed in the case to promote “racial ‘integration.’”¹²⁴ Together with the dissent, Kennedy's concurrence creates a majority of justices who affirm student diversity as a compelling state interest to use racial classifications among other factors in primary and secondary school assignment and transfer plans.¹²⁵ In conjunction with the Court's earlier decision in *Grutter, Parents Involved* recognizes a compelling state interest in promoting diversity in education.¹²⁶ This conclusion may have substantial ramifications for some types of reparations programs. We will explore the significance of these determinations below, after considering the Court's well-established recognition of a compelling state interest in remedying past discrimination.

The Court has consistently recognized that the states and the federal government have a compelling interest in remedying specific instances of past discrimination.¹²⁷ In *United States v. Paradise*, decided two terms before *City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.*, the Court held that a state promotion plan that required that fifty

120. See *id.* at 732-33.

121. See *Bakke*, 438 U.S. at 311-15 (1978) (Powell, J. concurring); *Parents Involved*, 551 U.S. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

122. *Parents Involved*, 551 U.S. at 788.

123. See *id.* at 782-83.

124. *Id.* at 838-39 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent also finds that the plans were sufficiently constrained in their design to comply with the requirements of strict scrutiny as well. *Id.* at 846.

125. See *id.* at 782-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also *Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).

126. See *Parents Involved*, 551 U.S. at 782-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also *id.* at 722 (plurality opinion).

127. *Id.* at 720; *Grutter*, 539 U.S. at 328.

percent of state trooper promotions be awarded to qualified black candidates was justified by a compelling governmental interest in remedying past discrimination in the Alabama Department of Public Safety.¹²⁸ The Court found that “[t]he Government unquestionably has a compelling interest in remedying past and present discrimination by a state actor.”¹²⁹ In the case, the Court upheld a district court order requiring the plan in order to remedy decades of racial discrimination in hiring found by the district court.¹³⁰

The Court elaborated the limits of governmental interests in developing a state program intended to remedy past discrimination in *City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.*¹³¹ The city of Richmond, Virginia sought to remedy what it identified as decades of racial discrimination in the construction industry.¹³² Upon review of the record, the Court concluded that “none of the evidence presented by the city points to any identified discrimination in the Richmond construction industry.”¹³³ Instead, the Court found that the evidence in the record only demonstrated past societal discrimination and that no compelling state interest warranted the use of racial classifications to remedy such discrimination.¹³⁴ In this regard, the Court focused its concern on the evidentiary basis presented to support the city’s plan.¹³⁵

Congressional findings in *Fullilove v. Klutznick* showing nationwide discrimination in the construction industry represented one of the bases that Richmond depended on in justifying its minority set-aside program.¹³⁶ The *Croson* Court, however, determined that Richmond’s plan lacked any findings of specific acts of racial discrimination in Richmond itself.¹³⁷ Statistical evidence presented by the city that showed the limited participation of blacks and other non-white racial groups was rejected by the Court as not being probative because it compared city population levels to representation in the construction industry—an improper

128. *Paradise*, 480 U.S. at 167 (plurality opinion); *J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. at 469.

129. *Paradise*, 480 U.S. at 167 (plurality opinion).

130. *Id.*

131. *J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. at 469.

132. *Id.* at 480 (plurality opinion).

133. *Id.* at 505.

134. *Id.*

135. *Id.* at 498-506.

136. *Id.* at 504. In *Fullilove v. Klutznick*, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), the Court upheld a federal plan, which required that no less than ten percent of federal funds for local public works projects are used by state grantees to obtain services or supplies from minority businesses.

137. *J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. at 504-05.

comparison, the Court found, to show discrimination.¹³⁸ Rather, the Court noted, statistical comparisons must be made to the qualified applicant base to make a *prima facie* showing of racial discrimination.¹³⁹ Ultimately, the Court rejected the district court's determination that evidence in the record supported the city's determination that past racial discrimination had impacted the number of minority contractors in Richmond.¹⁴⁰

Meeting the compelling state interest requirement to support reparations may proceed along either of the preceding paths—diversity or remedy—each with its own risks.

B. *Section Two: Narrowly Tailored Program Requirements*

Even when a government actor can show a compelling state interest for a challenged action, courts will require that actions utilizing racial classifications be narrowly tailored.¹⁴¹ To meet this obligation, courts look to a series of factors, including “the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration of the relief . . . and the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties.”¹⁴² The court will inspect proposed programs for constitutionality using these and other criteria, as appropriate, to ensure “the most exact connection between justification and classification.”¹⁴³ Demonstrating that a proposed reparations program has been narrowly tailored arguably represents the most substantial challenge to the constitutionality of legislative reparations programs. Since attaining diversity, in some limited contexts, and remedying specific acts of past discrimination have both been recognized as compelling governmental interests, legislative reparations programs likely face their greatest hurdle in persuading the Court that a particular program is sufficiently constrained in its scope, duration, and impact on non-beneficiaries.

In *Grutter v. Bollinger*, the Court made a detailed analysis of the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial classifications in its admissions program, providing a framework for evaluating such program's consistency with the constitutional constraints the Court requires under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.¹⁴⁴ The Court identified four critical elements of the admissions plan

138. *Id.* at 503-05.

139. *Id.* at 501-03.

140. *Id.* at 503-05.

141. *Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1*, 551 U.S. 701, 786-88 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

142. *United States v. Paradise*, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).

143. *Parents Involved*, 551 U.S. at 720 (quoting *Gratz v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003)).

144. 539 U.S. 306, 334-43 (2003).

that marked its constrained approach to attaining diversity: individualized consideration to applicants irrespective of race;¹⁴⁵ assurance that all factors contributing to diversity are meaningfully considered along with race;¹⁴⁶ good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives to achieve diversity;¹⁴⁷ and no undue harm to members of any racial group.¹⁴⁸

The Court repeatedly emphasized the flexibility of the program as a hallmark of its approach.¹⁴⁹ Programs that employ rigid racial measures such as quotas, reducing individuals to a racial statistic, lack the flexibility needed under the Court's analysis.¹⁵⁰ In contrast, the Court found that the University of Michigan considered each applicant in a competitive process irrespective of his or her racial identity.¹⁵¹ Using this process, the numbers of racial minorities in the applicant pool "differ[ed] substantially" from the numbers enrolled and "varie[d] considerably for each [racial] group" yearly.¹⁵² This indicated to the majority that the program avoided racial balancing disfavored by the Court.¹⁵³

The law school also demonstrated to the Court that non-racial diversity received meaningful consideration through its frequent admission of non-racial minority applicants with test scores and grades below those of other applicants who are rejected from across the racial spectrum.¹⁵⁴ "The Law School does not, however, limit in any way the broad range of qualities and experiences that may be considered valuable contributions to student body diversity," the Court explained.¹⁵⁵ The flexibility of the program persuaded the Court that race represented one of many factors that the school used to fulfill its compelling interest to attain a diverse class rather than an impermissible motive.¹⁵⁶

The consideration of race-neutral alternatives drew the Court's attention in *Parents Involved* as well as *Grutter*, though with different results.¹⁵⁷ In *Parents Involved*, the Court determined that

145. *Id.* at 336-37.

146. *Id.* at 337-39.

147. *Id.* at 339-40.

148. *Id.* at 341.

149. *Id.* at 334.

150. *Id.* at 335.

151. *Id.* at 337.

152. *Id.* at 336.

153. *Id.*

154. *Id.* at 338.

155. *Id.*

156. *Id.* at 334.

157. *Compare id.* at 328 (holding law school's admission policy constitutionally valid) *with* *Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1*, 551 U.S. 701,

the school districts "failed to show that they considered methods other than explicit racial classifications to achieve their stated goals."¹⁵⁸ Distinguishing the case from *Grutter*, the Court noted the relative insignificance of the transfer programs in determining the racial diversity of the schools.¹⁵⁹ Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, stated that non-racial approaches would have proven equally effective in achieving diversity in the districts reviewed.¹⁶⁰ The districts' failure to consider non-race based alternatives to achieve their diversity goals colored the Court's review of their programs and its ultimate determination that they were not sufficiently constrained to comply with the Court's strict scrutiny analysis.¹⁶¹ *Grutter*, in contrast, included a longitudinal analysis of admissions over a six-year period that assessed the effect of a race-neutral admissions policy on the University of Michigan Law School's ability to attain its diversity goal.¹⁶² Moreover, because the school's goal was diversity across a range of factors beyond race, several race-neutral alternatives were ruled out as incompatible with the school's goal of attaining diversity while maintaining its commitment to academic selectivity.¹⁶³

The potential harm that a program will cause to non-beneficiaries is also examined under the Court's strict scrutiny analysis.¹⁶⁴ In *Grutter*, the Court found that the law school's diversity program did not unduly harm non-minority applicants because "it can (and does) select nonminority applicants who have greater potential to enhance student body diversity over underrepresented minority applicants."¹⁶⁵ In the diversity context, the potential for undue harm flows from the winners and losers created by government programs. When race determines the outcome, rather than serving as one of many factors, courts may find too great a burden placed on non-beneficiaries.¹⁶⁶

City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co. provides a sustained

709-11, 734 (2007) (holding the school districts' plan to balance racial representation constitutionally invalid).

158. *Parents Involved*, 551 U.S. at 734.

159. *Id.* at 734-35.

160. *Id.* at 788-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

161. *Id.* at 732-35.

162. *Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306, 320 (2003). The Law School's expert forecast a decrease of ten percent or more in the number of underrepresented racial minorities if race-neutral criteria were used. *Id.*

163. *Id.* at 340.

164. *United States v. Paradise*, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987)

165. *Grutter*, 539 U.S. at 341.

166. *Id.* at 387, 391-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

examination of a program intended to remedy past discrimination.¹⁶⁷ In its strict scrutiny analysis, the Court closely reviewed the program details to determine its constitutional legitimacy.¹⁶⁸ This section considers the Court's analysis articulated in *Croson* to elaborate the parameters of a narrowly tailored remedial program under strict scrutiny. The city of Richmond based the challenged program in *Croson* on the federal program approved by the Court in *Fullilove v. Klutznick*.¹⁶⁹ Beyond statistical data revealing the dearth of minority contractors in the construction industry, the Court found little evidence specific to the city underlying its program.¹⁷⁰ This had significant ramifications for the Court's analysis of the constitutionality of the proposed remedy.¹⁷¹ The Court remarked, "it is almost impossible to assess whether the Richmond Plan is narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination since it is not linked to identified discrimination in any way."¹⁷² Two of the factors used to assess whether programs show sufficient constraints, nonetheless, received the Court's attention—the consideration of race-neutral alternatives and the flexibility of the relief.¹⁷³

The Court stated that the city of Richmond did not appear to have considered any race-neutral alternatives.¹⁷⁴ The Court went on to show the impact of the city's failure to consider alternatives, noting the absence of evidence in the record to the contrary.¹⁷⁵ The majority identified several race-neutral alternatives to Richmond's program.¹⁷⁶ These alternatives, it maintained, could all effectively increase minority participation without using racial classifications.¹⁷⁷

In contrast to the federal plan upheld in *Fullilove v. Klutznick*, which set aside 10 percent of federal construction grants to minority contractors,¹⁷⁸ the Richmond Plan required that parties awarded prime contracts with the city award 30 percent of the subcontracts to minority businesses.¹⁷⁹ In further distinction from the federal plan, the Richmond Plan only allowed waivers when minority contractors

167. 488 U.S. 469, 507-11 (1989).

168. *Id.*

169. *Id.* at 504.

170. *Id.* at 505.

171. *Id.* at 507.

172. *Id.*

173. *Id.* at 507-08.

174. *Id.* at 507.

175. *Id.* at 507-10.

176. *Id.* at 509-10.

177. *Id.*

178. 448 U.S. 448, 453 (1980).

179. *J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. at 477.

were "unavailable or unwilling to participate,"¹⁸⁰ while the federal plan allowed a waiver when a minority contractor charged a price that was "not attributable to the present effects of prior discrimination."¹⁸¹ "[T]he 30% quota cannot be said to be narrowly tailored to any goal, except perhaps outright racial balancing," the Court determined.¹⁸² The Court found that the plan's rigid quota and inattention to race-neutral measures were inconsistent with a narrowly tailored approach.¹⁸³

The Court raised an additional concern regarding the proposed remedy important for our purposes. Based on the wide range of beneficiaries, under the plan, the Court expressed concerns of over-inclusivity. Because minority groups could benefit who had not been shown to have suffered past discrimination in the Richmond construction industry, the Court expressed misgivings about the "remedial" nature of the challenged program.¹⁸⁴ The Court elaborated: "Under Richmond's scheme, a successful black, Hispanic, or Oriental entrepreneur from anywhere in the country enjoys an absolute preference over other citizens based solely on their race. We think it obvious that such a program is not narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of prior discrimination."¹⁸⁵ Implicit in the Court's concern is the perceived benefit that minority contractors will disproportionately gain over white contractors. Despite the fact that minority contracts were less than 1 percent for all of the minority groups combined for the preceding five-year period and that blacks made up 50 percent of Richmond's residents, the Court argued that excluding white contractors from competition for a set percentage of contracts without specific evidence of past discrimination placed what the Court viewed as an unacceptable burden on white contractors limited to the remaining 70 percent of contracts.¹⁸⁶ The Court makes clear in the case that a program that distributes burdens and benefits based on race does not meet strict scrutiny requirements unless the racial benefits correspond to specific racial

180. *Id.* at 478-79.

181. *Id.* at 489.

182. *Id.* at 507.

183. *Id.* To the majority, the Richmond City Council's support of the plan seems to have represented racial politics. *Id.* at 493, 495-96. The opinion conspicuously notes that blacks held five of nine council seats and that it passed by a vote of 6 to 2 with one councilman abstaining. *Id.* at 481, 495-96. Defending the heightened scrutiny applied, the majority writes "a law that favors Blacks over Whites would be suspect if it were enacted by a predominantly Black legislature[.]" *Id.* (quoting John Hart Ely, *The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination*, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 739 n.58 (1974)).

184. *Id.* at 506.

185. *Id.* at 508.

186. *Id.* at 479-80, 508-10.

discrimination identified in the record.¹⁸⁷ The burden of this obligation rests upon the government to justify its use of racial classifications.¹⁸⁸

V. REPARATIONS PROPOSALS REVIEWED

The Article considers four types of reparations programs in this part: social transformation, as proposed by Maxine Burkett and Alfred Brophy (bottom up programs),¹⁸⁹ community/institution building (trust based programs),¹⁹⁰ opportunity based (financial support programs),¹⁹¹ and individual compensation.¹⁹²

A. *Social Transformation Based Reparations*

Social transformation programs focus on an American vision that addresses the longstanding challenges of race and class subordination. Advocates of this approach have not typically specified how such a reparations program would function.¹⁹³ However, a commitment to poverty elimination and racial justice

187. *Id.* at 552.

188. *Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1*, 551 U.S. 701, 783 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

189. See generally ERIC YAMAMOTO, *INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA* 210-35 (1999); Alfred L. Brophy, *Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery*, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497 (2003); Maxine Burkett, *Reconciliation and Non-Repetition: A New Paradigm for African-American Reparations*, 86 OR. L. REV. 99 (2007).

190. See generally BROOKS, *ATONEMENT*, *supra* note 7; Carlton Waterhouse, *Avoiding Another Step in a Series of Unfortunate Legal Events: A Consideration of Black Life Under American Law From 1619 to 1972 and a Challenge to Prevailing Notions of Legally Based Reparations*, 26 B. C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 207 (2006); Robert Westley, *Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?*, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 429 (1998); Manning Marable, *In Defense of Black Reparations – Part Two of Two*, THE FREE PRESS, Oct. 9, 2002, <http://www.freepress.org/columns/display/4/2002/485>.

191. RANDALL ROBINSON, *THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS* 244-45 (2000); Charles Ogletree Jr., *Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in America*, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 307 (2003).

192. See ALFRED L. BROPHY, *REPARATIONS*, *supra* note 4, at 173-75; see also James R. Hackney Jr., *Ideological Conflict, African American Reparations, Tort Causation and the Case for Social Welfare Transformation*, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1193 (2004) (discussing the relationship between reparations plans and political ideology).

193. See generally ERIC YAMAMOTO, *INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA* (2000); Maxine Burkett, *Reconciliation and Non-Repetition: A New Paradigm for African-American Reparations*, 86 OR. L. REV. 99 (2007); Brophy, *supra* note 5, at 501-25; see also Robin D.G. Kelly, *A Day of Reckoning*, in *REDRESS FOR HISTORICAL INJUSTICES IN THE UNITED STATES: ON REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY, JIM CROW, AND THEIR LEGACIES* 218 (Michael Martin & Marilyn Yaquinto eds., 2007).

represent common themes.¹⁹⁴ Likely, programs under this approach would arguably include more robust government programs to fund college education on the basis of financial need, increased funding for education at the primary and secondary level, a commitment to a living wage, and universal health care.¹⁹⁵ Depending on how social transformation programs are structured, they may completely avoid significant constitutional analysis receiving only a rational basis review.¹⁹⁶ Programs based on financial criteria do not implicate equal protection concerns and will only be examined for their rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.¹⁹⁷ However, Brophy and Burkett suggest some racial component to these programs as well.¹⁹⁸ If some program beneficiaries qualify for funding or other government benefit based on race rather than financial need, then the program will require strict scrutiny analysis under *Adarand v. Peña*.¹⁹⁹ In that case, the government provided benefits for disadvantaged businesses—allowing race to serve as a presumption of disadvantage.²⁰⁰ While the Court did not decide the case itself, it did hold that the congressional program was subject to strict scrutiny, overturning *Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC* and remanding the case to the lower court.²⁰¹

A multiracial reparations agenda focused on social transformation that provides benefits to disadvantaged whites as well as African Americans and other racial minorities will have to be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest.²⁰² The Court's first question for such a program would be whether the government had demonstrated a compelling interest in the program.²⁰³ In that respect, the Court would look to some findings by the Congress or a state legislature to support the program.²⁰⁴ It is not clear what social transformation advocates would envision as the likely basis of such programs, but if they look to the history of racial discrimination against minority groups, they may point to findings of specific government mistreatment of racial minorities or even use statistical evidence of disparity in particular aspects of society to support special benefits. With adequate evidence, the Court may

194. See Brophy, *supra* note 5, at 555.

195. See *id.*; Burkett, *supra* note 189, at 156.

196. *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.*, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).

197. *Id.*

198. See Brophy, *supra* note 5, at 555; Burkett, *supra* note 189, at 156.

199. See BROPHY, REPARATIONS, *supra* note 4, at 159.

200. *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña*, 515 U.S. 200, 205-06 (1995).

201. *Id.* at 233-39; see *Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC*, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).

202. *Adarand*, 515 U.S. 200.

203. *Id.* at 237-38.

204. *City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. 469, 504-06 (1989).

find a compelling government interest to use racial classification to remedy past discrimination.²⁰⁵

Nonetheless, two challenges come to mind under this approach. If slavery, race discrimination, and poverty are equally included in the bases of social transformation programs, then the motivation of the programs seems disjointed. Would the federal or state governments place slavery, Jim Crow, and other forms of racial discrimination, along with poverty as coequal reasons for the program? The inclusion of poverty as a general category on a non-racial basis arguably contradicts a motivation to remedy past discrimination, especially since the largest group of beneficiaries would likely be white. Additionally, the simultaneous extension of benefits to disadvantaged whites, slave descendants, and members of other racial groups does not immediately suggest a common nexus. Even if the Court found a compelling interest to remedy the effects of slavery and acts of governmental discrimination, contemporary disadvantage experienced by whites and even the past racial discrimination against other racial minorities seem attenuated from that motivation. The Court's decision in *Croson* makes clear that findings need to support programs under a strict scrutiny analysis.²⁰⁶ The nature of findings that would unify the government's interest in remedying past racial discrimination, slavery and contemporary disadvantage for whites is difficult to envision. Basing the program on past racial discrimination by government actors or identified social discrimination in an industry or area would allow for a multiracial legislative program to remedy past discrimination. This would fall short, however, of the social transformation vision of reparations, which requires that class and racial issues be addressed through such programs.

The Court's strict scrutiny analysis also requires that government action using racial classifications be narrowly tailored. Social transformation based reparations intentionally seek the broadest base of recipients possible both to address the significant class and racial injustices extant in society and to promote a broad political spectrum. Narrowly tailoring such programs to remedy past discrimination, however, may prove as difficult as establishing a compelling governmental interest for their creation. To the degree that reparations for social transformation provide benefits to a cross-racial group of individuals who are united by their current race or class-based disadvantage rather than past discrimination, such programs seem outside of the Court's definition. In *Croson*, the Court expressed particular dismay over the city's inclusion of

205. *United States v. Paradise*, 480 U.S. 149, 166-67 (1987).

206. *J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. at 505.

Alaskan Aleuts and other racial minorities in the Richmond plan without any identified or likely history of past discrimination in the city.²⁰⁷ Social transformation programs that lump disadvantaged whites, African Americans, and other racial minorities together will risk the same concerns.²⁰⁸ A program based on disadvantage irrespective of race would fare much better under the Court's searching analysis, as it looks specifically to race-neutral alternatives available to serve the asserted governmental interest.²⁰⁹ In the alternative, a program that benefited an assortment of racial groups who suffered identified past discrimination by government or other actors would fall more squarely within the Court's requirements for program constraints closely tied to remedial goals.²¹⁰ Social transformation programs that intend to remedy past discrimination while also addressing poverty or class disparity on a non-racial basis will likely run afoul of the Court's view of the Equal Protection Clause requirements. However, the same programs may fare differently if presented on the basis of diversity.

Federal or state government programs benefiting individuals based on a desire to promote diversity in education, business, or otherwise fit more readily into the Court's equal protection requirements. In *Grutter*, the Court recognized attaining diversity in higher education as a compelling governmental interest.²¹¹ Following the Court's approach in *Grutter*, state legislatures could work in conjunction with state universities to develop the type of reparations program envisioned by those seeking social transformation through revised admissions criteria.²¹² These types of programs could broaden access to higher education through admissions decisions as well as scholarship and low interest loan and loan forgiveness programs. In the educational sphere, *Grutter* would seem to allow diversity-based reparations programs that would benefit underrepresented racial minorities as well as disadvantaged white students.²¹³ Any proposed programs would nonetheless have to meet the Court's requirement that they be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest.²¹⁴ Public colleges and universities, the state legislatures, or both would need to provide a basis for implementation of the proposed program through findings like those of the University of Michigan Law School that the failure

207. *Id.* at 506.

208. *Id.*

209. *Id.* at 507.

210. *See id.* at 508.

211. *Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306, 307 (2003).

212. *See id.* at 340-41.

213. *See id.*

214. *See id.* at 326.

to consider race would significantly decrease the number of underrepresented racial minorities attending the state schools.²¹⁵ Like the University of Michigan program, schools and the legislature will have to show that race represents one of many factors considered by decisionmakers.²¹⁶ To support such a showing, program administrators may need to demonstrate that white disadvantaged students are admitted over some underrepresented racial minorities as with the University of Michigan program.²¹⁷ Additionally, program implementation can strive for flexible targets to reach a critical mass of students, but not rigid goals.²¹⁸ Racial balancing has been resoundingly and repeatedly rejected by the Court as a basis for racial classifications.²¹⁹ Program designers will have to convincingly demonstrate a commitment to diversity on a wide range of criteria, rather than racial balancing.²²⁰

While school admissions programs can readily follow the University of Michigan Law School model, the applicability of the Michigan model to scholarship or loan-related programs was not addressed by the Court. Scholarship funds limited to students based on diversity would seem permissible under *Grutter* as long as diversity was defined in the broad terms applied to admissions.²²¹ Federal or state legislators seeking to make funds available to students from disadvantaged racial groups, along with other students, in order to help promote diversity in higher education could potentially do so under *Grutter* by making funds available to a wide range of students across racial groups. Through the use of criteria that ensures fund distribution well beyond racial identity, a diversity based social transformation reparations program could make significant strides toward increased college attendance and graduation in society.

Beyond education, the Court also addressed the issue of diversity in *Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC*.²²² Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Court found that a program to allow distress sales to minority media firms served an important governmental interest.²²³ The dissent by Justice O'Connor took issue with the standard applied

215. Failure to tailor the program to the context and history at a particular school may open up a challenge.

216. *Grutter*, 539 U.S. at 334.

217. *See id.* at 338.

218. *See id.* at 334.

219. *See id.* at 329-30.

220. *See id.* at 338.

221. *See id.*

222. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).

223. *Id.* at 566.

and the conclusion reached by the Court.²²⁴ With regards to the use of racial classifications she maintained:

In both the challenged policies, the [FCC] provides benefits to some members of our society and denies benefits to others based on race or ethnicity. Except in the narrowest of circumstances, the Constitution bars such racial classifications as a denial to particular individuals, of any race or ethnicity, of "the equal protection of the laws." The dangers of such classifications are clear. They endorse race-based reasoning and the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict.²²⁵

However, the dissent also contended that modern equal protection jurisprudence had only recognized remedying the effects of past racial discrimination as sufficient warrant for the governmental use of racial classifications.²²⁶ Despite O'Connor's rejection of this limited approach to equal protection in her majority opinion in *Grutter*,²²⁷ it is unknown whether a majority of the current Court would recognize a compelling state interest in achieving diversity beyond the educational sphere; it seems unlikely. While a program limited to the disadvantaged as measured by neutral criteria irrespective of race would satisfy the Court's concerns, race-neutral criteria used to aid the most disadvantaged of the society would fail to qualify as reparations in the eyes of many.

Yet, the Court's recognition of a compelling state interest other than the remediation of the effects of past racial discrimination in *Grutter* may suggest a comparable extension to various aspects of the society where racial minorities are substantially underrepresented. A reparations program focused on social transformation and modeled closely on the approach taken by the University of Michigan would have the best chance of surviving a constitutional challenge. Those sponsoring and defending such a program would have to meet two significant hurdles. If the program's intent is diversity, then some criteria or preexisting mechanism will be needed to ensure that non-racially disadvantaged persons participate.²²⁸ In *Grutter*, one admissions process served to determine who would be admitted.²²⁹ Diversity represented only one among multiple criteria.²³⁰ A reparations program following the *Grutter* model would have to distribute benefits to a range of beneficiaries and not just the racially

224. See *id.* at 602-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

225. *Id.* at 603 (citations omitted).

226. See *id.* at 613-14.

227. *Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).

228. See *id.* at 338-39.

229. See *id.* at 315-16.

230. See *id.* at 337.

disadvantaged.²³¹ This may correlate with the social transformation approach to reparations. Curiously, as described above, the program resembles the statutory provisions at issue in *Adarand* though the basis in *Adarand* was remediation rather than diversity.²³² Nonetheless, the Court never determined if the program was sufficiently constrained to meet strict scrutiny—remanding the case for factual determination—so it remains unclear whether the current Court would allow such a program on remedial, much less, diversity grounds.²³³ In light of the Court's rejection of the diversity rationale in *Metro Broadcasting* as racial balancing, and the plurality's recent inveigh against diversity as a rationale in secondary and primary education in *Parents Involved*, a reparations program that allocates contracting or other commercial opportunities based on racial identity in order to promote diversity arguably falls well outside of the Court's view of constitutional programs.²³⁴ As described, this program would be presumptively unconstitutional.

To pass constitutional muster, a diversity program in the commercial sphere should employ race-neutral criteria favoring persons from disadvantaged backgrounds irrespective of race.²³⁵ If race was replaced by economic disadvantage as qualifying criteria, the program would redistribute social benefits to the disadvantaged of the society as desired by social transformation advocates. Racial diversity, however, may significantly decrease among beneficiaries. One likely result would be diminished or possibly negligible representation of African Americans among beneficiaries.²³⁶ Such an outcome would still work toward social transformation but would strain the program's relationship to its ostensible motivation—America's history of slavery and Jim Crow discrimination against

231. *Id.* at 338.

232. *See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña*, 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995).

233. *See id.* at 237.

234. Higher education has unique features which may be used to explain the *Grutter* decision that are absent from the commercial sphere. *See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1*, 551 U.S. 701, 724 (2007).

235. To conform to the requirements of *Grutter*, broad diversity including race, class, gender, geography, etc., would need to be combined with some "neutral" criteria to evaluate candidates. For contract preferences such as those at issue in *Adarand* or special purchase options like those at issue in *Metro Broadcasting*, the Court would have to decide if market participants who do not qualify for the program should have to bear the burden of racial classifications as a criteria used in administering the program. To qualify under *Grutter*, the program would arguably have to expand a group of participants qualifying on nonracial criteria to include a more diverse group of participants. A state legislature or the United States Congress could develop a program to support diversity in government contracting; it is unclear whether the Court would extend the *Grutter* rationale beyond the educational sphere.

236. Competition with the large numbers of economically disadvantaged whites and Latinos along with other candidates makes this very likely.

blacks—to dissolution. In effect, under such a program the question for advocates may become whether racial diversity or a Rawlsian vision of distributive justice rests at the core of the approach.²³⁷

B. *Community/Institution Building Reparations Programs*

Roy L. Brooks and Robert Westley represent chief advocates of community/institution building reparations programs.²³⁸ Each has argued for a reparations program for African Americans using a trust fund to build up black communities.²³⁹ For Brooks, Westley, and others, community-building reparations focus on investments into black communities that improve the educational, economic, and other opportunities that community members have available to them.²⁴⁰ Through community development programs, supporters seek to remedy economic, educational, and other forms of racial disparity facing African Americans.²⁴¹ These disparities can be traced back to Jim Crow segregation, if not slavery, in the view of most commentators discussing African American reparations; trust funds represent a way to redress economic, educational, and other harms at the community level rather than the individual level.²⁴²

Brooks and Westley each propose a governmental disbursement to a nongovernmental trust fund that would be used for community development—improving the quality of schools and supporting the development of black businesses.²⁴³ Although this format avoids the traditional equal protection challenges raised when governments show preference to individuals in college admissions or government contracting opportunities, the distribution of government monetary resources to a trust that discriminates based on race could raise equal protection concerns. Whether such a program violates the Equal Protection Clause would depend upon the details of the program itself and the trust. In this section, I consider how a race-neutral program and a race-specific program would fare when viewed as quasi-governmental organizations.

A race-neutral reparations trust fund would operate to further community development without establishing racial preferences for

237. See JOHN RAWLS, *A THEORY OF JUSTICE* (Harvard Univ. Press 1973) (1971).

238. See generally BROOKS, *ATONEMENT* *supra* note 7; Westley, *supra* note 5. The author has also proposed institution building reparations in previous works. See Waterhouse, *supra* note 11, at 207.

239. BROOKS, *ATONEMENT*, *supra* note 7, at 159-62; Westley, *supra* note 5, at 470.

240. BROOKS, *ATONEMENT*, *supra* note 7, at 159-62; Westley, *supra* note 5, at 468-70.

241. BROOKS, *ATONEMENT*, *supra* note 7, at 159-62; Westley, *supra* note 5, at 468-70.

242. BROOKS, *ATONEMENT*, *supra* note 7, at 159-63; Westley, *supra* note 5, at 470.

243. BROOKS, *ATONEMENT*, *supra* note 7, at 159-62; Westley, *supra* note 5, at 470.

carrying out its activities. The NAACP provides one of many examples of organizations committed to equality for all Americans that is multiracial and nondiscriminatory in its approach to its mission.²⁴⁴ The organization, which began as a multiracial coalition, continues this approach today. Its employment policy, below, reflects its commitment to nondiscrimination:

This policy states NAACP's position on discrimination. This policy applies to all NAACP employees, volunteers, members, clients, and contractors.

The NAACP does not discriminate on the basis of race, creed, color, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender expression, age, height, weight, physical or mental ability, veteran status, military obligations, and marital status.

This policy also applies to internal promotions, training, opportunities for advancement, terminations, outside vendors, organization members and customers, service clients, use of contractors and consultants, and dealings with the general public.²⁴⁵

Because of its mission, the organization's services and advocacy focus upon the needs of racial minorities, but its approach to doing so rejects racial exclusion and discrimination. A reparations trust following the same approach could avoid equal protection concerns even if considered a quasi-governmental entity. If the fund focused upon correcting educational, economic, and political disparities between African Americans and other groups without discriminating in its hiring and contracting, it could provide a range of services and benefits to African American communities to enhance the quality of education, employment opportunities, and political representation available to community residents without violating the principles of the Equal Protection Clause.²⁴⁶

Arguably, challenges to these types of programs would need to show that the organization discriminated in its membership or that employment practices excluded community residents from benefits based on their race to violate the Equal Protection Clause. A focus

244. See NAACP, Our Mission, <http://www.naacp.org/about/mission/index.htm> (last visited Nov. 13, 2009) ("The vision of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is to ensure a society in which all individuals have equal rights and there is no racial hatred or racial discrimination.").

245. NAACP, Employment at the NAACP, <http://www.naacp.org/about/jobs/index.htm> (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).

246. See *United States v. Fordice*, 505 U.S. 717, 748-49 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[I]t hardly follows that a State cannot operate a diverse assortment of institutions – including historically black institutions – open to all on a race-neutral basis, but with established traditions and programs that might disproportionately appeal to one race or another.").

upon aiding particular communities' needs—in this case communities disadvantaged by America's legacy of slavery and segregation—should not trigger equal protection concerns even if the fund was a quasi-governmental body subject to equal protection under the state action doctrine.²⁴⁷ Aid to public and private community schools through funding, volunteer service, or equipment donation by a reparations trust fund would keep within safe distance from equal protection concerns. Likewise, nonpartisan political education programs, activities, events, and community organizing open to all community members regardless of race should not trigger Fourteenth or Fifth Amendment constitutional concerns. Economic based programs could pose a more significant issue, but not necessarily. Low interest business loans, management consultation, business and marketing plan assistance, as well as micro-loan services made available to local businesses employing community residents and creating management or career development opportunities for local residents could be provided on a non-racial basis. All of the above programs ostensibly fit within community building programs advocated as a means of reparations.²⁴⁸ Through a focus upon community membership rather than the racial identity of program participants, one or more trust funds established to support these programs would comply with Equal Protection Clause requirements under the state action doctrine. If challenged, a trust sponsoring these programs should only be subject to a rational basis review even if held to constitute state action.²⁴⁹ Accordingly, these programs are presumptively constitutional. Race specific community building/institutional development programs do not as readily avoid equal protection concerns.

Race specific trust funded programs and activities would presumably limit benefits to self-identified African Americans. Utilizing the fund mechanisms proposed by Brooks and Westley, a race specific community building reparations program might invest resources in schools, businesses, and organizations that limit participation, membership, and support based on race. Consider, for example, a trust based business development program that provides for black businesses that discriminate based on racial identity in

247. See *Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis*, 407 U.S. 163, 172-73 (1972). *But see Greenya v. George Washington Univ.*, 512 F.2d 556, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding that a lesser degree of governmental involvement may constitute state action with respect to racial discrimination).

248. BROOKS, ATONEMENT, *supra* note 7, at 159-63; Westley, *supra* note 5, at 437, 468-70.

249. See *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.*, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (finding that courts should give state action more deference if economic legislation is being challenged).

hiring. Such a program funded through federal or state grants could be considered a quasi-governmental entity subject to equal protection requirements under the state action doctrine. In the same way, educational funds made available by a trust for schools and possibly school programs exclusively available to African Americans would be subject to a strict scrutiny analysis by the Court under the state action doctrine.

To satisfy the Court's requirements, programs would have to be narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling governmental interest. The first prong of the Court's examination will be to decide whether a compelling state interest exists for the proposed programs. In the above examples, if the Congress and state legislatures made specific legislative findings of past governmental discrimination and the need for the challenged programs to remedy those actions then the Court would likely find that a compelling state interest exists to establish the programs. In *City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.*, the Court repeatedly emphasized the lack of sufficient findings to justify the city's minority set-aside program.²⁵⁰ Race specific community building reparations programs like those discussed above should still meet the first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis if supported with adequate findings.

The second prong of strict scrutiny analysis for race specific community building programs requires that government actors narrowly tailor programs employing racial classifications or other race based criteria for participation or qualification. This branch of the analysis would prove the most difficult for programs to satisfy. At this stage, the Court looks to race-neutral alternatives, the flexibility of program qualification criteria, and the impact of programs on non-beneficiaries. While specific program details would decide the final fate of proposed reparations programs, we can ascertain the likely fate of the two race specific community building program discussed above. A reparations trust based business development program providing services to African American businesses that limit employment to African Americans would face a difficult evaluation if required to meet strict scrutiny under the state action doctrine. Rigid hiring requirements for program beneficiaries that would deny employment opportunities based exclusively on racial identity seem far from the narrow tailoring favored by the Court. Programs with such predetermined restrictions for hiring lack the flexibility and the racial neutrality favored by the Court. Moreover, racial discrimination dictates in hiring would likely be seen as adversely impacting non-beneficiaries by denying qualified persons participation irrespective of their abilities or interest to

250. 488 U.S. 469, 502-06 (1989).

further the goals of the business. In a similar fashion, an educational program that funded the creation or operation of a school that openly discriminated based on students' racial identity would not seem to meet the Court's narrow tailoring requirement. The rigid racial admission requirement along with the failure to use a racially neutral approach to provide educational resources to African American students would likely doom such a program. To overcome the Court's bias against such governmental activities, strong evidence would certainly be necessary to show that remedying past governmental discrimination against blacks required racially exclusive admissions and jobs programs as a means of providing particular educational and employment opportunities. Making the required showing to support programs of this type would be extremely difficult, but not necessarily impossible. Accordingly, these examples and similar race specific community building reparations programs that restrict participation, membership, or admissions to African Americans would be presumptively unconstitutional if found to constitute state action.

C. *Individual Support Based Reparations Programs*

Trust fund proposals for reparations include college tuition, health care coverage, and business support for African Americans.²⁵¹ These proposals would make eligibility based on racial identity.²⁵² In the event that trust funds designated for these purposes originated from the federal and/or state governments, then a challenge to the operation of such trusts as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause would be highly likely. While the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue directly, lower courts have held that state action is more readily found when racial discrimination is involved; this lowers the threshold required for sustaining such a challenge.²⁵³ A government funded trust that limits funding to African Americans may be required to comply with strict scrutiny under the Court's equal protection jurisprudence.

Brooks proposes an atonement trust fund that would be limited to African Americans born during a set period of time.²⁵⁴ The fund could then be used by or for beneficiaries to pay for educational expenses, or to provide investment or business start up resources.²⁵⁵ Under the proposal, the fund would last for a limited period of years and would be maintained by the federal government and operated by

251. BROOKS, ATONEMENT, *supra* note 7, at 156-57 (discussing the possible features of trust fund reparations); *see* Westley, *supra* note 5, at 468-70.

252. Westley, *supra* note 5, at 468-70.

253. *Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis*, 407 U.S. 163, 172-73 (1972).

254. BROOKS, ATONEMENT, *supra* note 7, at 159-60.

255. *Id.* at 161-63.

commissioners.²⁵⁶ Because of the federal involvement, Brooks' proposal seems squarely within the state action doctrine. Upon challenge, it would have to meet the Court's strict scrutiny requirements.²⁵⁷

Race-specific programs like Brooks' would have to be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.²⁵⁸ The federal and state governments' interest in remedying past discrimination has been found to be compelling by the Court.²⁵⁹ Under strict scrutiny, however, the Court looks at programs on a case-by-case basis to assess whether a compelling state interest supports the specific program at issue.²⁶⁰ Brooks' proposal to make funds available to blacks for education and investment follows the remedial model followed by the Court in past affirmative action cases.²⁶¹ In these cases, the Court repeatedly upheld remedial programs that provided remedies prospectively through promotion or hiring programs that benefitted members of the racial group formerly discriminated against.²⁶² Brooks' program provides a comparable prospective benefit to African Americans. Under the proposed program, however, the Court would have to determine whether a compelling state interest existed for the federal or particular state government to implement the proposed program based on its past slavery and segregation practices.²⁶³ I suggest that the Court's decision would depend on the particular findings and approach taken by the legislatures involved.

A race based reparations program founded generally on America's history of slavery and Jim Crow segregation will likely fail to meet the Court's requirements. The Court has repeatedly rejected societal discrimination as the basis of remediation. Reparations based on specific findings of federal or state government based racial discrimination, however, should be treated differently by the Court. Particular findings made by legislatures that identify past discriminatory government practices that current legislative bodies seek to remedy warrant greater consideration by the Court. Consistent with the Court's ruling in *United States v. Paradise*, state governments as well as the federal government may employ remedies

256. *Id.* at 161.

257. *See supra* Part IV.

258. *See* BROOKS, ATONEMENT, *supra* note 7, at 159-60.

259. *United States v. Paradise*, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987).

260. *See id.* at 166-67 (holding affirmative action remedy in creating a twenty-five percent African American police force narrowly tailored to a compelling state purpose).

261. *See id.*

262. *See id.* at 166 (citing *Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC*, 478 U.S. 412, 480 (1986); *Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.*, 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986)).

263. *See supra* Part IV.

for past discrimination that provide prospective remedies on the basis of race.²⁶⁴ Brooks' proposal falls readily within those parameters as long as it is based on specific government findings regarding past governmental discrimination; allegations and facts regarding general societal history fail to satisfy the Court's requirements.²⁶⁵

Because of the vast time period covered under claims for slavery and segregation, legislative findings need to connect past racial discrimination during slavery with governmental practices of discrimination during the Jim Crow Era and beyond.²⁶⁶ Today, findings that show a continued pattern of racial discrimination into the twenty-first century would stand the best chance of satisfying the Court. Factual findings that show an institution's support of slavery and other acts of government discrimination prior to the Thirteenth Amendment combined with findings of racial discrimination by the same actors prior to the passage of civil rights legislation of the 1960s would meaningfully connect governmental discrimination against blacks during the Antebellum period with governmental practices of racial discrimination against blacks in the more recent period.²⁶⁷ Findings of governmental racial discrimination predating the 1960s civil rights legislation may nonetheless be criticized as too attenuated from the present to support a compelling governmental interest in any proposed remedy.²⁶⁸ Such a claim, however, would run afoul of legislative power to address historic events through contemporary legislation. Moreover, the large number of surviving African Americans who lived through the period of government discrimination suggests continued legislative authority and a compelling interest to offer remediation for the harms done to them.²⁶⁹ The Civil Liberties Act of 1988 employs a similar logic—providing remediation directly to surviving internees or their immediate families.²⁷⁰

Even if the Court finds a compelling state interest exists for direct race based reparations, to meet constitutional scrutiny it will have to be narrowly tailored.²⁷¹ “[T]he efficacy of alternative

264. *Paradise*, 480 U.S. at 185-86.

265. *See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989).

266. *See id.*

267. *Cf. id.*

268. *But see Paradise*, 480 U.S. at 167 (finding that four decades of exclusion of blacks from the Alabama Department of Public Safety “unquestionably” provided “a compelling interest in remedying past and present discrimination”). The dissent agreed with this. *Id.* at 196 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

269. *Cf. Paradise*, 480 U.S. at 170.

270. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1989b – b-8 (2006).

271. *See supra* Part IV.

remedies; the flexibility and duration of the relief” provided; and “the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties” all represent factors used by the Court to make this determination.²⁷² Brooks’ proposal includes educational and financial counseling for beneficiaries of an “atonement trust fund” to assist them in choosing schools and in using funds for business investments.²⁷³ As described, the program allows considerable flexibility, which is preferred by the Court over rigid quotas or dictates used to achieve racial balancing.²⁷⁴ The program also includes a sunset provision to bring it to a close.²⁷⁵ This mechanism limits the program to a discrete time period consistent with the Court’s concerns that race-based governmental action be narrowly constrained.²⁷⁶ Perhaps, the biggest hurdle that race-based support programs face is the Court’s preference for race-neutral alternative remedies.²⁷⁷ However, because such programs avoid one of the Court’s central concerns under this analysis—the burden placed on third parties—the Court should offset some of the weight of this and other factors. I consider the balance between these two factors below.

A constitutional assessment of programs like Brooks’ Atonement Fund will arguably depend on the balance between these two factors. Affirmative action programs rejected by the Court, under its strict scrutiny analysis, juxtapose beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in a competitive bid for employment or educational opportunities.²⁷⁸ Given a competitive process, the Court has viewed affirmative action programs as providing a preferential advantage to persons seeking state or federal opportunities based on race.²⁷⁹ Unlike those programs that impermissibly include race in determining which applicants will succeed in an ostensibly merit based contest—burdening non-beneficiaries in governmental efforts to remedy past discrimination—financial support-based reparations programs make resources available at no cost to individual non-beneficiaries.²⁸⁰ The absence of such burdens on non-beneficiaries greatly reduces the arguable harm caused by support based reparations programs and the corresponding threshold the Court should use in determining

272. *Paradise*, 480 U.S. at 171.

273. BROOKS, ATONEMENT, *supra* note 7, at 159-162.

274. *Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (“[A] race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system . . .”).

275. See BROOKS, ATONEMENT, *supra* note 7, at 159.

276. *E.g.*, *Grutter*, 539 U.S. at 333-39.

277. See *id.*

278. *Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. 469, 506, 508-10 (1989).

279. See *id.* at 507-510.

280. *United States v. Paradise*, 480 U.S. 149, 170-71 (1987).

their constitutionality.²⁸¹ Even so, a consideration of race-neutral alternatives remains the most vulnerable point for these programs.

To overcome this concern, legislative findings should discuss the effects of past governmental discrimination on the wealth of African Americans past and present.²⁸² Richard America and other scholars have documented the intergenerational impact of racial discrimination and slavery on the wealth of African Americans today.²⁸³ Congressional and state legislative findings that build on this research can establish the relationship between financial resources and educational and economic opportunities. A reparations program intended to enhance the financial resources of individual African Americans as a remedy for past governmental deprivations adeptly fits such legislative findings. Race-neutral alternatives to accomplish such a task seem few, considering the nature of the harm established by legislative findings.²⁸⁴ While financial support from the federal and state governments based solely on need could be viewed as a race-neutral alternative to race based reparation support programs, it would fail to redress past racial discrimination against African Americans. Wealth and educational disparity experienced by African Americans are not limited to the poor.²⁸⁵ From reconstruction to the present, African Americans have lacked the educational opportunities and financial resources of their white counterparts.²⁸⁶ Past discrimination by the federal and state governments played no small part in significantly limiting the financial resources and educational opportunities of more than five generations of African Americans.²⁸⁷

Under Brooks' proposal, the atonement fund would enhance the resources available to African Americans to secure greater economic and educational opportunities.²⁸⁸ While need based financial assistance allocated irrespective of race and America's history of discrimination would create greater opportunities for America's poor, it would not constitute reparations for slavery or segregation. In

281. *See id.* at 179-81.

282. *J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. at 506.

283. *See, e.g.*, Richard America, *The Theory of Restitution*, in REDRESS FOR HISTORICAL INJUSTICES IN THE UNITED STATES: ON REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY, JIM CROW, AND THEIR LEGACIES 160-69 (Michael T. Martin & Marilyn Yaquinto eds., 2007).

284. A means test could be included similar to that used by Brooks as criteria to qualify for business investment support. *See BROOKS, ATONEMENT*, *supra* note 7, at 159-62.

285. Westley, *supra* note 5, at 439.

286. JOE FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES AND FUTURE REPARATIONS 61-66 (2000).

287. *See id.* at 205-06.

288. BROOKS, ATONEMENT, *supra* note 7, at 159-62.

short, race-neutral financial support programs do not represent an effective alternative to remedy past governmental discrimination. In the absence of effective alternatives, the Court should find that programs like Brooks' satisfy this factor.²⁸⁹ Financial support-based reparations programs for slavery and segregation consistent with the foregoing description are likely constitutional, as they should survive the Court's strict scrutiny analysis.

D. *Individual Compensation Based Reparations*

The final reparations program type this Article examines is the individual compensation model. The most straightforward approach to reparations and the most well known is a simple compensation plan. Many international and domestic reparations plans utilize individual compensation as part of a more comprehensive program; it rarely represents an exclusive means of reparations.²⁹⁰ Few commentators endorse individual compensation *per se* as reparations for America's history of slavery and segregation. Nonetheless, it represents one of the options before federal and state legislators seeking to redress the historic mistreatment of African Americans.

Mechanisms for individual compensation vary. Annual payments to beneficiaries, a one-time payout, and tax credits all represent means of distributing individual compensation. Ogletree and Westley each contemplate some form of means testing as a prerequisite for qualifying for individual compensation, thereby limiting the beneficiaries of the program.²⁹¹ The most basic scheme, however, would be a one-time cash payment to persons meeting program qualifications.²⁹² Most commentators limit qualifications to individuals claiming an enslaved African ancestor.²⁹³ This issue, however, requires much greater consideration for reparations that redress the 100 year history of Jim Crow segregation. African Americans without enslaved ancestors who lived in the United States through the Jim Crow Era clearly suffered the effects of

289. See *Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003) ("Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative . . .") (citing *Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.*, 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986)).

290. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, *Japan Pays Some Women from War Brothels, but Many Refuse*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1996, at A11; Eric K. Yamamoto, *Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American Claims*, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477, 483-84 (1998).

291. Brooks also includes means testing as a precondition for business investment support from the atonement fund. BROOKS, ATONEMENT, *supra* note 7, at 159-162.

292. See Robert S. Browne, *The Economic Basis For Reparations to Black America* (1993), in REDRESS FOR HISTORICAL INJUSTICES IN THE UNITED STATES: ON REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY, JIM CROW, AND THEIR LEGACIES 238, 247 (Michael T. Martin & Marilyn Yaquinto eds., 2007).

293. See *id.* at 238-48.

governmental race discrimination in employment, education, and loan financing.²⁹⁴ Their exclusion from a reparations program designed to remedy that same discrimination as well as harms caused by governmental involvement in slavery seems improper. More scholarly attention to this question is certainly required. For purposes of this Article, however, I consider the constitutionality of three possible compensation programs that draw beneficiaries from three distinct groups: the black descendants of enslaved African Americans, blacks who immigrated to America, and the non-black descendants of enslaved Africans in America.

A race-neutral individual compensation program could allow participation by any citizens with one or more enslaved African ancestors in the United States.²⁹⁵ Under this type of program, persons who identify themselves as white, Asian, Hispanic, etc., could all participate with African Americans in an individual compensation program. On a race-neutral basis, beneficiaries would receive a one-time payout of some legislatively determined amount as compensation or a symbolic gesture of the government's intention to make amends for past discrimination. This type of program avoids equal protection concerns. It distributes government benefits irrespective of race and avoids the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny analysis.²⁹⁶ Because this program would exclude the descendants of black immigrants who suffered government discrimination in Antebellum America and their descendants who lived through a century of segregation, it fails to redress a great deal of governmental discrimination experienced by blacks. In contrast, it would provide compensation to whites and others who avoided such mistreatment. While free from equal protection concerns, this program would ignore a large group of beneficiaries; making it under-inclusive of blacks bearing the brunt of Jim Crow discrimination and over-inclusive of members of other groups who may have suffered few of the economic and educational harms that befell their black counterparts. Nonetheless, it is a presumptively constitutional reparations program for slavery, although it fails to address Jim Crow Era discrimination.

I consider two more compensation programs that differ based on the status of black immigrants as potential beneficiaries. The first would be made up of descendants of enslaved African Americans who racially identify themselves as black or African American.²⁹⁷ The

294. FEAGIN, *supra* note 286, at 25-27, 76.

295. See generally David Lyons, *Reparations and Equal Opportunity*, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 177 (3004) (discussing a series of race-neutral social welfare programs that could take the place of reparations specifically targeted to blacks).

296. Bittker & Brooks, *supra* note 4, at 374, 381-83.

297. Arguably, this can be shown through any formal representations within the

second would combine features of the first program with the features of the race-neutral program discussed above. Under it, persons who racially identify themselves as black or African American could qualify in either of two ways: as descendants of enslaved African Americans or as persons who can establish familial residence before 1934²⁹⁸—twenty or more years before the *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* decision.²⁹⁹ Because the equal protection analysis for both race-based programs is substantially similar, I consider them together.

As discussed above, satisfying strict scrutiny begins with a consideration of the government's interest in establishing a compensation program.³⁰⁰ Legislative findings of past governmental discrimination represent an essential element of any reparations program subject to an equal protection analysis.³⁰¹ To support either of the race specific compensation programs above, the Congress and state legislatures should make findings identifying past discriminatory practices of the government and their long term effects on African Americans.³⁰² The reparations program should then be identified as redress or a remedy for those past practices. Legislators may model the compensation on the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which provided a \$20,000 payout to Japanese internees and their immediate families.³⁰³ This approach was upheld by the federal courts in *Jacobs v. Barr*.³⁰⁴ In that case, the Court held that the federal government had a compelling interest in remedying its past mistreatment of Japanese internees based on past racial prejudice.³⁰⁵ Federal and state government support of slave labor and discrimination against blacks in education and employment opportunities—not to mention access to health care and political participation—provides a comparable basis for individual compensation. The Court has repeatedly affirmed the appropriateness of government efforts to remedy specific acts of past

previous five or more years identifying themselves as African American or black.

298. An alternative framework could be twenty years prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The earlier time period is favored because it reflects a historical bias toward the earlier and more constrained period of segregation. The twenty-year time period is intended to establish a complete generation experience of racial discrimination.

299. *Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

300. See *supra* text accompanying Part IV.

301. *United States v. Paradise*, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987); *Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. 469, 505-06 (1989).

302. See *Paradise*, 480 U.S. at 166-67; *J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. at 505-06.

303. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1989b – b-8 (2006).

304. See 959 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

305. *Id.* at 321.

discrimination.³⁰⁶ If buttressed by robust legislative findings, as described above in the analysis of financial support based programs, the Court should find that a compelling governmental interest exists for race-based compensation programs for the victims of past governmental discrimination. Showing that a race-based compensation program is narrowly tailored presents a greater challenge.³⁰⁷

Tailoring a reparations program in a way that limits beneficiaries based on race certainly raises equal protection concerns under the Court's jurisprudence.³⁰⁸ It does not, however, necessitate a fatal finding.³⁰⁹ The Court will examine the burden of the program on non-beneficiaries and the efficacy of race-neutral alternatives along with its flexibility and duration. The limitation of certain persons from a class of beneficiaries based on race may still meet the Court's requirements.

A compensation program for the descendants of the enslaved exclusively available to African Americans would limit beneficiaries based on race in a way that would implicate a strict scrutiny analysis by the Court. A program available to descendants of the enslaved regardless of their racial identity should not implicate strict scrutiny analysis.³¹⁰ This program's focus upon descendants of the enslaved who also experienced governmental discrimination during the Jim Crow Era, ties two historic eras together and requires that beneficiaries have a connection to both types of injustice in order to qualify. Arguably, the program would not arbitrarily exclude non-black slave descendants since black immigrants who may have experienced Jim Crow Era segregation would also fall outside the category of beneficiaries. A legislative record establishing Antebellum and Jim Crow Era governmental race discrimination and the lingering effects on African American descendants of the enslaved could potentially support such a constrained program.

As above, the proposed program does not burden non-beneficiaries. The program neither harms nor limits the opportunities of non-beneficiaries to compete in American society.

306. *Paradise*, 480 U.S. at 166-67; *J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. at 505-06.

307. See *supra* text accompanying Part IV.

308. *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña*, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995).

309. *Id.* at 237.

310. See BROPY, REPARATIONS, *supra* note 4, for a discussion on how the Court in *Geduldig v. Aiello*, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) found that pregnancy and gender were not equivalent. Likewise, in *Personnel Administrator v. Feeney*, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), the Court found that the fact that most veterans were men did not mean that veteran preferences were discriminatory against women. The high incidence of enslaved ancestors among African Americans should not make remedial programs for the descendants of the enslaved a racial classification.

Race-neutral alternatives arguably fail to address the unique harm suffered by program beneficiaries who represent a subset of blacks in the United States. Because the program excludes some blacks, however, the Court should view the program as narrowly constrained to meet legislative interests in providing redress to African Americans facing the effects of centuries of past discrimination against their forebearers.

Race-based exclusions should be viewed as an appropriate legislative effort to target a particular harm for remediation rather than constitutionally impermissible racial discrimination.³¹¹ Judicial review of the next program, including black immigrants as beneficiaries may be viewed less favorably by the Court. The availability of reparations to black immigrants along with the descendants of the enslaved may disrupt the nexus of harm that would support reparations for blacks financially affected by government discrimination over the course of two centuries. Justification for the second program may necessitate findings that indicate that slavery and segregation each warrant redress.³¹² Legislatures could stagger the financial award to distinguish persons affected by either slavery, segregation, or both. This mechanism may demonstrate to the Court the legislative interest in basing awards on the likely effects of past discriminatory practices on program beneficiaries. While the program would still not burden non-beneficiaries, the Court may find that effective race-neutral alternatives were not considered.³¹³ This factor alone should not end the analysis, but weighs against a constitutional finding for the second race specific program.

By providing a single award, both programs clearly meet the Court's preference for a limited duration for race specific programs.³¹⁴ In contrast, they include little flexibility in their beneficiaries or operation. Despite the rigid structures, the programs still display characteristics of a narrowly tailored program that should be upheld by the Court.³¹⁵ Each contains the same rigid structure as the Civil Liberties Act of 1988.³¹⁶ When considered in conjunction with the lack of harm the programs cause to non-beneficiaries and their requirement that beneficiaries be connected to past governmental discrimination, both programs have the potential to be upheld.³¹⁷ Because it constrains program beneficiaries more narrowly, the first

311. *Paradise*, 480 U.S. at 166-67.

312. *See id.*

313. *See* *Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989).

314. *Paradise*, 480 U.S. at 171, 178.

315. *See supra* text accompanying Part IV.

316. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1989b – b-8 (2006).

317. *See* *Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003).

program is better poised to survive the Court's analysis and is likely constitutional. The second program may likewise be upheld if legislative findings support the two different categories of beneficiaries. Absent such findings, the program is likely unconstitutional as the Court may not be satisfied that the program was sufficiently constrained to satisfy the demands of the Equal Protection Clause.³¹⁸ A staggered approach differentiating the awards to black immigrants affected by governmental discrimination from those to descendants of the enslaved may demonstrate to the Court a sufficiently constrained mechanism for remedying the effects of past governmental discrimination.

VI. CONCLUSION

Reparations programs that avoid governmental disruption of the educational and economic/commercial spheres of society will avoid the Court's oft expressed concerns with ongoing hiring, promotion, admissions, and contracting decisions that take account of race. A reparations program that focuses more narrowly on victims of past governmental discrimination, however, may not comport with the goals of some reparations commentators who envision reparations as a reformation of the American polis. A more modest program focused on the victims of federal and state racial discrimination will, however, remedy decades of racial discrimination against blacks. In that regard, a basic financial award to victims of governmental discrimination in employment, housing, political participation, and education may best fit the Court's equal protection demands. Money represents a fungible resource that approximates the educational, economic, and political losses of this diverse group. While I personally disfavor this approach, it may be the most politically feasible and legally defensible under Court jurisprudence. Nothing, however, would prevent such a program from allowing beneficiaries to direct their payments into a trust fund made available to the descendants of beneficiaries for their use. As an example of this, consider a reparations program for all military personnel who served in the segregated armed services. Congress could readily investigate and find that the military discriminated against blacks in benefits, salary, opportunities, promotions, health care, and assignments. As reparations, Congress would then provide a financial payment to these servicemen to remedy and recognize the wrongs inflicted upon them and the resulting harms. Such a program could be narrowly tailored to go directly to surviving servicemen or their surviving dependents. This program would be narrowly tailored and represent a compelling state interest held by Congress to remedy past

318. See *supra* text accompanying Part IV.

discrimination.
