CROWDSOURCED STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISIONS CAN REVIVE OUR DEMOCRACY

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INTRODUCTION

There is a consensus of opinion that something is wrong in this Commonwealth; that the many of the people are not prosperous, that the many of the people are not enjoying their lives and have not the liberties as it was intended. If you say that this Constitution was intended to enable them to enjoy life, then you admit that the several departments have not accomplished it. It necessarily must follow that you have got to change in some way some form of this government in order to change these conditions.¹

The same concern that animated delegates such as Gerry Brown, a delegate to the 1917 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, and delegates to later Progressive Era state constitutional conventions exists today, if not to an even larger extent. Just as that generation of constitution-makers speculated “that contemporary institutions were ill-suited to meet the current problems of governance,”² many today doubt that our democratic institutions are up for the tasks at hand.³ Back then, constitutional conventions helped “reconstitute[] republican institutions on an appropriate foundation.”⁴ Today, no such foundational reforms are on the table. It is time to launch a new generation of constitution-makers.

Modern democracies have been tested by a slew of wicked problems. Among other issues, climate change, disinformation, and globalization have sparked a wave of constitutional revisions around the world.⁵ States

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³. See discussion infra Section II.
⁴. Dinan, supra note 2, at 944.
in the United States have missed that wave. No state has held a state constitutional convention since New Hampshire in 1984. It has been even longer since voters approved the recommendations of a state constitutional convention—last occurring in Louisiana in 1974. Efforts to serially amend horse-and-buggy era documents by affixing tailpipes, a GPS, and other modern creations to these outdated legal vehicles have only rendered state constitutions more convoluted, rather than more responsive to modern problems.

Numerous countries have used new participatory tools to improve the functionality and legitimacy of their constitutions via constitutional conventions. Such countries have experimented with tools that allowed for “participatory, partially citizen-led processes [with] intent on revitalizing politics [to be] at the heart of the [process].” Applied to revision efforts in U.S. states, these tools will at once improve the quality of the revised state constitution and increase the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the public. Participatory tools accomplish the latter goal through two means: first, by introducing additional and varied stakeholders into the democratic process; and, second, by giving all stakeholders a meaningful opportunity to contribute to these processes.

Constitution-making in Iceland and Ireland serve as case studies for how these tools can apply to revision efforts. U.S. states should study these international examples, in addition to lessons learned from older domestic efforts at revision, before launching their own revision efforts through a constitutional convention.


10. Id. at 252.


13. See id. at 252.
Residents of and constitutional reformers in Rhode Island, Michigan, Connecticut, Illinois, and Iowa should be the first in line to study these new approaches. Voters in these states will have the chance to vote in upcoming years on their respective state’s scheduled automatic ballot referral for a constitutional convention. The eight other states that have an automatic referral of the same question should also be on notice. By starting their review of the means to carry out a constitutional convention, these voters can better weigh the merits of voting affirmatively.

State constitutions will continue to fall short of their important role in the U.S. democratic system absent revision. Some constitutions can only be defined as primitive, having been created in the nineteenth century and only amended since then. Some are littered with legislative pronouncements ill-suited for a constitution. Other barriers have also reduced the role of state constitutions in their respective state democratic systems.

This paper seeks to pave the way for a single state to use participatory tools in an effort to revise their constitution via a constitutional convention. Just as the successes (and failures) in places like Iceland sparked a number of other democracies to experiment with participatory tools in substantive democratic processes, one state going through this transformative process could inspire several others to pursue their own version of such revision.

Another aim of this paper is to outline ways to democratize constitution-making. Prior to the widespread use of the printing press, only the likes of Thomas Jefferson, who had a private library, could easily access constitutions from other jurisdictions to assess the caliber of his state’s own constitution. As the publication of multiple constitutions in compilations became possible, constitution-making—“no matter in what

15. Id.
16. See id.
humble or remote circumstance [a] convention might meet”—became a more democratic activity. The democratic nature of constitution-making has ceased in modern times. As of 2019, just one in four Americans knew the number of amendments to the U.S. Constitution. It is likely that their knowledge of the contents of their state constitution was even lower. In fact, a Johns Hopkins University survey disclosed that half of Americans do not know whether their state has a constitution.

This paper contains four areas of analysis related to the revival of democratizing constitution-making. The first is an overview of the importance of state constitutions and their revision. The second briefly reviews the history of state constitutional revision. The third outlines the participatory tools used abroad, especially in Iceland and Ireland. The fourth discusses other important factors to the success of a revision effort.

I. THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS

The value of state constitutions to their respective jurisdictions comes from their content as well as the processes through which they are created and revised. State constitutions have a specific role in our democratic well-being. First, they fill in gaps left by the Federal Constitution as to how state governments ought to make use of the governmental powers not delegated to the federal government. The omissions of the Federal Constitution also create space for state constitutions to establish novel rights for their respective states. Second, state constitutions advance state-level norms and ideals. They are supposed to reflect “the fundamental values, and ultimately the character, of the people of the state that adopted it.” Third, state constitutions empower residents to exercise their democratic powers.

21. Id.
26. See id. at 1331 (detailing unique provisions of state constitutions, such as prohibitions on expenditures for sectarian purposes, not included in the Bill of Rights).
27. Gardner, supra note 8, at 764, 815–16 (stating that the content of a constitution is meant to “reflect some of the most essential and intimate aspects of the character of the people who adopted it”).
They are meant to be “the means by which the people communicate to their agents[,] the scope of authority that may be wielded [on] the people’s behalf,”28 as well as “a direct act of the sovereign people themselves.”29 Yet, contemporary state constitutions no longer represent the “set of values to which [the living generation has] bound ourselves.”30 Instead, the values in state constitutions reflect the values of bygone drafters and the consent of bygone ratifiers. This disconnect represents a nearly severed tether between the people and a core aspect of their democracy. The longer this disconnect lasts, the more people may come to question the legitimacy of their government—worsening the effects of the wicked problems outlined in the Introduction.

The process through which constitutions are created and revised informs the extent to which residents feel like “popular sovereigns.”31 The evolution of constitution-making solidified the idea that “popular sovereignty required that constitutions be written by a popularly selected convention, rather than the legislature, and then ratified through a process that elicited popular consent—ideally, in a referendum.”32 State constitutional change though, has increasingly not come about through such processes.33 Those baseline thresholds for sovereignty—a drafting body that is distinct from the legislature, and a ratification process that can actually elicit consent from across society—have been absent in recent decades.34 The task for modern constitutional efforts is to remind people of their role as sovereigns and to ensure that the procedural mechanisms recognize them as such.

II. A History of State Constitutional Revision


28. Id. at 814.
29. Id.
30. Contra id. at 815.
31. Id. at 814.
34. See id. at 574.
35. Friedmann, supra note 19, at 35.
36. See id.
Since then, state constitutions have been in a prolonged coma, only twitching as amendments continued to get piled on.\textsuperscript{37} In recent times, constitution-making has ceased to be a regular activity. Only two states—Georgia and Rhode Island—have adopted a new constitution in the last forty years.\textsuperscript{38} There’s also been a decades-long drought in providing the public with one of the best means for constitution-making: a convention. Between 1961 and 1970, there were eight conventions; between 1971 and 1980, there were seven conventions; and since 1980, there has been one convention.\textsuperscript{39} The use of constitutional commissions has also been decreasing: thirty-two different commissions were active between 1965 and 1969; nine were active between 1975 and 1981; and just three were active between 1990 and 1991.\textsuperscript{40} Amendments are now the chief means of constitutional-tinkering. This is problematic. The processes for ratifying amendments suffers from serious democratic deficits by way of leaving many of “We the People” on the sidelines.\textsuperscript{41}

At the opposite end of the timeline, Revolution-Era Americans deeply involved themselves in the processes and content, both in the Federal Constitution as well as the constitutions of their respective states.\textsuperscript{42} Earlier generations of Americans had a greater understanding of constitutions and the capacity to debate constitutions based on primary sources.\textsuperscript{43} Interest in constitutions was so strong and widespread that there was actually a market for publishers of constitution compilations to create versions suitable for “statesman and . . . the citizens at large.”\textsuperscript{44} Even when the act of constitution-making was completed, the public was expected to consult the constitution compilation on a frequent basis.\textsuperscript{45}

Constitution-makers and members of the public took pride in their constitution.\textsuperscript{46} Newspapers reported on how their respective state’s constitution was informing other constitution-making efforts.\textsuperscript{47} No

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{37} See id.
\textsuperscript{39} See Marshfield, supra note 6, at 146.
\textsuperscript{40} See Gais & Benjamin, supra note 18, at 1303.
\textsuperscript{41} See Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account: Toward a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1641 (2010) (“T[he principal mechanism by which states now update their constitutions is the amendment process.”).
\textsuperscript{42} See Baum & Fritz, supra note 20, at 200.
\textsuperscript{43} See id. at 205, 213–14.
\textsuperscript{44} Id. at 214.
\textsuperscript{45} See id. at 213–14 (detailing the public’s involvement in constitutional matters in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
\textsuperscript{46} See id. at 201–02.
\textsuperscript{47} See id. at 214.
\end{footnotesize}
comparable coverage occurs today. Gone are the days when state constitutionalism even came close to rivaling federal constitutionalism as a sort of civil religion. Even as far back as 1988, when many Americans could still recall a time in which their state constitutions underwent revision, Friedman labeled the public as “quite ignorant” about state constitutions and found “little evidence that they revere [them].” As of 2017, Henrik Dullea went so far as to claim that, with respect to the State of New York’s Constitution, “most people aren’t aware of its existence,” including the thousands of public employees in the state that swear to uphold that document as a condition of their employment. Constitution-making has become the sole domain of the “[p]olitical scientists, legal scholars, and politicians” called on when states undertake serious reviews of their constitutions.

Changes to state constitutions helped the country solidify and build on definitions of good governance. In the mid-nineteenth century, constitution-makers responded to corrupt state legislatures by instituting new checks on legislators, such as term limits. At the turn of the twentieth century, constitution-makers shifted their focus to the corruption associated with big corporations, banks, and railroads. Another wave of change to constitutions occurred when the public recognized the importance of conserving resources and the natural landscape. Though disruptions to America’s economy, political culture, and societal norms have not ceased, conventions have become politically impossible.

A. The Role of Conventions

Constitutional conventions have “the potential [to] increas[e] citizen attention and interest in politics, governmental problems, and possible

48.  See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
49.  See Friedman, supra note 19, at 36; see also Baum & Fritz, supra note 20, at 213.
50.  Friedman, supra note 19, at 36; see also Marshfield, supra note 6, at 146.
52.  See Hammons, supra note 25, at 1327–28 (noting that California, New York, Florida, and Texas enlisted the aid of these professions during their own constitutional review in the late 1990s).
53.  See Friedman, supra note 19, at 37.
54.  See id. at 38.
55.  See id.
solutions.”57 This process also carries the potential to restore faith in democracy by “developing a true public dialogue and debate process.”58 Throughout U.S. history, states realized the power of conventions by hosting them on a relatively frequent basis. New York, by way of example, hosted conventions in 1821, 1846, 1867, 1894, 1915, 1938, and 1967.59 The eras in which New York and others opted to host conventions are not random. After wars, after recessions, and after depressions, New Yorkers and others realized the importance of updating their state constitutions to respond to new problems.60

As constitutions have become frozen, with the exception of amendments aligned with the interests of a small faction or powerful interest, they have stopped advancing individual rights to the extent originally envisioned and have failed to respond to major changes to our political, economic, and cultural realities. The distribution of power seems to have settled in a way that diminishes “We the People.” That distribution can and should be altered by constitutional conventions that rely on participatory tools.

B. The Decline in State Constitutional Quality

Evaluation of the standard metrics for constitutional quality reinforces the notion that state constitutions could be improved by conventions. Constitution quality can be measured in a variety of ways. Key indicators are democraticity, rights-heaviness, and responsiveness.61 Secondary considerations include aspects such as durability, which are byproducts of the key indicators. Numerous scholars have their own mix of indicators. Robert F. Williams assesses the suitability and adaptability of a state constitution for the task of governing a state.62 Donald Lutz regards a constitution as a form of political technology designed to foster a stronger democracy.63 Hélène Landemore acknowledges that constitutions are often reviewed for their interpretability and usefulness.64 Finally, Ann Lousin stresses the need for state constitutions

57. Permaloff, supra note 7, at 229.
58. See id.
59. Marshfield, supra note 6, at 146.
60. See id. (documenting that Illinois held conventions in years soon after major events, such as in 1847, 1869, 1920, 1969). Maryland similarly held a convention immediately following the Civil War, during Reconstruction, and in the late 1960s. Id.
62. Williams, supra note 33, at 553–54.
63. See Lutz, supra note 32, at 363.
64. Landemore, supra note 61, at 195.
that have a system of checks and balances, that provide as much transparency as possible, and that avoid infringing the privacy rights of individuals.\(^{65}\)

The proffered indicators of quality seem to hinge around either the ability of the constitution to create a working government or its ability to foster democratic legitimacy within the public. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Landemore takes her assessment of the democraticity of a constitution one step further by reviewing not just the final constitution (or the proposed one), but also the means for the creation of that constitution.\(^{66}\) She cites the theory that “the more participatory a constitutional process is, the more rights and mechanisms for popular participation it should include,” as a justification for reviewing the participatory nature of the drafting process as a test of its quality.\(^{67}\)

By any of the aforementioned measures, analysts such as James Gardner regard state constitutions as lacking in quality. Gardner’s survey of state constitutional law revealed a “vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and essentially unintelligible pronouncements.”\(^{68}\) A myriad of issues with state constitutions explains how Gardner could reach such a damning conclusion, and why their functional capacity has decreased, especially in recent decades.

1. State Constitutions Have Too Many Amendments

State constitutions have had their functional capacity limited by excessive and occasionally conflicting amendments. Michael G. Colantuono clearly articulated the difference between amendments and revisions:

The term “amendment” typically refers to changes to one or a few provisions, usually related to a single subject. The term “revision,” on the other hand, refers to more pervasive changes, ranging from the drafting of an entirely new document to changes that alter multiple provisions and touch upon multiple subjects.\(^{69}\)

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65. Lousin, supra note 17, at 604.
66. See generally Landemore, supra note 61.
67. Id. at 191–92.
68. Gardner, supra note 8, at 763.
Scholars disagree on whether amendments improve or diminish the quality of state constitutions.\textsuperscript{70} The merit of amendments centers on the characteristics of those amendments, many of which tend to amount to superlegislation. One line of thinking holds that “superlegislation”—meaning provisions that, despite lacking “constitutional flavor” because “they are no different in quality or type from ordinary laws,” have been given constitutional status as a result of some political maneuvering—contributes to constitutional instability.\textsuperscript{71} Special interests behind these provisions diminish the quality of the constitution by freezing their policy preference at a certain moment into a document that is meant to lay out frameworks independent of policy cycles.\textsuperscript{72} Superlegislation receiving the same treatment as constitutional principles may also reduce the “transcendent value” of the document and diminish its ability to “inspire and maintain a social consensus.”\textsuperscript{73} It follows that many constitutional experts consider these provisions “extraneous” and have determined that they rapidly become outdated.\textsuperscript{74}

Too many amendments, superlegislation or not, is also problematic. Deliberate and comprehensive revision is preferable to amendments that, at best, may offer some, but insufficient progress, and at worst, may conflict and reduce the coherence and functionality of the constitution.\textsuperscript{75} The likelihood of the latter is increased when, as is often the case, a ballot includes several different initiatives.\textsuperscript{76} When that is true, the interrelationship between those initiatives often goes undiscussed.\textsuperscript{77} Some states try to limit bombarding the electorate with too many amendments on a single ballot.\textsuperscript{78} Yet, even in Arkansas, where the limit is three per ballot, those three amendments could still saddle the constitution with conflicting messages.\textsuperscript{79} Absent deliberate and comprehensive revision, states will continue to see stress build on their

\textsuperscript{70} Compare Lutz, supra note 32, at 365 (“The higher the formal amendment rate, (a) the less likely that the constitution is being viewed as a higher law, (b) the less likely that a distinction is being drawn between constitutional matters and normal legislation, (c) the more likely that the document is being viewed as a code, and (d) the more likely that the formal amendment process is dominated by the legislature.”), with Williams, supra note 33, at 554–56 (describing the difficulty in striking the balance of effectiveness of amendments).

\textsuperscript{71} See Friedman, supra note 19, at 36.

\textsuperscript{72} See id. at 36–37.

\textsuperscript{73} Colantuono, supra note 69, at 1510.

\textsuperscript{74} Hammons, supra note 25, at 1333; William E. Scheuerman, Constitutionalism in an Age of Speed, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 365 (2002).

\textsuperscript{75} See Gais & Benjamin, supra note 18, at 1292.

\textsuperscript{76} See id. at 1302–03.

\textsuperscript{77} Id.

\textsuperscript{78} See Permaloff, supra note 7, at 223.

\textsuperscript{79} See id.
institutional structures—which have stood since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and are ill-suited for new circumstances.\textsuperscript{80}

That stress is already weighing on many state constitutions. Most constitutions have more than one hundred constitutional amendments.\textsuperscript{81} The “specificity” and “silliness” of some of these amendments fails to advance key indicators of constitutional quality and to imbue the document with a sense of democratic legitimacy.\textsuperscript{82} Too many amendments may trivialize the state constitution and hinder its ability to articulate “fundamental rather than positive law.”\textsuperscript{83}

2. State Constitutions Are Out of Date

“Most present state constitutions were written to provide the legal foundation of government for a far simpler society than that in which we live . . .[,] and] most state constitutions have failed to keep pace with the times,” according to legal scholar Albert Sturm, writing in 1970.\textsuperscript{84} The fact that “two-thirds of all states have constitutions that are more than a hundred years old”\textsuperscript{85} helps illustrate how far behind state constitutions have fallen. The importance of “keeping pace with the times” stems from the need for a government to solve contemporary problems and, through those solutions, instill a continued sense of legitimacy among the people.\textsuperscript{86} Written constitutions embody the results of prospective lawmaking and constitution-makers from decades, if not centuries, ago, and therefore could not reasonably have been expected to foresee current technological, social, and economic trends.\textsuperscript{87} For many states, the conditions of the present no longer fall even remotely close to the future settings considered by the constitution-makers of their current documents.\textsuperscript{88}

Would-be constitution-makers are increasingly unable to anticipate changes in the technological, social, and economic realities of future generations, let alone design a constitution capable of guiding government efforts to respond to those changes. Constitutions are more

\textsuperscript{80} Gais & Benjamin, \textit{supra} note 18, at 1292.
\textsuperscript{81} Devins, \textit{supra} note 41, at 1641.
\textsuperscript{82} Id. at 1642–43 (flagging his own disagreement with this notion).
\textsuperscript{85} Devins, \textit{supra} note 41, at 1641.
\textsuperscript{86} STURM, \textit{supra} note 84, at 1–2.
\textsuperscript{87} See Scheuerman, \textit{supra} note 74, at 361–62.
\textsuperscript{88} See id. at 363.
likely than ever to become “out of date” at an increasingly faster rate.\(^89\) That is why states must adopt more regular and deliberative processes for constitutional change. By scheduling out periods of revision and specifying the robust mechanisms for public participation, states can reduce the time lag between the drafting of a constitution and the changes it is meant to address.\(^90\)

3. State Constitutions Fail to Manifest Local Values

State constitutions should serve as expressions of the values and priorities of the state’s residents. It is debatable whether state constitutions have ever fulfilled that aspiration and if they ever can. Still, it is a worthy aspiration because the pursuit of a state-specific constitution will force political actors and the public alike to think critically about what makes their state unique, and to what extent those unique features should be protected by their constitution.

State constitutions will likely always share some aspects in common. Almost no one thinks that constitutional convention delegates can “go to work and build a Constitution out of [their] heads, out of [their] own inner consciences.”\(^91\) That’s why even constitution-makers in “frontier” states—like Texas—relied on constitutions from other states to compile their own documents.\(^92\) Because no constitution is formed in a vacuum, they often contain similarities—arguably too many. The perhaps excessive overlap between state constitutions is especially likely when comparing constitutions written or revised during the same time period.\(^93\) State constitutions also tend to have similar provisions because they all have to respond to similar problems.\(^94\) An examination of the fifty state constitutions by Frank P. Grad disclosed so little variation between the documents, that a review of the documents in isolation may lead someone to think that states are fungible.\(^95\)

For some scholars of constitutional law, these similarities reduce the merits of studying state constitutions as expressions of the political

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89. See id.

90. See id. (specifying that constitutions must do more than allow for “a modicum of flexibility” for future generations to adapt the document to social change).

91. See Baum & Fritz, supra note 20, at 220.

92. See Devins, supra note 41, at 1643–44.

93. See id. at 1644.

cultures of their state. Others, such as Daniel Elazar and Amy Bridges, feel comfortable clumping state constitutions into regional groups. This duo of constitutional scholars each reviewed early constitutional reforms by region, and discovered that regions tended to adopt specific reforms based on their shared characteristics. In the West, for example, the states commonly reacted to their “dependence on outsiders for resources and [their] distance, political as well as geographic, from the resources the territories needed.” Elazar’s analysis of state constitutions detected six types of state constitutions—loosely based primarily on region, and secondarily on constitutional era. Even those who may accept that at one time states had unique political cultures—perhaps interwoven into their constitution—they might challenge whether a modern revision of that constitution would result in anything unique. As a result of the nationalization of politics, globalization of our economy, and atomization of the individual, some argue that state-identity does not play a meaningful role in how individuals perceive their democratic selves.

Though many state constitutions look alike today, a nuanced look at shared provisions reveals idiosyncrasies and, therefore, hope that state constitutions can manifest local values. One source of variation comes from the fact that the adoption of these shared provisions usually occurs at different rates based on the political culture of that state. For instance, though many states have provisions for direct democracy, the inclusion of initiative and referendum provisions took place in two different waves. Whether a state joined the first or second wave, or

96. See Dinan, supra note 2, at 937 (“[T]he predominant view has been that states have not undertaken many significant institutional innovations.”).
97. See Amy Bridges, Managing the Periphery in the Gilded Age: Writing Constitutions for the Western States, 22 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 32, 57 (2008); Daniel J. Elazar, The Principles and Traditions Underlying State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIS 11, 18–22 (1982).
98. See Bridges, supra note 97, at 57; Elazar, supra note 97, at 18–22.
99. Bridges, supra note 97, at 57.
100. See Elazar, supra note 97, at 18–22 (outlining six different categories of state constitutions, including (1) commonwealth, (2) commercial republic, (3) Southern contractual, (4) civil code, (5) frame of government, and (6) managerial).
101. See Lee Drutman, America Has Local Political Institutions and Nationalized Politics. This is a Problem, VOX: POLYARCHY (May 31, 2018), https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2018/5/31/17406590/local-national-political-institutions-polarization-federalism (“The nationalization of politics reflects a broad cultural transformation since midcentury, in which Americans have become far more attached to their national identities than their place-based identities.”). But cf. Emily Pears & Emily Sydnor, The Correlates and Characteristics of American State Identity, 51 PUBLIS 173, 195 (2022) (“Our work shows that . . . Americans still identify with their states, despite narratives of political nationalization, and that Americans’ state identifies drive their trust in state governments.”).
102. See Devins, supra note 41, at 1643–44.
103. Id. at 1643–44, 1643–44 n.73.
missed the swell entirely, gives some sense of that state’s political appetite for major change. In the resulting Venn diagram of which states share some aspects but not others, the distinctness of each starts to emerge.

The differences in these groups can also indicate the unique characteristics of states. As mentioned above, some changes tend to occur by region. The West, for instance, has a higher concentration of direct democracy provisions than elsewhere. Others can be grouped by historical moment, adopting provisions common to the era in which they adopted their original constitution or revised it. New England states, for example, tend to share much in common with the Federal Constitution because of their shared creation periods. The fact that these common bunches do not perfectly overlap with one another, evidences that space exists for each state to have a constitution that contains a unique combination of shared and distinct provisions.

States continue to show signs of their idiosyncratic state constitutions by how these documents are interpreted by their respective state’s legal community. The idiosyncratic means of applying state constitutions stands out even in this age of nationalized politics, global economics, and interstate mobility—all factors that would suggest that states no longer have distinct identities. Action and inaction with respect to a state’s constitution can indicate features of that state’s political culture. For instance, Schlam believes that change to the Illinois State Constitution has occurred relatively infrequently because of the local political culture, which he describes as “disunified, individualistic, and often factious.”

The distinctiveness of state constitutional systems receives too little attention even when news related to state constitutions receives national

104. Id.
105. Id. at 1652.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1653; see also Lawrence Schlam, State Constitutional Amending, Independent Interpretation, and Political Culture: A Case Study in Constitutional Stagnation, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 269, 276 n.15 (1994) (citing several articles noting the similarities between constitutions crafted in similar temporal windows).
108. See Devins, supra note 41, at 1653.
109. Compare Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 SW. L.J. 951, 966 (1982) (“[D]ifferences in our state constitutions are not accidents of draftsmanship . . . [but rather] reflect differences in our tradition.”), with Elazar, supra note 97, at 18–22 (identifying six types of constitutions that may mark the finest level of distinction that can be drawn between states).
110. See Schlam, supra note 107, at 271.
111. Id.
attention, according to Neal Devins.\footnote{112}{See Devins, supra note 41, at 1632.} In the rush to nationalize everything, the “distinctive political, historical, and cultural moments” behind state constitution news goes under covered.\footnote{113}{Id.} This under coverage is hard to justify because “state supreme court decision-making increasingly defines the meaning of constitutional rights throughout the country.”\footnote{114}{Id.}

The work by some state supreme courts to actively engage with their state constitutions in part counters the narrative above that state courts have neglected their respective constitutions. Writing in 2010, Devins argued that “[o]ver the past thirty years, state courts have eclipsed the U.S. Supreme Court in shaping the meaning of constitutional values.”\footnote{115}{Id. (identifying that, proportionally by volume, a state supreme court “now issues more opinions about state constitutional law than the U.S. Supreme Court issues decisions about federal constitutional law.”).} Gardner would disagree with that perception of state courts, having concluded that “state constitutional law [as of 1992,] is a vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and essentially unintelligible pronouncements.”\footnote{116}{Gardner, supra note 8, at 763.} Not only does Gardner think that state courts have failed to advance state constitutional law, but he also thinks they have no desire to.\footnote{117}{See id. at 804.} He theorized that “state courts by and large have little interest in creating the kind of state constitutional discourse necessary to build an independent body of state constitutional law.”\footnote{118}{Id. at 804.} Regardless of whether the reality today is closer to the interpretation of Devins or Gardner, even those who believe state courts have robustly engaged with their state’s constitution would agree that more education in the legal community around the state constitution would improve the relevance of that document and contribute to the democracy of that state.

The content of state constitutions also reveals the distinct aspects of each state’s culture and history. Two quick examples: first, California’s constitution guarantees an interpreter to residents who do not speak English when charged with a crime;\footnote{119}{CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14 (“A person unable to understand English who is charged with a crime has a right to an interpreter throughout the proceedings.”).} second, the Washington State Constitution specifies rights for crime victims.\footnote{120}{WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35 (granting “basic and fundamental rights” to crime victims “[t]o ensure victims a meaningful role in the criminal justice system and to accord them due dignity and respect”).} A state constitutional convention could further bring out the latent characteristics within each
state that make that place a unique political environment. This potential reflects the fact that a revision would dare the public and members of the political elite to paint very state-specific visions of the future.

The demographics of political elites in each state reinforces the idea that state constitutionalism reflects homegrown values. As of 2000, nearly two out of every three state supreme court justices were born in the state in which they serve. If the California State Legislature is indicative (and it should be, given the high number of people that move to the state), then the majority of state legislators are also from the state in which they serve. By virtue of being from the states they represent, these officials likely know the values and norms of voters and officials, as well as the current nuances of the state’s political climate. And although many people continue to move to new states, the vast majority of Americans stay put in their state in any given year, which suggests that members of a political community also immerse themselves in a state’s political culture. This means voters are capable of looking for officials that align with the unique political norms of that state.

States can still form unique political communities and constitutions capable of expressing the values of these communities. The likelihood of state constitutions representing core community values will only increase if states revise their constitutions through conventions informed by participatory tools.

4. State Constitutional Change by Other Means Lacks Democratic Vetting

Constitutional change by way of initiative or judicial interpretation lacks a core feature of any process to change a constitution: deliberation.

121. See Devins, supra note 41, at 1668–71.
123. See Elizabeth Castillo et al., Interactive: How Diverse Is the California Legislature?, CALMATTERS (Feb. 16, 2022), https://calmatters.org/politics/california-legislature/2021/01/how-diverse-california-legislature/ (reporting that nearly sixty-one percent of California state legislators were born in California); see also Eric Ostermeier, Home Sweet Home: How Many U.S. Senators Serve Their Birth State?, SMART POLITICS (Jan. 5, 2015), https://smartpolitics.lib.umn.edu/2015/01/05/home-sweet-home-how-many-us-senators/ (finding that sixty-two percent of U.S. Senators over the last 100 years were a state representative in the state in which they were born).
124. See Devins, supra note 41, at 1669.
125. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MOVING IN AMERICA: U.S. MOVER RATE AT HISTORIC LOW (2016), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/visualizations/2016/comm/cb16-189_migration_graphic.pdf (indicating that the number of Americans moving in any given year has remained below twenty-five percent each year since 1948, while the percentage of people actually leaving their state is even lower).
Initiatives bring too few people into the process and carry little to no opportunities for the public to contribute to the actual text and impact of the proposed amendment.\textsuperscript{126} Constitutional alteration via judicial interpretation also presents “democratic deficits.”\textsuperscript{127} These more expeditious means of constitutional adaptation to new technological, social, and economic realities falls short of the sort of democratic mechanisms meant to accompany such significant changes. Constitutional conventions can prevent the overuse of such speedy mechanisms and produce changes less likely to raise questions of democratic legitimacy.\textsuperscript{128}

Initiatives have been overused as a means to change constitutions. Way back in 1987, Janice C. May tallied more than 8,200 amendments submitted to the voters in forty-nine states, with 5,083 adopted in those forty-nine states.\textsuperscript{129} Only a narrow slice of the population tends to participate in elections.\textsuperscript{130} And, of those that do, they are often “manipulated and befuddled by a combination of misleading [advertisements], rock videos, and texts that would baffle a Philadelphia lawyer.”\textsuperscript{131} The result is that “the outcome of a single election is less likely to provide a meaningful expression of the will of the people than the outcome of the complex textual procedures.”\textsuperscript{132} Yet, with increasing frequency, these nonrepresentative expressions fundamentally alter the character of the state’s governance, by taking on topics such as taxation and budgetary measures.\textsuperscript{133}

By treating constitutional changes like any other democratic change, initiatives also threaten to bring constitutional reform to the level of “everyday politics.”\textsuperscript{134} This demotion conflicts with the will of the U.S. framers who desired constitutional changes to take place in a higher democratic realm, namely one that ensured the resulting change carried

\textsuperscript{126} See Gais & Benjamin, supra note 18, at 1302.
\textsuperscript{127} See Scheuerman, supra note 74, at 379.
\textsuperscript{128} See id. at 370 (noting that the staunchest defenders of constitutionalism consider democratic legitimacy to be a core feature of the system).
\textsuperscript{129} Janice C. May, Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited, 17 PUBLIUS 153, 162 (1987).
\textsuperscript{130} See Gais & Benjamin, supra note 18, at 1302 (“[T]hose who do not vote on initiatives are quite different from those who do . . . in most instances people with less formal education and lower incomes are under-represented in deciding most propositions.”).
\textsuperscript{131} Friedman, supra note 19, at 39; see also Gais & Benjamin, supra note 18, at 1301 (discussing how highly emotional and symbolic appeals related to initiatives can skew the decisions of voters); Colantuono, supra note 69, at 1504–05 (discussing how ballot measure “complexity increases both the likelihood of voter noncomprehension and the potential for voter manipulation by campaign advertisers”).
\textsuperscript{132} Colantuono, supra note 69, at 1501.
\textsuperscript{133} See Gais & Benjamin, supra note 18, at 1292–94.
\textsuperscript{134} Scheuerman, supra note 74, at 371.
a heightened degree of democratic legitimacy. According to Scheuerman, a simple up and down vote on an initiative to change the constitution cannot bring about that degree of legitimacy because it will fail to adequately indicate a sufficient degree of popular consensus. More generally, “[e]xpeditious revision procedures are ill advised because they undercut deliberation and stability and denigrate state constitutional law.”

Initiatives are an improper democratic setting for the slow discourse required for quality constitutional alteration. If most voters are only truly engaged with the merits of proposed initiatives just a few weeks prior to the election, then there is not enough time to foster public discourse on these topics. This speedy process could in fact be interpreted as the sort of rapidity in mass politics that indicates the “irrationality” of the resulting decision.

Initiatives also cater to the interest of a specific minority of voters. In today’s expensive political environment, only groups with many members and a lot of money can use the initiative process to realize their goals. These groups may employ a number of anti-democratic means to get their suggested change on the ballot. For instance, they may hire out-of-state signature gatherers, rely on funds donated by out-of-state individuals and groups, and confusingly word their petition statement to disguise its true impact and origins. The upshot is that constitutional change through initiatives falls short of democratic standards that should be associated with such important alterations. Sadly, other common means of constitution change, such as judicial review, also fail to live up to these standards.

One immediate issue with robust judicial review of a constitution is the potential for the court to cross the line from mere interpretation into alteration of the document. Though the existence of formal mechanisms to amend constitutions suggests there is a line between amendment and interpretation, “the line between constitutional interpretation and alteration is hard to draw in legal praxis.” Scheuerman suggests that courts have crossed that line in their Fourth Amendment

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135. See id.
136. See id. at 371–72.
137. Colantuono, supra note 69, at 1509.
138. See id. at 1506.
139. See Scheuerman, supra note 74, at 374.
140. See Gais & Benjamin, supra note 18, at 1302.
141. See Permaloff, supra note 7, at 235.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See Scheuerman, supra note 74, at 367.
Rather than resort to slower, more deliberative means of constitutional alteration, courts have responded to technological, social, and economic changes that weigh on the Fourth Amendment by adopting new interpretations over the decades. Though the line between interpretation and alteration is hard to draw, the closer courts get to altering the constitution, the more that “democratic deficits” emerge. The “democratic deficits” associated with constitutional change via judicial action are severe enough to caution against interpretations even nearing alteration.

For one, members of state constitutional courts face varying degrees of public accountability. States with supreme court justices that are elected by the people, tend to adopt interpretations of constitutional provisions that cater to their voters and to the most influential special interests groups that voted for them. In contrast, state supreme court justices that are isolated from the people have more freedom to adopt extreme interpretations. Of the seven state supreme courts that adopted pathbreaking interpretations of their constitutions related to same-sex marriage from 1993 to 2009, none subjected their justices to contested judicial elections. This sort of unrepresentative and non-deliberative “pathbreaking” may have helped the respective state constitutions keep pace with society, but arguably conflicts with the overriding priority that constitutional alteration occurred via “broad-based, time-consuming popular deliberation.”

The case-by-case approach to constitutional change through judicial action also raises democratic concerns. As with initiatives, singular changes to a constitution, rather than thoughtful analysis of how several changes may fundamentally alter a constitution, risk reducing the functionality and therefore legitimacy of the constitution. It is also not clear that members of the judiciary have the information and expertise required to think through how best to alter the constitution in response

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145. See id. (“In a similar vein, the legal implications of a constitutional ‘right to privacy’ will probably have to be revised in the face of permanent innovation in information technology.”).
146. See id. at 368.
147. Id. at 379.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. See Devins, supra note 41, at 1665.
151. See id. at 1676–79 (“No state with contested elections has played a path-breaking role.”).
152. See id. at 1676–77.
153. See Scheuerman, supra note 74, at 375.
154. See id.
to technological, social, and economic changes.\textsuperscript{155} As Scheuerman points out, “[t]he fact that social and economic acceleration probably has helped transform constitutional courts into a kind of Constitutional Assembly in continuous session should worry us.”\textsuperscript{156}

Briefly, in comparison to initiatives passed by an unrepresentative segment of the population without sufficient means for deliberation and alterations made by judicial action, constitutional changes made by the legislature theoretically carry fewer democratic deficits. Unlike voters in initiatives, legislators can more forcefully claim to bring broad-based representation to a debate on the merits of any constitutional alteration.\textsuperscript{157} And, unlike courts, legislatures have a more deliberative and general process for considering constitutional changes.\textsuperscript{158} In practice, it is not clear that legislatures are indeed representative or reliable in the exercise of deliberative exchange.\textsuperscript{159} Absent these important factors, the legislative route to constitutional change may only add to the document’s lack of clarity and inability to adjust to new conditions.\textsuperscript{160} In particular, the lack of sufficient deliberation could result in the legislature too frequently altering the constitution and, consequently, injuring its legal constancy.\textsuperscript{161}

It is also not clear that the legislature will take on the full scope of issues with their state’s constitution. As pointed out by Gais and Benjamin, legislative members may shy away from certain fundamental changes to the constitution because those alterations could threaten their own position by, for example, devolving more power to local governments or to the people themselves.\textsuperscript{162} Absent a willingness to consider the sum of the reforms that could emerge from a convention, the legislature is not an acceptable substitute for constitutional revision.

The history of legislative amendments also suggests that “We the People” have long been skeptical of even these supposedly representative bodies having the power to make constitutional changes. Slowly but surely, “We the People” have demanded a greater role in legislative efforts to amend the constitution. Early constitutions “stipulated that

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155. Compare Devins, supra note 41, at 1668–71 (discussing justices’ capacity to make informed decisions accounting for potential backlash in their home states), with Scheuerman, supra note 74, at 376–77 (noting that courts may be better suited to update constitutional systems in accordance with social and economic realities).

156. See Scheuerman, supra note 74, at 379 (internal quotations omitted).

157. See id. at 383.

158. See id. at 381.

159. Id. at 380.

160. Id. at 382.

161. See id. at 382; see also James Bryce, Constitutions 13–22 (1901) (warning that easy legislative changes to a constitution could result in a complicated document).

162. See Gais & Benjamin, supra note 18, at 1298.
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state legislatures enjoyed sole responsibility for enacting amendments.” In those days, a state legislature could amend the constitution in a single legislative session, usually with a supermajority vote. Later, the people demanded a greater say in that process and made it so legislative changes had to receive approval from two separate sessions, in order to provide the people with a chance to vote out legislators championing the change. Still not satisfied, the next generation of “We the People” added to the consecutive legislatures requirement by subjecting that change to a popular referendum in the early nineteenth century.

The path to constitutional change must not rely on a single institution, such as a court or legislature, nor the perspectives of a narrow set of society.

III. Participatory Tools Used Abroad

The provision of more frequent and meaningful opportunities for public participation in substantive decision making can result in an increased willingness for participants to get involved again down the road. Several countries around the world have realized this pattern and used it to improve their respective constitutions. These tools have been employed in broad crowdsourcing exercises to formulate nationally-significant policies such as a new constitution in Iceland, as covered more below, and a new policy on outdoor recreation vehicles in Finland. Specifically, in the context of constitutional revision, states in the United States have missed the practice and theory of what Landemore calls “participatory constitution-making.” This new practice, as instituted in varying degrees by Iceland, Chile, Egypt, Tunisia, and Ireland, reflects

163. Dinan, supra note 2, at 975.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 975–76.
166. See id.
168. See generally HÉLÈNE LANDEMORE, OPEN DEMOCRACY: REINVENTING POPULAR RULE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY xiv–xx (2020) (noting that in the last few decades, “countless experiments in so-called democratic innovation” have proven successful across the world).
169. Id. at xx–xvi; see generally MARION GRET & YVES SINTOMER, THE PORTO ALEGRE EXPERIMENT: LEARNING LESSONS FOR BETTER DEMOCRACY (Stephen Wright trans., 2005) (discussing participatory budgeting in Brazil).
170. See Landemore, supra note 61, at 181 (describing “participatory constitution-making”—the effort to include ordinary citizens in the process of amending constitutions—as a trend toward “open government”).
how “our understanding of constitution-making has evolved to now mean having direct influence on the content and shape of the constitutional text itself, as opposed to just performatively bringing a ready-made text into existence or shaping it indirectly via elected representatives,” as summarized by Landemore in her review of the Iceland constitutional process. These constitutional revision efforts have incited “public spiritedness” and “foresight” in pursuit of establishing “popular veneration” of the document. Participatory tools and techniques produced those critical components of a strong democracy.

Participatory tools generally increase deliberation, which is foundational to constitution-making. Attributes typical of deliberative processes include: accessibility, the creation of a space for sharing in which participants have no fear of repercussions, relevance, transparency, equality of participatory opportunities, inclusivity, informed participants, and facilitation by a moderator. Some of these attributes do not readily fit into the process of constitution-making. For instance, the need for a small body of constitution-makers makes complete equality of participatory opportunities a non-starter. Similarly, not every participatory tool will work in the context of constitution-making. Participatory tools include “citizen assemblies[,] . . . citizen juries, deliberative polls[,] and participatory budgeting.”

Citizen assemblies are the typical tool applied to constitutional conventions because they “stand out [from other tools] as constituting the most extensive modern form of collective decision-making by common folk.”

In the context of constitutional conventions, citizen assemblies provide several deliberative benefits: first, they bring together “ordinary” people; second, they provide selected citizens with educational resources about the process as well as time to deliberate; and third, they rely on consensus-based decision making. Other participatory tools can be

171.  *Id.* at 179–80.
172.  *See generally* Dinan, *supra* note 2, at 933 (discussing James Madison’s warnings that constitutional conventions “would rarely achieve the same level of public spiritedness and foresight” or engender public trust as strongly as the convention of 1787).
174.  *See id.* at 15–17 (discussing value conflicts regarding equal representation, pluralism, and informed decision-making).
175.  *See* Suteu, *supra* note 9, at 258.
177.  *See* Suteu, *supra* note 9, at 258; *see also* David M. Farrell, *The 2013 Irish Constitutional Convention: A Bold Step or a Damp Squib?*, in *75 Years of the Constitution of Ireland: An Irish-Italian Dialogue* 191, 194–95 (Giuseppe Franco
used to augment the capacity of citizen assemblies to collectively decide important questions. For instance, many conveners of citizen assemblies involve experts to summarize and augment the findings of assemblies, and moderators to guide the work of the assembly.\textsuperscript{178}

The key to establishing constitutional legitimacy through participatory tools and processes hinges on moving from mere consultation of the public to active involvement, so that a sense of public ownership of the draft builds.\textsuperscript{179} More deliberative constitution-making processes can result in constitutions more likely to strengthen democracy and ensure constitutional stability—two common assessments of constitutional quality.\textsuperscript{180} These deliberative processes also assist with constitutional longevity by expanding common knowledge of the constitution, thereby creating a public attachment to and stake in the success of the constitution.\textsuperscript{181} Finally, deliberative processes can renew the public’s collective democratic spirit by providing a means to participate that goes beyond merely casting a vote in a standard election—a typical idea of what it means to democratically participate.\textsuperscript{182}

That is why twenty-first century constitution-makers have often layered their use of participatory tools. For example, rather than rely on elections that tend to reflect the will of a narrow set of voters to select delegates, convention organizers can use another participatory tool—quasi-random selection—to identify the assembly members.\textsuperscript{183} The resulting assembly is more reflective of the public and less biased by the process of having to earn election.\textsuperscript{184}

Another participatory tool is crowdsourcing, which amounts to facilitating a massive deliberative feedback exercise. Crowdsourcing involves the collection of a broad array of views from a range of members of civil society, the expression of particularly important interests, and an exchange related to those views and interests between constitution makers and the public.\textsuperscript{185} These aspects align with how the founding fathers thought about the proper process for constitutional reform: one
that guarantees a “fair hearing to a rich diversity of views.”\textsuperscript{186} Crowdsourcing in constitution-making may include soliciting real-time feedback from the public on drafts from the convention and creating means for the public to have a role in identifying the topics and values they would like the convention to prioritize, as well as the delegates that will form that convention body.

According to Silvia Suteu’s analysis of international constitutional reforms, “Iceland and Ireland are often hailed as trailblazers in marrying technology and direct democracy in their respective constitutional reform processes.”\textsuperscript{187} While neither process met the full expectations of the most ardent advocates of participatory constitutional reform,\textsuperscript{188} both reveal important lessons for states considering constitutional conventions.

The following sections review the Iceland and Ireland constitutional revision efforts to assist state constitutional convention organizers with learning about participatory tools as applied to specific aspects of revision. These aspects include the topic selection process, the level of specificity for selected topics, the means for selecting delegates, the process for reviewing drafts from the conventions, and the process of approving the final draft.

\textbf{A. Iceland as a Case Study}

Iceland implemented a number of participatory tools in their constitutional revision process. An assembly of elected laypersons drafted a constitution that addressed topics vetted by a randomly selected group of Icelanders that participated in a deliberative dialogue moderated by experts.\textsuperscript{189} The randomly-selected Icelanders formed the First National Forum—a day-long “exercise that consisted of articulating the values and priorities that should guide the renewal of government and public administration.”\textsuperscript{190} A total of 1,500 Icelanders selected from the National Population Register participated.\textsuperscript{191} Hundreds of representatives from interest groups and institutions also joined the First National Forum.\textsuperscript{192} Jointly, these Icelanders agreed on Icelandic societal values, which were then shared with and debated by the

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\item \textsuperscript{186} \textit{Id.} at 372–73.
\item \textsuperscript{187} Suteu, supra note 9, at 252.
\item \textsuperscript{188} See \textit{id.} at 253.
\item \textsuperscript{189} Landemore, supra note 61, at 187–88.
\item \textsuperscript{190} Icelandic Experiment, supra note 167, at 169.
\item \textsuperscript{191} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{192} See Suteu, supra note 9, at 261 (“The forum was made up of 1,200 randomly selected citizens and 300 representatives of interest groups and institutions[].”).
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public.\textsuperscript{193} Another forum, the Second National Forum, this time with 950 quasi-randomly selected citizens, formed to produce a report meant to guide the Iceland Constitutional Convention based on the public’s response to the First National Forum.\textsuperscript{194} Twenty-five elected delegates, none of whom were currently elected officials, operated the Convention as the Constitutional Council.\textsuperscript{195} The delegate election involved 522 candidates, thereby creating yet another opportunity for the Icelandic public to see their neighbors, colleagues, and leaders striving to become even more involved participants in the constitutional process.\textsuperscript{196}

Once the Convention got underway, the public’s role did not cease, which aligned with the country’s narrative that it was producing a crowdsourced constitution.\textsuperscript{197} Council members maintained the public’s engagement with the process by using social media platforms, a website, and a digital newsletter to inform them of their progress and solicit their input.\textsuperscript{198} More precisely, the public could comment on a “progress document” that contained the Convention’s latest work by going to the council’s website and using Facebook’s reply system.\textsuperscript{199} This feedback and engagement mechanism, among others, resulted in hundreds of proposals and thousands of comments.\textsuperscript{200} However, the Constitutional Council’s participants did not form a statistically representative group of Iceland.\textsuperscript{201} Still, the joint editing of the progress document marked a form of deliberation—albeit imperfect.

From this robust public participation, delegates advanced a number of important democratic mechanisms within the draft constitution. Such ideas included specifying a relatively low threshold—ten percent of voters—for subjecting laws passed by the Icelandic Parliament to a nationwide referendum,\textsuperscript{202} and an even lower threshold—two percent—for the public to present an issue to Parliament.\textsuperscript{203} Reviewers of the draft constitution regarded it “as one of the most inclusive in history and well-
above the mean of contemporary constitutions.”205 Iceland’s experiences make clear that a deliberative process can help a state constitution fulfill its dual purpose as a “document[] of aspiration as well as of government.”206

1. Topic Selection Process

Two processes can assist with identifying the topics on a convention’s agenda. One leans on public engagement to source the topics. The other relies on political elites, including experts, academics, and civil society, to prune potential topics into a final agenda. Both processes can have deliberative features that set the convention up for success. Which process to follow depends on the conditions in the state that led to the convention as well as the dynamic between political elites and the public.

The Icelandic process for topic selection relied on randomly selected individuals participating in the First and Second National Forums.207 The First National Forum was “a one-day exercise that consisted of articulating the values and priorities that should guide the renewal of government and public administration,”208 organized by a grassroots organization named “the Anthill.”209 A total of 1,200 quasi-randomly selected citizens joined 300 representatives of interest groups and institutions at the First National Forum.210 As an aside, quasi-random selection means randomly selecting individuals from certain demographic and geographic communities so as to produce a more representative sample of society.211 The Anthill, for example, randomly sampled the Icelandic public “with due regard to a reasonable distribution of participants across the country and an equal division between genders, to the extent possible.”212 They also considered age.213

Once the selected delegates were gathered, they separated into tables, at which moderators helped the participants zero in on their

207. See Suteu, supra note 9, at 261.
208. Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 169.
209. Id.
210. See Suteu, supra note 9, at 261.
211. See generally Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 176–79 (discussing quasi-random selection in practice by the Icelandic National Forum and Constitutional Council and its effects on representation therein).
212. Id. at 177.
213. Id.
favored values and priorities. Generally, moderators can do the important work of categorizing ideas, condensing those ideas into a digestible format for public consumption, and gathering feedback responsive to those ideas. That is the role Icelandic moderators and experts played in transmitting the knowledge collected at the First National Forum to the Second National Forum, and from the Second National Forum to the Constitutional Assembly.

The Second National Forum came about through collaboration between the Iceland Constitutional Convention—appointed by Parliament—and two organizations, Anthill and Gallup Iceland, which oversaw the selection of participants. They jointly brought together 950 randomly selected Icelanders to establish “the principal viewpoints and points of emphasis of the public concerning the organization of the country’s government and its constitution.” Experts distilled and disseminated the work of the Second National Forum via an extensive report. Importantly, the activities and discussions of the Forum were available for public viewing, though the Forum did not record how many members of the public actually made use of that transparency by, for instance, watching the proceedings.

Though this crowdsourcing may seem likely to produce too many topics capable of disrupting the country’s political norms, Convention organizers ensured popular support for the selected values through two means: first, members of the public (the randomly selected individuals) were the creators of these values and priorities; and second, members of the public at large had a chance to review the results of the First Forum because their work product was published for popular consumption. And, as mentioned, similar opportunities for public review occurred during the Second Forum as well.

The Second National Forum resulted in a meaningful report to guide Convention delegates, in part, because the Forum contained a structure designed to assist the constitutional effort. Where means for public input on topic selection have lacked guardrails imposed by moderators, those

214. See id. at 183–84 (stating that some moderation techniques foster more deliberation than others, however, the techniques used in Iceland may have stifled some deliberation by giving moderators too much time to speak themselves).
215. See Noveck, supra note 173, at 48–49.
216. See Suteu, supra note 9, at 271. Landemore, supra note 61, at 188.
217. See Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 169, 177.
219. See Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 181–82.
220. Id. at 180.
222. See Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 180.
processes have not been very productive. For example, an Estonian website designed to solicit legislative ideas from the public drew only a few quality proposals.\(^{223}\) The website contained little to no instructions on what ideas should be prioritized nor on how to structure ideas to increase the odds of legislative action.\(^{224}\) Therefore, the Estonian government ended up with “short and incomplete” proposals that often repeated untenable proposals already offered (and denied).\(^{225}\) Guidance from moderators distinguished the Iceland National Forum from Estonia’s website.

Iceland also strategically included experts in their process. The expert report that emanated from the Second National Forum was specifically meant to serve as a starting point for the Iceland Constitutional Convention.\(^{226}\) With the key values identified, the Icelandic Parliament then called for the creation of a Constitutional Council to turn these aspirations into a reality via a new Constitution.\(^{227}\) The Council was able to quickly get to work thanks to the report from the Second National Forum and general popular support for the effort.

2. Specificity of Selected Topics

The people deserve to know, with specificity, the purpose of a proposed constitutional convention.\(^{228}\) Identifying that purpose requires a “state-wide conversation” about what qualifies as a constitutional problem and forming a consensus around the qualifying issues.\(^{229}\) This conversation should be done through “[a] legitimate mechanism . . . [that is] somewhat independent of the permanent government” so as to give “normal” citizens a chance to shape the convention’s topical agenda, as well as to limit the popular skepticism that could arise if political elites determined the agenda.\(^{230}\) Gais and Benjamin argue that “[d]irect citizen control over the agenda . . . is most likely crucial in order for any constitutional procedures to be accepted as legitimate.”\(^{231}\)

Topic selection could be done by identifying values or issues. A values-based agenda will likely result in more aspirational and principles-based conversations across society. Such a broad conversation

\(^{223}\) See Noveck, supra note 173, at 52–53.
\(^{224}\) See id.
\(^{225}\) Id.
\(^{226}\) Suteu, supra note 9, at 261.
\(^{227}\) See Landemore, supra note 61, at 188.
\(^{228}\) See Louzin, supra note 17, at 607.
\(^{229}\) See id. at 607, 613 (listing “initiatives, referenda, and recall” as “truly constitutional issues”).
\(^{230}\) See Gais & Benjamin, supra note 18, at 1308.
\(^{231}\) Id. at 1309.
carries benefits and potential pitfalls. The broader conversation may make it easier to involve a diverse range of stakeholders in the convention process. However, the somewhat vague agenda could incite worry among members of the public and civil society that want certain aspects of the current constitution to remain untouched.

An issues-oriented convention offers a different set of pros and cons. The more specific agenda may put certain parts of civil society on notice, in terms of making sure they mobilize their respective communities to engage with the convention process. This limited agenda, however, may not inspire a new sense of optimism within the public that the reform will truly solve more foundational issues with their democracy.

Iceland, via the First National Forum, focused on identifying “values and priorities” to guide the renewal of the government. As discussed above, the public then reviewed these values and priorities before having the Second National Forum fine tune them for the Constitutional Assembly.

Icelandic economic and political turmoil preceding the First and Second National Forums and the Iceland Constitutional Convention help explain why they opted for a values-based agenda, rather than one zeroed-in on specific issues. The 2008 financial crash disrupted Iceland’s stability. A “pots and pans” revolution emerged and suddenly pre-existing mutterings about the need for constitutional change became a relevant matter to the public and politicians. It was the people, not politicians, that started the long road toward constitutional reform. The First National Forum was organized by a grassroots organization, not the government.

It follows then that this was not a constitutional change effort designed to merely resolve long-standing issues. Instead, it was perceived as an opportunity to reimagine the relationship between the Icelandic people and their founding document. This opportunity was also picked up by groups across civil society. As mentioned above, the

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234. *Icelandic Experiment*, supra note 178, at 168 (describing Iceland as entering “a deep financial and economic crisis”).
235. *See* Suteu, *supra* note 9, at 260; *Icelandic Experiment*, supra note 178, at 168–69 (“[T]he topic of constitutional change had been discussed for many years . . . [and the next election] brought to power proponents of such a constitutional change and gave the topic political momentum.”).
236. Suteu, *supra* note 9, at 261.
237. *See* *Icelandic Experiment*, supra note 178, at 180 (“The Icelandic people had clearly expressed a desire to break with the shady deals and corrupt ways of the pre-crisis era (which is not to say that the new ways are so different).”).
238. *See* id. at 169.
Anthill played a leading role in getting the constitutional change process underway. Other groups from different parts of civil society, such as the Ministry of Ideas—a think tank—also propelled the effort by bringing in entrepreneurs, small business owners, and other members of civil society. With many different entities holding a vested stake in the process and outcome of the Convention, the Constitutional Council focused on transparency, responsibility, and distribution of power. The alternative, excluding robust public participation, would not have been possible. Because the movement started “outside of the official political institutions” it had to remain on the outside and to center on the concerns of those outsiders. The Second National Forum aided with that effort by specifying those values deemed to “reflect[] the views of the population of Iceland.” The specific values included “the importance of human rights, democracy, transparency, equal access to healthcare and education, as well as a desire for a more strongly regulated financial sector[,] and for putting Iceland’s natural resources under public control.” And, though some of these values skew closer to being issues when compared with the specificity of the issues addressed in the Irish context, the Icelandic agenda is best thought of as being predominantly values-driven.

3. Means for Selecting Delegates

State conventions usually consist of convention bodies made up of delegates elected from geographical districts. Some states do not specify how delegates ought to be chosen. In some cases, the selection of delegates depends on the process specified by the enabling legislation creating the convention and passed by the state legislature. Though elections are common practice, “[t]here is surprisingly little federal constitutional law concerning the selection of delegates to a state

239. See id.
240. Id. at 172.
241. See Suteu, supra note 9, at 262.
242. See Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 172.
243. See id.
244. Id. at 173.
247. See Permaloff, supra note 7, at 226.
The result is that elections for delegates that are unlike those held for U.S. Congress and most state legislatures would likely pass legal muster. This general uncertainty may open the door for states with fewer or no guidelines for the selection of delegates, such as in New Jersey, to experiment with the stratified random selection ("SRS") of delegates.

Delegate selection in Iceland followed the traditional path: hosting elections for the delegates. Though a relatively large number of Icelanders opted to run, the winners tended to come from urban areas and were disproportionately male and affluent. Moreover, only a handful of professions were represented. The group was “extremely educated and counted a disproportionate number of professors and students of politics.” The working class had very little representation among the Constitutional Council.

However, the winners were certainly not members of the political elite. Landemore described them as “obscure” and “having little to no prior political experience.” Still, the election failed on the first goal—a representative group of winners. The election also only engaged less than thirty-six percent of the population—the remainder did not vote. Only the most passionate individuals likely participated in these elections and, while those who did participated did so in a meaningful way, those on the sidelines were greater in number.

Iceland demonstrated the issues with isolating current lawmakers yet relying on elections to identify Convention members. Excluded from participating, current officials questioned the legitimacy of the elections.

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248. Briffault, supra note 246, at 1125–27 (pointing out that “it is not clear whether the one person, one vote doctrine applies to the election of constitutional convention delegates”).

249. See id.

250. Id. at 1125 (listing New Jersey as among the “many” states with no constitutional guidance on how to select delegates).

251. See Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 178–79 ("[O]nly three out of the twenty-five members were from outside of Reykjavik, compared to a little less than 2/3 of the Icelandic population.").

252. See id. at 178.

253. Id.

254. See id.

255. Id. at 166.

256. See id. at 178 (admitting that the process used to select National Forum participants was “undeniably more statistically representative than the participants to a regular referendum” and, presumably, the winners of an election).

257. See Valtysson, supra note 197, at 55.

258. Beyond likely voting, a sliver of extremely democratically engaged Icelanders assisted in the nominating process for one of the 522 candidates—nine percent of the population signed letters of commendation for candidates. Id.
legitimacy concerns. Whatever Icelanders would have changed in hindsight to increase the representativeness and political support of the assembly may not have been possible. Bjarki Valtysson notes that “[t]he general population of Iceland was skeptical of the ‘upper’ political spheres, and trust in Parliament [and] the government . . . was extremely low” in the wake of the economic collapse of 2008.259 Too much formal participation by politicians could have undermined the efforts in Iceland. Other approaches, such as the quasi-random selection of delegates, may have been perceived as too centralized and insufficiently participatory.

4. Process for Reviewing Drafts

The inclusion of processes for the public to review and provide feedback on drafts of constitutional revisions significantly differentiates the idea of a crowdsourced revision process from other, less deliberative means for change. Through draft review, the public can partner with the constitution-makers in a two-way dialogue about the proposed changes. The case studies of Iceland and Ireland show that realizing this dialogue is easier in theory than in practice. States should pay attention to the faults with the systems employed by these countries and heed the guidance of Lousin when it comes to making key civic institutions a part of draft review.

Some stakeholders should have a larger role than others in reviewing the draft. Lousin focuses on academic centers and questions the perspectives of organizations that would produce a skewed analysis based on their positions.260 The ideal convention system for Lousin, then, involves partisan actors and special interests in the outreach and awareness process but not in the analysis process.261 In fact, Lousin stresses that conventions must operate independently, without any staff tied to the legislature.262

In Lousin’s ideal convention, the research staff, press corps, and committee council should be separated from the regular legislature apparatus.263 To provide the public with neutral assessments of each draft and to pass along public sentiment to the delegates, such a level of independence is a must.264 This independence can help with the participatory nature of the convention by bringing new professionals into the process.

259. See id. at 52–53.
260. See Lousin, supra note 17, at 614.
261. See id.
262. Id. at 615.
263. See id. at 615–16.
264. See id. (highlighting the value of such a staff to the Illinois convention).
Several opportunities for draft review by the public will also reduce the odds of drafters slipping any “bad” provisions through. A review process will not “eliminate tradeoffs.”265 Any comprehensive proposal and singular proposals will include tradeoffs with provisions that some groups prefer to others. Still, opportunities for the public to review these compromises may increase the odds of their acceptance.

Landemore refers to the Council’s involvement of the Icelandic public in its drafting process as “[t]he most open and directly participatory part of the Icelandic constitutional process.”266 The Council’s drafts were posted online for the public to read and send back comments and feedback.267 The public had the chance to review twelve drafts and could submit their responses via a Constitutional Council website and through social media websites.268 The Constitutional Council also reviewed submissions via email and mail.269 Analog efforts to solicit engagement included working with the media to publish updates and creating advertisements around the country.270

A fault was that the Constitutional Council did not have a specific process for how this content would be reviewed and, if ever, responded to.271 Because the response process was not “properly institutionalized and funded,” Council members could ignore, respond to, and incorporate into the draft (potentially without any sort of attribution) the comments they received.272 A more deliberative process would have specifically outlined how public participation was informing the next draft. Yet, the public’s comments proved useful in the Icelandic context. A total of 360 proposals came in from an Icelandic population of about 320,000.273 The Constitutional Council also received more than 3,600 comments on its Facebook page, some of which jumpstarted long comment threads.274 Comments deemed “necessary or useful” led to changes in the next

265. See Colantuono, supra note 69, at 1507.
266. Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 174.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Suteu, supra note 9, at 262.
271. See Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 174 (“While there was no conscious intention on the part of the Council members to establish a systematic back and forth between them and the crowd, something close to such a feedback loop seemed to have emerged from the very first draft onwards.” (footnote omitted)).
272. See id. at 182.
273. Id.
274. Id.
In total, it is estimated that about ten percent of comments had a causal impact on the final draft.\textsuperscript{276} From these mechanisms, Landemore regarded the draft proposal as having been “written with the more or less direct participation of its people.”\textsuperscript{277} And, in many ways, it was. Comments from the public led directly to the right to the Internet being included in the final draft.\textsuperscript{278} It is possible that the members of the public simply knowing that they could contribute to the drafting stage provided them with a sense of ownership over the document (even if they never took advantage of the opportunity to comment).\textsuperscript{279} Landemore speculates that even the perception of ownership could help explain why the public so robustly supported the constitution in the advisory referendum.\textsuperscript{280} Commenters and observers of comment threads likely felt a particular tie to the referendum and may have developed deeper civic knowledge by virtue of learning from other commenters, rather than just the Constitutional Council members.\textsuperscript{281}

The Icelandic process aspired for a level of deliberation that was not attained in practice. The process left room for improvement in terms of a truly deliberative and participatory writing process. Overall, the tools meant to facilitate deliberation between the public and the Convention merely resulted in the former making statements that generally had no substantive impact on the work of the latter.\textsuperscript{282} Despite operating several platforms to disseminate information, the Convention did not always do so in a timely nor comprehensive manner. For instance, the Convention only published transcripts from open Convention meetings and publication often came weeks after the meeting.\textsuperscript{283} To add to the participatory hurdle, the transcripts arrived in PDF format and exceeded 1,000 pages.\textsuperscript{284} And, though the Convention aimed to deliberate with the public, the reality was that Convention members often provided “irregular, informal, and limited” feedback to the public’s comments.\textsuperscript{285} Other factors also decreased the value of the deliberation. Individuals likely lacked the information and expertise to provide actionable

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{275} Id. at 174.
\item \textsuperscript{276} Landemore, supra note 61, at 190.
\item \textsuperscript{277} See Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 167.
\item \textsuperscript{278} See id. at 176.
\item \textsuperscript{279} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{280} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{281} Id. at 180.
\item \textsuperscript{282} See Suteu, supra note 9, at 274.
\item \textsuperscript{283} See Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 182.
\item \textsuperscript{284} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{285} Id.
\end{itemize}
feedback to the Constitutional Council. And, to the extent any individuals had the requisite background knowledge, those individuals likely were not representative of the Icelandic public, diminishing the value of their feedback. Convention delegates responding to the “uninformed and non-deliberative will of the people” creates a sort of “[p]ush-button democracy” that does not really foster deliberation.\(^286\) Icelanders that did opt to use the Convention’s largely online deliberation mechanisms tended to be younger and more tech-savvy than the public at large.\(^287\) In short, though “the crowd” had access to the means to shape the final draft of the Convention, those means may not have been as robust as hoped for nor as widely used as planned.\(^288\)

Finally, meaningful draft review also requires transparency in terms of authorship. Yet, experts involved with the Convention often went beyond rewording the initial language.\(^289\) Those changes could not be reversed by the assembly, and the experts never publicly explained their rationale for the changes.\(^290\) In such cases, the public had their means for deliberating on the language of the constitution disrupted. Experts were not accountable nor responsive to the public.

\textbf{B. Ireland as a Case Study}

Like in Iceland, constitutional convention designers in Ireland employed a number of deliberative tools to turn the public into constitution-makers. Encouraged by the support of political stakeholders, civic groups took hold of the idea of a citizen assembly shaping the next Irish constitution by launching the “We the Citizens” initiative.\(^291\) Organizers of the initiative thought of it as an experiment meant to show that deliberative processes can lead to robust outcomes.\(^292\) The initiative equipped all one hundred members of a representative sample of the Irish public with expert reports on the constitution and then facilitated deliberation on those reports.\(^293\) A report issued in the aftermath of the experiment detailed the successes of the effort and may have pushed stakeholders in the Irish government to move forward with

\begin{itemize}
\item \(^{286}\) See Noveck, supra note 173, at 34 n.118.
\item \(^{287}\) See Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 182–83.
\item \(^{288}\) See id. at 175–176.
\item \(^{289}\) See Suteu, supra note 9, at 271.
\item \(^{290}\) Id.
\item \(^{291}\) See id. at 264–65 (noting the support of political stakeholders in Ireland for citizen-driven changes to the constitution); see also David M. Farrell et al., Deliberative Democracy in Action Irish-Style: The 2011 We the Citizens Pilot Citizens’ Assembly, 28 IRISH POL. STUD. 99, 99–100 (2013) [hereinafter Deliberative Democracy].
\item \(^{292}\) Deliberative Democracy, supra note 291, at 99–100.
\item \(^{293}\) Id. at 103–04.
\end{itemize}
an Ireland Constitutional Convention led by a citizen assembly, despite concerns that Ireland may have been “too different or unique for citizen assemblies to work there.”

Parliament moved forward with a Constitutional Convention that leaned even more heavily on laypeople than the effort in Iceland. Rather than use random selection only for agenda-setting bodies, like the National Forums in Iceland, the Irish made sixty-six randomly selected individuals a part of a one-hundred-person body charged with reforming the constitution. The remainder of the convention body came from members of Parliament, ensuring that each of the political parties that accepted an invitation from the government had a representative at the table.

Though the Irish gave traditional political stakeholders a larger role in the process than in Iceland, they still managed to make the public a part of the Convention’s work. One example: the Irish actively solicited feedback on proposals from underrepresented groups and groups unlikely to participate without deliberate solicitation, such as Irish citizens living abroad. Another example: the Irish also provided in-person and online options for the public to identify issues for consideration by the Convention and to provide feedback on the work of the Convention. Civic institutions also had a role in the Convention through the opportunity to give presentations on topics to the Convention. Not all political stakeholders in Ireland thought these mechanisms went far enough, but the process has generally received “favorable reviews.”

1. Topic Selection Process

The Irish pursued a different route to topic selection than Iceland, one that relied less on crowdsourcing techniques but still provided civic society a meaningful role. As opposed to a grassroots movement jumpstarting the conversation about which topics to focus on, a committee of the Parliament arguably launched that conversation in Ireland. And though the public did not form this list of issues, a

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294. See Suteu, supra note 9, at 265.
296. See id.
297. See Suteu, supra note 9, at 266–67.
298. Id.
299. See id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 264.
grassroots movement formed to assist with readying the Convention.303
The “We the Citizens” initiative hosted a pilot citizen assembly in which
one hundred randomly selected citizens relied on expert reports to
deliberate specific policy topics.304
The involvement of such civic institutions and stakeholders
reinforced the importance of giving members of the public at-large a seat
at the table in reviewing these issues and formulating the proper
response.305 The experiment achieved its goal of demonstrating the
“value of citizen-oriented, deliberative approaches to achieving large-
scale political reform.”306 This success may have compelled the coalition
government to stick with their plan to make the majority of the
Constitutional Assembly members of the public. In response, it is possible
that the Irish people felt as though they had sufficient say over the
process of how the issues identified by the government would be resolved
that they did not need to contest not having their own version of Iceland’s
National Forums.

The early success of the “We the Citizens” initiative, paired with the
success of the citizen delegates in helping the Convention move through
its agenda, likely created space for more consultation with the public on
topic selection as the Convention looked for additional agenda items.
When moving beyond the seven items originally set forth by the
government, the Convention opted to ask the people for what issues to
tackle next.307 This sort of proactive engagement with the people likely
stymied concerns that the Convention was uncontrollably expanding its
mandate. By hosting regional meetings around the country, the
Convention made people feel more like sovereigns in the reformation of
their constitution.308 Of course, the Convention could have tried
something akin to their own National Forum to source their next issue
areas, but the regional meeting method likely better reflected their
country’s civic culture.

2. Specificity of Selected Topics

Though the financial crisis of 2008 incited conversations about
constitutional reform in Ireland, as in Iceland, the Irish mapped out a
more issues-driven response to the crisis. Whereas the crisis sparked

303. See id. at 264–65.
304. Id.
305. See id. at 270.
306. Deliberative Democracy, supra note 291, at 100.
307. Suteu, supra note 9, at 267.
308. See id.
more foundational democratic questions in Iceland,\textsuperscript{309} for the Irish it
provoked thoughts about specific proposals for increasing accountability
and encouraging economic growth.\textsuperscript{310}

This more pragmatic lens to constitutional reform resulted in
government entities taking the lead in topic selection.\textsuperscript{311} After a report
on the potential for electoral reform by the Parliament Joint Committee
on the Constitution, the Irish government eventually moved forward
with a citizen assembly meant to address seven major issues in a
constitutional convention.\textsuperscript{312} Notably, this outline for constitutional
change received backing from the two parties that formed the governing
coalition at the time—a coalition that had been elected after the
publication of the Committee’s report and, thus, in the middle of a public
discourse on the potential for constitutional change.\textsuperscript{313} The fact that the
public had a chance to vote for the governing coalition, with at least some
idea of the possibility that they would pursue constitutional change,
added a degree of representativeness to the Irish process of issue
selection.

3. Means for Selecting Delegates

Ireland offered another mix of how to think through the variables
related to delegate selection. They opted to include elected officials as
well as a quasi-random selection of delegates—meant to be “broadly
representative of Irish society”—in their Constitutional Assembly.\textsuperscript{314}
Some commentators speculate that the direct inclusion of elected officials
in the Irish Convention helped prevent the sort of disconnect between the
public and political classes that emerged in Iceland.\textsuperscript{315} It is possible that
because the push for the Convention originated in the Parliament, that
the inclusion of elected officials was unavoidable. The issue-specific focus
of the Convention, which may require more expertise than an effort
revolving around values and priorities, justified the inclusion of officials
with experience in those issues.

The Irish example helped dispel some concerns that participation by
politicians in a convention assembly would crowd out the opinions of “lay”

\textsuperscript{309} See Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 168 (mentioning that the crisis
sparked questions about incompetence and corruption within the government).
\textsuperscript{310} See Suteu, supra note 9, at 264.
\textsuperscript{311} See id. at 264–65.
\textsuperscript{312} Id.
\textsuperscript{313} Id. at 264; see also Deliberative Democracy, supra note 291, at 99.
\textsuperscript{314} 216 No. 12 Seanad Deb., Constitutional Convention: Motion (July 12, 2012) (Ir.),
\textsuperscript{315} Id.; see also Farrell, supra note 177, at 198.
participants. Partlett is one scholar who has worried about citizen assemblies being dominated by “charismatic politicians.” 316 Some civic society organizations in Ireland also feared that politicians would diminish the voices of the randomly selected citizens. 317 To the extent those fears were realized in the opinions of some Irish, the general consensus was that the Constitutional Convention performed well, despite (or because of) its mix of elected officials and laypersons. 318

4. Process for Reviewing Drafts

The Irish had fewer processes for draft review built into its convention effort than Iceland. Like Iceland, it crossed off the low hanging fruit in terms of openness and opportunities for engagement by uploading its work onto a website, as well as by using Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. 319 Unlike Iceland, the Irish did not provide the public with several iterations of drafts nor regular opportunities to actually correspond with the delegates. 320 Still, as the Convention matured and moved methodically through its agenda, it came to recognize the value of public feedback. The Convention invited the public, including Irish citizens living abroad, to submit comments on the initial seven topics. 321 Thousands of submissions came in, especially in relation to the most controversial topics on the agenda. 322 Members of civil society were also made a part of the review process. 323 Civic organizations had the opportunity to make presentations directly to the Convention. 324 This opportunity did not appease all civic organizations, especially those concerned that quasi-random sampling would not adequately bring voices of marginalized and vulnerable communities to the fore. 325 It is also not clear how input from the public and civic society shaped the Convention’s work, if it did at all. 326

Like Iceland, experts played a role in helping draft the final language, but their involvement was made public in the Convention’s

316. Landemore, supra note 61, at 200.
317. Suteu, supra note 9, at 267–68.
318. Id.
319. See id. at 267.
320. See id. at 264–71.
321. Id. at 266–67.
322. Id. at 267.
323. Id. at 265–67.
324. See id. at 267.
325. Id.
326. See id. at 274.
This limited role for experts aligns with best practices as set forth by theorists of deliberative democracy and constitution-making. This limited role for experts aligns with best practices as set forth by theorists of deliberative democracy and constitution-making.328

C. Upshot for State Convention Organizers

1. Topic Selection Process

Whether the legislature or the public plays the dominant role in selecting the topics, convention organizers should ensure that those conversations take place as far in advance of the convention as is reasonable and feasible.329 By way of example, the Temporary New York State Commission on Constitutional Revision started a whole four years before New Yorkers would confront the opportunity to vote for a convention on their ballots.330 The Commission engaged in a slew of pre-election activities, including hosting public hearings, spreading research materials, sponsoring TV discussions, and otherwise taking the pulse of New Yorkers on the topic.331 This public engagement must be sustained and comprehensive.

The jurisdictions that opt to prioritize the public’s input when zeroing-in on their agenda have the opportunity to build a strong sense of ownership within the public and the actual outcomes related to the topics they selected. To increase this sense of ownership, “citizens must have adequate and equal opportunities for placing questions on the agenda.”332 Those opportunities, though, will not be adequate, nor equal, if people do not have the requisite knowledge of their state’s political environment and, in particular, the strengths and weaknesses of their state’s constitution.

In the nineteenth century, ordinary Americans and chosen convention delegates alike had access to the information required to participate in constitution-making—consequently, “[c]onstitution-making was hardly an activity confined to experts or requiring...
specialized information.” 333 Since then, few would agree that constitution-making does not require specialized knowledge. One factor that may influence which topics come before the convention may hinge on the knowledge of the public and delegates. If either group lacks substantive knowledge about a particular topic, then that topic will likely be left for another day. That is why state convention organizers in the early nineteenth century often ensured that every delegate to a convention received a comprehensive compilation of constitutions. 334 This allowed delegates to quickly study up on the topics and issues that came before them. 335 A similar mentality should be applied with respect to preparing members of the public to sort through which topics to place on the convention agenda.

The traditional approach to educating voters about democratic issues will not suffice in the context of weighing which constitutional topics to include in the convention’s agenda. Though states have rightfully been applauded for producing voter pamphlets to increase information available to voters, some researchers have questioned the adequacy of these materials. 336 Others have found that adequate or not, only already-informed voters, which make up a small slice of the electorate, tend to read the materials. 337 The more likely source of information for voters is mass media, 338 which further evidences the need for convention organizers to begin introducing the public and the media to potential convention topics as early as possible.

Regardless of if the public or a smaller group of experts select the topics, experts have a role to play in educating the public. Experts on policy matters can help the people select the topics for the convention, or evaluate the topics identified by experts. The use of such experts for this very purpose is not new. Lousin calls for having university centers, such as the Institute of Government and Public Affairs of the University of Illinois, to prepare studies on potential constitutional topics, as far in advance of the convention as a decade. 339 Absent such studies, conventions may struggle to function and live up to expectations. 340

333. See Baum & Fritz, supra note 20, at 212.
334. Id. at 215–17.
335. Id.
336. Gais & Benjamin, supra note 18, at 1312.
338. Colantuono, supra note 69, at 1505–06.
339. Lousin, supra note 17, at 609.
340. See id. (“It would be an understatement to say that [the Institute of Government and Public Affairs] studies were invaluable [to the Illinois convention]; truly, the convention could not have functioned at all without the preparatory work by these scholars.”).
So, when weighing whether to rely on the public or experts for topic selection, state convention organizers should consider a couple of factors. One would be the current state of public education with respect to constitutional topics. Another would be the willingness of mass media to assist with the education of the public. One last factor would be the capacity of civil society to ready the public (or a subsect of the public) for such an important and intellectual task.

Based on these factors, organizers should emulate the Icelandic or Irish model. The more participatory and deliberative approach would be to crowdsource the topics for consideration, á la Ireland. Whether to lean more into the model suggested by Iceland or by Ireland may depend on what single event or series of events sparks the push for constitutional change. In Iceland, the people perceived their constitution as being at “the root of their current political and economic troubles.”341 In Ireland, the legislature identified some key issue areas in response to general national concerns.342 The combination of the COVID-19 calamity and a racial awakening could lead a state’s public to look more like Icelanders than the Irish. That said, the general lack of state constitutional knowledge may mean that any grassroots effort to revise a constitution will require too much educational work to get off the ground, which means the legislature will likely have to initiate the process.

2. Specificity of Selected Topics

Regardless of whether a state takes a value-based or issue-based approach, organizers need to perform serious studies of the state’s problems and how those problems relate to the constitution. Typically, states have used constitutional revision mechanisms as a means to address certain issues.343 However, the state setting has also been the stage for more thematic reform efforts, such as “confronting . . . principles and institutions of governance.”344

Organizers that pursue either route will also have to address well-founded fears of a “run-away . . . convention.”345 Citizens and politicians alike fear “unlimited” state constitutional conventions.346 From a legal

341. See, e.g., Elkins et al., supra note 205, at 1.
342. See Suteu, supra note 9, at 263–64.
343. See Dinan, supra note 2, at 935.
344. See id. at 937.
345. See Gais & Benjamin, supra note 18, at 1304–05 (“Citizens may fear that constitutional conventions would open up a ‘Pandora’s box’ or ‘can of worms’ in which delegates would make enormous constitutional changes with little or no public accountability.”).
346. Williams, supra note 33, at 568.
perspective, a state constitutional convention encounters few barriers, making a runaway effort possible. The federal government specifies very few requirements for how states should organize their government—with the exception of maintaining a republican form of government.\(^{347}\) Marshfield pointed out that “[t]here seem to be no limits on what can pass through state constitutional amendment procedures.”\(^{348}\) The likelihood of runaway conventions is diminished by a few federal laws, explicit state procedural requirements, and the need for approval from the public.\(^{349}\)

Political norms may act as another block to a runaway convention. Absent such norms, both progressive and conservative voters may oppose the convention. “State amendments have targeted vulnerable minorities, deeply entrenched specific fiscal strategies, and profoundly restructured institutions.”\(^{350}\) More conservative community members may also fear that a convention could leap toward recognizing rights that do not align with a more incremental approach to such guarantees. For instance, more conservative residents of Washington D.C. likely questioned their Convention’s proposals for rights to employment and to strike.\(^{351}\) Similarly, both progressive and conservative thinkers should worry about special interests taking hold of an agenda-less convention. Without agenda limitations, special interests may dictate how the convention spends its time and steer the final proposal toward solutions that have received minimal public vetting.\(^{352}\)

Though some aspects of politics in the United States would suggest that vested interests would push to assert their own agenda, other scholars and examples point to a countervailing norm of political sensibility that pulls convention efforts toward topical moderation. For example, the Repair California effort, to alter portions of the state’s constitution, planned to operate on a limited topical agenda.\(^{353}\) This act of self-moderation by the Repair organizers suggests that constitutional convention planners may have a sense of how expansive an agenda is, and what kind of agenda (issues or values) is politically feasible based on their state’s culture.

\(^{347}\). Gais & Benjamin, supra note 18, at 1305 (mentioning that the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted what requirements do exist as allowing states a wide range of possible institutional arrangements).

\(^{348}\). Marshfield, supra note 6, at 65.

\(^{349}\). Id. at 143.

\(^{350}\). Id. at 65.

\(^{351}\). See Schrag, supra note 245, at 822.

\(^{352}\). See Marshfield, supra note 6, at 65.

Neither a values-based nor issues-based approach to topic selection will foreclose the odds of a runaway convention. A values-oriented approach to agenda-setting could quickly stoke fears of a runaway convention. The guidance provided by the National Forums to the Icelandic Constitutional Council, by way of example, was “so general as to have very little constraining power on the Council members.” Though even the Icelandic Forums contained some limits, the “structure, length, organization, and selection mode” of the Forums were left outside of the public’s control, perhaps constraining some of the possible values that could emerge.

An issues-oriented approach could also stoke concerns of overreach, potentially inciting fears within very specific and very powerful civic stakeholders. For instance, if issues related to the right to work were placed on the agenda, organized labor would likely try to quash the convention effort for fear of that agenda item producing a constitution that significantly undermined the power of labor unions. Regardless of the approach taken, state constitutional organizers may lessen fears by explicitly taking certain “hot button” issues off the table. This strategy has limited the inducement of fear in several settings.

3. Means for Selecting Delegates

Convention organizers should resist the temptation to follow the traditional approach for selecting delegates. Delegate elections suffer from several democratic flaws that could undermine the quality of a constitutional convention and the legitimacy of its outcomes. For one, the electorates in most states are not representative. The communities that tend to vote are also the communities that tend to have the greatest sway over legislators as well. Furthermore, relying on individuals to volunteer themselves for participation is unlikely to result in a diverse set of candidates. Given the partisan nature of U.S. politics, and the resource intensive aspects of running for office, it is unlikely that merely hoping for a pluralistic group of delegates will actually produce such a group.

354. Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 175–76.
355. See id. at 181.
356. See Williams, supra note 33, at 568.
357. See id. at 568–69 (noting that the majority of state courts have ruled in favor of this sort of limitation).
358. See, e.g., Colantuono, supra note 69, at 1501–02 (noting that lower socioeconomic groups, such as people of color, the poor, and those with less education, tend to vote in smaller numbers than wealthier, whiter, and older voters).
359. Id. at 1502.
That hope did not manifest in the Washington D.C. Convention effort. Of the 103 candidates that ran for the forty-five seats in the District of Columbia, few were current or former politicians.\(^{360}\) And, of the five seats allocated to represent the entire District of Columbia, all five went to current or former politicians.\(^{361}\) Cumulatively, the candidate pool and eventual winners of the Washington D.C. delegate election make clear that as long as electoral success is a function of money raised, free time available, and name recognition, average Joes and Janes will likely not have a chance of electoral success.\(^{362}\) Using normal election mechanisms to select delegates will only increase the already excessive influence exerted by wealthier, whiter, and older community members. That process will not inspire a sense of legitimacy among communities typically left on the democratic sidelines.

Efforts to level the electoral playing field to increase the legitimacy of winners may backfire—further bringing into question the use of elections to select delegates. By virtue of the Washington D.C. Convention creating so many delegate seats, it is true that a number of atypical political candidates entered the election.\(^{363}\) These candidates, though, often lacked the means to earnestly campaign.\(^{364}\) So, they placed “leaflets on trees and lamp posts, [hosted] neighborhood house parties, and [relied on] word-of-mouth recommendations.”\(^{365}\) The public did not view these amateur efforts as signs of the Convention’s legitimacy and significance.\(^{366}\)

Reliance on typical election mechanisms for the selection of delegates could also result in the election of delegates likely to support constitutional proposals that merely reinforce the status quo, or even worse, reinforce the advantages afforded to communities more likely to participate.\(^{367}\) This may be especially true if already elected officials are allowed to participate. In that case, it will be in the interest of the officials to appease voters that they will count on for support in subsequent elections. The resulting “identity of interest” between the electorate and the selected delegates will undermine the ability of the constitution to

\(^{360}\) See Schrag, supra note 245, at 848.

\(^{361}\) Id. at 865. Of the forty-five seats in the District of Columbia, five of the seats were to represent the District of Columbia at large, whereas the remaining forty seats were to represent individual neighborhoods within the District of Columbia. Id. at 848, 865. There were nine candidates running for the five at-large positions. Id. at 865.

\(^{362}\) See id. at 848.

\(^{363}\) See id. at 849.

\(^{364}\) See id.

\(^{365}\) Id.

\(^{366}\) See id.

\(^{367}\) See Colantuono, supra note 69, at 1502.
consider and act on the interests of “discrete and insular minorities,” often thought to be the most in need of greater judicial and constitutional protection.\textsuperscript{368}

A low turnout in the delegate election could thwart the legitimacy of the convention. Even the novelty of voting for delegates to a constitutional convention may not generate a robust turnout. And, even among those who do turnout, a lack of familiarity with delegate candidates may result in voters simply skipping over those races.\textsuperscript{369} Both a low turnout and a high rate of “skipping” took place in the Washington D.C. election for delegates.\textsuperscript{370} Only thirty-one percent of registered voters participated in the election and, of those voters, only half cast ballots in the delegate race.\textsuperscript{371} Consequently, a mere six percent of the District’s population had a say in who attended the Convention.\textsuperscript{372}

The random selection of delegates via SRS counters many of the negatives of electing delegates. SRS is “obtained by separating the population elements into nonoverlapping groups, called strata, and then selecting a simple random sample from each stratum.”\textsuperscript{373} In the Iceland context, the population for the SRS used for the National Forums came from the National Population Register.\textsuperscript{374} The strata included age, gender, and geographic location.\textsuperscript{375} Though an SRS can identify a perfect descriptively-representative sample of society (based on the selected strata), in practice an SRS might not return such a sample.\textsuperscript{376}

Even if an SRS were to reproduce a perfect microcosm of society, some stakeholders may not feel as though the selected body should control the constitution-making process. As occurred in the Irish context, some organizers may believe that marginalized and vulnerable communities deserve more than proportional representation, given the particular relevance of constitutional protections for these groups.\textsuperscript{377} That is why

\begin{footnotesize}
368. Id.
369. Schrag, \textit{ supra} note 245, at 849. This lack of familiarity may result from the media’s disinterest in the delegate elections. Consider that the \textit{Washington Post}, the District’s only daily newspaper at the time of their election for convention delegates, failed to “stimulate wider interest in the [delegate] election.” Id. at 848.
370. Id. at 849.
371. Id.
372. Id.
375. Id. at 177.
\end{footnotesize}
convention organizers may want to think beyond merely holding up a mirror to society and instead consider how to weigh the representation based on likely constitutional impact.\footnote{378}{See id.}

Some may challenge replacing elections with what could be perceived as lotteries, especially given that elections theoretically provide extensive deliberative opportunities. Skeptics of delegates that are selected by random selection rightfully question the capacity of members of the public to understand complex constitutional issues.\footnote{379}{See Colantuono, supra note 69, at 1504.} Studies show that members of the public frequently struggle to make rational electoral choices.\footnote{380}{See id. at 1503–05.}

Two distinctions between decision processes of voters and delegates should assuage the concerns of the capacity of randomly selected delegates to rise to the occasion of a constitutional convention. First, these delegates will receive more time to review more informational materials and with greater assistance than voters in a typical election.\footnote{381}{Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 187.} Iceland’s methodical efforts to educate the public generally and delegates in particular evidence that average Joes and Janes can be turned into constitution-makers.\footnote{382}{See Suteu, supra note 9, at 271. Though, as noted by Suteu, constitution organizers must pay attention to just how much influence experts may exert on a convention’s work product. Id. Where experts exceed mere rewording of the convention’s initial language, the public will likely want to be aware of those changes. Id.} SRS-selected delegates will also likely receive more robust guidance from experts and politicians to inform their conversations.\footnote{383}{See Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 183 (explaining that in a “gold-standard” random selection Deliberative Poll, committee members are able to take part in plenary assemblies, where they may ask questions from panels of experts).} One potential means for that guidance could be an advisory body of political elites. For instance, the Repair California proposal for a constitutional convention planned to have members of the major parties provide delegates with important background information so as to “root their thinking in reality.”\footnote{384}{See Leib & Elmendorf, supra note 35, at 75.}

Second, the diversity of delegates that will result from a quasi-random sample is shown to raise the general competence of participating members.\footnote{385}{See Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 177–78.} Even if selected delegates demonstrate lower degrees of competence, the collective cognitive diversity of the group could overcome those shortages.\footnote{386}{Landemore, supra note 61, at 197–98.} In fact, up to a point, “[t]he more cognitive diversity,
the smarter the group.” Several factors contribute to the deliberative benefits of a randomly-selected assembly. For one, there is no better way to maximize cognitive diversity in a sample of the public than a random sample, unless, of course, you happen to have detailed information about the cognitive profiles of the public prior to the sample. Additionally, the inclusion of regular people, rather than typical civic participants, brings new competences and perspectives into the process. For instance, reliance on elections to select delegates would likely never allow “shy . . . not-so-well spoken, [and] quiet people” to have a seat at the table.

A randomly-selected assembly may also provide the convention with more legitimacy in the eyes of a public that has increasingly become skeptical of partisan politics. Elections will likely fail to produce a body that reflects the full diversity of the state’s population. Comparatively, a body selected by SRS will be capable of a “more rational, coherent, and inclusive ‘public voice,’ resulting in more representative policy suggestions.” Similarly, elections will fall short of engaging a broad range of society in selecting those relatively homogeneous election winners. Iceland experienced both of these shortcomings.

How many individuals to include in the assembly also presents a tricky deliberative question. Though Landemore pointed out that cognitive diversity requires a number of perspectives, too many delegates trying to shape the constitution may inhibit “the ability of [individuals] to exchange ideas.” Breaking delegates into committees and subgroups is one way to ensure that when discussions occur on various proposals, delegates can actually meaningfully talk with one another.

No magical number of delegates exists. Iceland had twenty-five. Constitutional Scholar, Jon Elster, thinks that between fifty and one

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387. *Icelandic Experiment*, supra note 178, at 176.
388. *Id.* at 177.
389. *Id.*
390. *Id.*
393. Cf. *id.* at 1313 (arguing that “a more deliberative, coherent, and inclusive ‘public voice’ can be realized in practice only with the help of special institutions, specifically, those that nurture a strong civil society or civic space to stand between the public and private sectors—and have elements of both”).
394. *Icelandic Experiment*, supra note 178, at 178 (explaining that the majority of Iceland’s Constitutional Council was made up of urban professionals, and that even though politicians were prohibited from running to be on the council, the cognitive diversity was narrowed by the ultimate makeup of the council).
396. *Icelandic Experiment*, supra note 178, at 185.
hundred marks the sweet spot because that range reduces the likelihood of too much strategic behavior by the delegates while also mitigating the probability of informational free riding. \footnote{397} Whichever number organizers select, they should have a rationale for that number. Perhaps a minimum number should reflect what size body would be required to minimally provide descriptive representativeness, a notion that led Landemore to ponder if the Icelandic organizers should have had at least one hundred people. \footnote{398} The lack of explanation surrounding Iceland’s selection of twenty-five brought arbitrariness into a process that could not afford the skepticism that comes from randomness. \footnote{399}

Even though the benefits of SRS in selecting delegates may be clear to convention organizers, efforts to rally public support behind the concept should still take place. Absent finding ways to make the public feel comfortable with SRS, they may regard it as "exotic[,]" a notion that could decrease the legitimacy of the convention. \footnote{400} Previous "exotic" voting mechanisms only gained acceptance once the public had a chance to study them and participate in them. \footnote{401} This importance of prior exposure may explain why a proposal to randomly select Iceland’s delegates never caught hold. \footnote{402}

The willingness of any state to try something as novel as the random selection of “ordinary” individuals to write something as significant as a new constitution depends on several factors. More specifically, the dynamic between the public and political elites, the representativeness of the selection method (with a particular focus on representation of vulnerable and minority communities), and the public’s familiarity (and comfort) with the proposed selection mechanism, all factor into the extent to which a state can venture away from traditional means of selecting delegates.

4. Process for Reviewing Drafts

Draft review is critical to constitutional revision procedures that are “deliberative as well as legitimate.” \footnote{403} From a deliberative standpoint, the process of having experts, the public, and representatives of specific

\footnote{397}{See Jon Elster, The Optimal Design of a Constituent Assembly, in COLLECTIVE WISDOM: PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS 158 (Hélène Landemore and Jon Elster eds., 2012) [hereinafter COLLECTIVE WISDOM].}
\footnote{398}{See Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 186–87.}
\footnote{399}{See id. at 185–86.}
\footnote{400}{See Briffault, supra note 246, at 1153.}
\footnote{401}{See id. at 1152–53.}
\footnote{402}{See Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 186.}
\footnote{403}{Williams, supra note 33, at 574.}
civil interest review drafts will ensure that constitution-makers have the best information available and that they adequately consider the likely effects of their draft.\textsuperscript{404} So long as the constitution-makers actually act on that deliberative process, then the draft review will contribute to the legitimacy of the final document by “providing for direct citizen participation and control.”\textsuperscript{405} That legitimacy will only increase if convention organizers succeed in demonstrating the independence of the draft review and the revision effort as a whole.\textsuperscript{406} Unchecked interventions by experts, too great of an influence by elected officials, and the use of current legislative staff, all threaten that independence. The draft review process should make clear who is responsible for what content and how those drafters will be engaging with the collected feedback.

Actual feedback on iterations of the constitution may be the most important target of participatory tools. The public’s engagement with the actual substance of the document will allow the convention to become an occasion for “expressing ultimate public aims and concepts of democratic government” and for the eventually ratified constitution to “reflect the aspirations of people and their views on the use of public power to achieve their goals.”\textsuperscript{407} Every state but one requires the electorate to assent to changes to the state constitution.\textsuperscript{408} Whether that assent carries with it popular legitimacy will likely depend on the extent to which the public had a chance to influence the content of the revised constitution.

\textbf{D. Limits to the Efficacy of Participatory Tools}

The mere use of tools associated with public participation, like social media, does not guarantee a constitution-making process will meet its deliberative goals. True deliberation must go beyond one-way conversations,\textsuperscript{409} yet not all tools and processes allow for two-way conversations. A deeper review of Iceland’s approach to draft review brings some of these issues to the forefront. Most of the means through which Icelanders could inform the Constitutional Council did not require

\begin{itemize}
\item 404. \textit{Id.} at 574–75.
\item 405. \textit{Id.}
\item 406. \textit{See Gais \& Benjamin, supra note 18, at 1298–99.}
\item 407. \textit{Schrag, supra note 245, at 822.}
\item 408. \textit{See John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2008, in 41 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 3, 13 (Audrey S. Wall \& Heather M. Perkins eds., 2009).}
\item 409. In the words of Habermas, communicative action takes place when “participants in communication encounter one another in a horizon of unrestricted possibilities of mutual understanding.” \textit{See 2 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 149 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1987) (1981).}
\end{itemize}
real-time responses, nor did they carry the possibility of meaningful change. For instance, the Council used many social media posts merely to share video updates from Council members or update the public on how to view an upcoming session.\footnote{410}{See Valtysson, supra note 197, at 62.} According to Valtysson, “the [fifty-one] videos uploaded on YouTube [by the Council] cannot be said to have generated much communication, discussion, or deliberation.”\footnote{411}{Id. at 61.} Likewise, photos posted to Flickr by the Council, “did not generate a single comment and therefore did not facilitate any kind of conversation, let alone deliberation or antagonism.”\footnote{412}{Id.} Even the Council’s tweets did not result in a meaningful discourse with Icelanders.\footnote{413}{Id. (noting that the Council only tweeted 171 times to 522 followers during the rewriting process).}

Social media sites struggle to “facilitate lengthy deliberations”\footnote{414}{Id.} but, in some cases, these sites can create new encounters and conversations that carry deliberative benefits. Despite deliberative limits associated with the mediums through which Constitutional Council messages were disseminated, as well as the issues with the content of those messages, new sorts of deliberation took place in the Icelandic process. About a third of the Council members, for instance, took the time to regularly and thoroughly respond to myriad Facebook comments.\footnote{415}{Id.} That sort of exchange was certainly never imagined by the likes of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson in Philadelphia.

To engage as many parts of civil society, convention planners should resist the urge to over rely on digital means to solicit engagement. The “old” ways of gathering that input—in-person events, print media, etc.—should still be employed.\footnote{416}{See Lousin, supra note 17, at 610 (“There is no substitute . . . for face-to-face meetings.”).} The Illinois Constitutional Convention planners, for instance, held open-mic hearings around the state to provide residents with a chance to make their voice heard, as well as to be heard by important decision makers.\footnote{417}{Id. at 62.} The combination of new participatory tools that permit more residents to respond in more detail and with a higher likelihood of impact and the “old” ways of gathering community input will result in the most representative and thorough collection of ideas. To the extent “old” ways are employed, modern improvements to those ways should be adhered to.

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\item \footnote{410}{See Valtysson, supra note 197, at 62.}
\item \footnote{411}{Id. at 61.}
\item \footnote{412}{Id.}
\item \footnote{413}{Id. (noting that the Council only tweeted 171 times to 522 followers during the rewriting process).}
\item \footnote{414}{Id.}
\item \footnote{415}{Id. at 62.}
\item \footnote{416}{See Lousin, supra note 17, at 610 (“There is no substitute . . . for face-to-face meetings.”).}
\item \footnote{417}{See id. at 610–11.}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
If the public is not invited and nudged to participate in shaping the convention, then there is a chance lobbying groups and other organizations representing special interests may offer biased opinions based on their niche take on an issue.418 That is why Suteu recommends a proactive approach to bringing people into the convention process.419 Her conception of making a convention representative means ensuring that all interests affected by a convention have a way to make their voice heard.420

One proactive approach is to lean on trusted messengers to share deliberative opportunities. Rather than dispatch a stranger to a community to introduce something as large as a constitutional convention, convention organizers should identify and empower “trusted messengers” to run these sessions.421 These trusted messengers are community members with some, if not all, of the following traits: opinion leadership (i.e., people listen to them), deep community roots and knowledge, capacity to reach and educate individuals with low-trust in the government, and well-versed in communicating in a culturally and linguistically appropriate manner.422 Trusted messengers have become an increasingly important part of efforts to distribute time-sensitive and important information to diverse communities. For example, researchers urged the Census Bureau to lean on trusted messengers to help increase response rates in hard-to-reach communities.423

Trusted messengers can be a vast improvement from relying on public officials to connect with hard-to-reach communities. Public officials often have little to no knowledge of the conditions of these communities, one of the core attributes of a good messenger.424 A “Constitution Convention Corps” made up of trusted messengers can ensure that residents in all communities are aware not only of the face-to-face opportunities to provide their feedback on convention topics but also the online mechanisms. The take-aways from all forms of community engagement should be distributed to delegates for their consideration.

418. See id. at 614.
419. See Suteu, supra note 9, at 270–71.
420. Id.
422. Id.
423. See, e.g., id.
424. See Lousin, supra note 17, at 610.
The sum of all these conversations will help delegates see issues from a statewide perspective.  

Certain participatory tools can only succeed in concert with other tools. Crowdsourcing only works if you can gather a large crowd and make sure the members of that crowd have the information and capacity required to participate. Though technology has made the exchange of information easier, it may also have diminished the capacity of individuals to engage in meaningful discussions about that information. Authors such as Jeremy Rifkin and Neil Postman have long worried that new mediums, such as television and a generally faster pace of life, have hindered our collective ability to consume, understand, and debate information. Convention organizers should engage with experts in media studies to analyze how best to produce content and design processes in a way that accounts for our seemingly ever shortening attention spans.

The creation of new means to participate does not guarantee representative participation. For instance, when the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) offered citizens the opportunity to join a policy review panel, the resulting participants had important characteristics for convention organizers to note. First, this new means of participation did bring a higher number of participants into the fold. Second, many of the participants were engaging with the EPA for their first time. Third, and most importantly, it was not clear that this expanded pool of participants was any more representative than the usual, smaller pool of repeat participants. Still, those that did join the EPA’s efforts “not only contributed comments, but [also] listened and responded to one another’s points of view, thereby engaging in a deliberative and reflective process of dialogue.” This last point should encourage convention organizers because it illustrates that once people opt to participate, they will likely contribute in a meaningful way.

When it comes to soliciting online input from across society, particular attention may need to be paid to older individuals and individuals from communities of color. Younger and more highly

425. See id. at 610–11 (summarizing that the delegates participating in a statewide “road show” helped them “see Illinois as one state”).


428. Id.

429. Id.

430. Id. at 51–52.

431. Id. at 52.
educated Americans tend to adopt new technological tools to engage with the government faster than the rest of the public. These disparities should not push convention organizers away from digital tools. Research indicates that analog tools may actually result in even greater disparities in participation. In both the analog and digital context, participation likely hinges on the extent to which the individual trusts the government.

Convention organizers must work to overcome some of the concerns related to the public's growing lack of trust in the government and general lack of faith in new technologies applied in a government context. Surveys on related government uses of new technology reveal that a sizable portion of the public remains skeptical. For instance, only fifty-three percent of respondents thought that open data sharing would make government officials more accountable to the public. Likewise, only forty-eight percent thought open data sharing would allow citizens to better impact government affairs. If convention organizers want to engage as many people as possible via predominately online forums, then they will have to address this skepticism head on. They will also have to recognize and respond to the fact that some Americans just are not willing to engage in politics in online settings. Pre-pandemic, the Pew Research Center conducted a survey and concluded that: "[i]n an 'every day' level, Americans are three times as likely to discuss politics or public affairs with others through offline channels (in person, by phone call, or by letter) as they are through online channels."

The upshot is that crowdsourcing cannot rely on a single means for public participation. Due to the wide divergence in trust in government and digital literacy, convention organizers should explore in-person as well as digital means to proactively solicit engagement from across society.

434. See Horrigan & Rainie, supra note 432.
435. See id.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. See Smith, supra note 433.
Another limit to participatory tools is that the ensuing deliberation requires time. In other words, “speed sacrifices deliberation.” The short attention span of the public and the pressing need for constitutional change in light of technological, social, and economic changes weigh against too much deliberation and too many participatory tools when pursuing constitutional change. The public legitimacy of a constitution, though, tips the scales toward more deliberative exercises. And, with the inclusion of modern technology and crowdsourcing techniques, deliberation need not be as slow as it was in previous generations.

A slew of other faults exists with some crowdsourcing tools, all of which cannot be covered here. Briefly, Elster likely would find the transparency associated with crowdsourcing to be excessive because some degree of secrecy in assembly discussions can have deliberative benefits within that group. Another fault stems from failing to address the fact that only the most motivated and well-off can afford to participate in deliberative exercises that offer little to no financial support.

Still, as pointed out by Landemore, even the imperfect use of crowdsourcing tools can drastically improve a constitution-making process. These innovations can introduce delegates to new ideas, engender a great sense of ownership over the constitution within the public, and encourage the public to perceive their government as a more faithful executor of the people’s sovereign power.

E. General Research on Participatory Tools and Constitution Quality

Where these tools are employed, the quality of democratic inputs and outputs increase. Generally, where high quality deliberative opportunities exist, and those opportunities occur on a frequent basis, the democratic institutions facilitating those deliberations receive better quality and higher quantity input. This sort of deliberation is especially important with respect to constitution-making given the need for...
to establish a high degree of public confidence in the document. Landemore determined that the same general idea about quality participation leading to quality democratic inputs and outputs applied to constitution-making, in which he stated: “the more participatory a constitutional process is, the more rights and mechanisms for popular participation it should include.”

A review of the draft constitution that emerged from Iceland’s participatory process reinforced this finding. The power of greater participation to improve governance outcomes has received attention outside of Iceland. European foreign ministers, for instance, issued a joint declaration recognizing “the importance of increasing participation in local, regional, national and European democratic processes.” Similarly, the Council of Europe’s Congress on Local and Regional Authorities encouraged national governments to develop and implement strategies to enhance civic participation on important regulatory issues. The Council specifically prodded governments to leverage new information and communication technologies as a means to “strengthen democratic governance and its legitimacy, to promote values like openness, transparency and accountability of administration[,]” as well as to foster “public debate and communication.”

445. See Gais & Benjamin, supra note 18, at 1301 (“If we want people to view a constitution as legitimate, we must be sure they believe the rules and institutions it prescribes to be reasonable and fair.”).
446. See Landemore, supra note 61, at 192.
447. See id. at 204.
450. Id.
IV. OTHER FACTORS RELATED TO THE SUCCESS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
REVISION EFFORT

The use of participatory tools is not a sufficient condition to actually
revise a state constitution. Convention organizers must address other
modern democratic shortcomings to earn the participation and, later,
support of the public.

A. Media Coverage

A sizable gap exists between the increasing importance of state
constitutions and coverage by the popular press. It is essential to have
popular media share updates on and opportunities related to the
convention. That is why Lousin calls for a public relations department to
create “an Internet framework, as well as communications with the print
and electronic media outlets.” And, the more participatory and
innovative the process, the more the press will need to assist with
informing the public of the process and the means to get involved.

The absence of favorable and frequent media coverage did not help
convention organizers in Washington D.C., and some papers came out
early in direct opposition. Others merely did not cover the effort at all,
neglecting to even amplify messages from trusted institutions related to
the convention. The Washington Post, for instance, did not inform their
readers about the various races for delegate seats and opted not to
publish the Women Voters’ Annual Voters Guide, which contained
helpful information about the convention.

The Icelandic elections for convention delegates also struggled to
receive media attention. Landemore goes as far as to wonder if
“incompetence” among the Icelandic press resulted in their lack of
knowledge as to how to cover an election of more than five hundred people
and, due to that lack of knowledge, opting to provide no coverage at all.
The media may have also helped sink the proposed constitution. The
Icelandic media amplified concerns of the constitutional scholars that the
proposed constitution lacked coherence.

451. See Devins, supra note 41, at 1637.
452. Lousin, supra note 17, at 616.
453. See Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 185–86.
454. See Schrag, supra note 245, at 842 (referring to the Washington Star).
455. See id. at 849.
456. See Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 186.
457. See id.
458. Landemore, supra note 61, at 191.
Even favorable press coverage, though, cannot guarantee that a
convention will get underway or that its proposals will receive popular
support. For example, even though the Los Angeles Times
“enthusiastically endorsed” a recent call for a constitutional convention
in California, that effort floundered.\textsuperscript{459} The larger problem may be that
the people are “averse to debating fundamental questions of
governance.”\textsuperscript{460} The media may be able to diminish that aversion by
specifying how exactly constitutional change could alter the day-to-day
lives of residents. The writing of a constitution requires that citizens
“imagine their state in its future life. In other words, they [have] to
engage in a kind of (political) science fiction.”\textsuperscript{461} Journalists seem to be
well-suited for at least consolidating and disseminating ideas about what
that future life could be.

\textbf{B. Support Among the Political Elite}

Members of the political elite can signal to other officials, and to the
public at large, that a process merits their support and participation. The
sidelining of the political elite in Iceland’s process may have been part of
its demise. Landemore queries if so substantially limiting the role of the
political elite made them less willing to publicly fight for the passage of
the popularly-created constitution.\textsuperscript{462} In Iceland and elsewhere, political
elite and certain special interests may effectively wield a veto over any
constitutional revision effort. A failure to meaningfully incorporate
groups that may hold formal or informal veto power over the
constitutional revision process may sink the prospects of actualizing that
change.

Lousin would advise convention proponents to prioritize speaking
with the state’s governor and state legislators in order to bring them on
board.\textsuperscript{463} Without their support, these political elites may form a “rival
body” capable of delegitimizing the convention and undermining its
prospects from the outset.\textsuperscript{464} That is why, rather than try to have “the
people” steal a constitutional convention process from elites, Lousin
recommends allowing political parties and political actors to “play a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{459} See Vladimir Kogan, \textit{The Irony of Comprehensive State Constitutional Reform}, 41
\item \textsuperscript{460} See Henry M. Greenberg, \textit{Hope vs. Fear: The Debate Over a State Constitutional
\item \textsuperscript{461} \textit{Bethel Saler, The Settlers’ Empire: Colonialism and State Formation in
America’s Old Northwest} 249 (Daniel K. Richter et al. eds., 2015).
\item \textsuperscript{462} \textit{See Icelandic Experiment, supra} note 178, at 186.
\item \textsuperscript{463} Lousin, \textit{supra} note 17, at 605.
\item \textsuperscript{464} \textit{Id.}
\end{itemize}
leading role,” and to tap into their ability to validate and distribute information about the convention.\textsuperscript{465} If their support cannot be won, then convention advocates should aspire to leave legislators feeling a sort of “benign neglect” toward the convention.\textsuperscript{466}

Political elites can popularize the reasons for a constitutional convention and provide its outcomes with a degree of legitimacy. In Iceland, political leaders fulfilled the former role but not the latter. Years prior to the Icelandic people moving into the weeds of constitutional revision, the prime minister “had for many years fought for a total review of the constitution,” including during her time as a Member of Parliament.\textsuperscript{467} That sort of recurring drum-beating for a substantial revision can increase public support for constitutional reforms, even if members of the political elite are not fully on board or even are in opposition.\textsuperscript{468}

In Ireland, political stakeholders similarly helped lay the foundation for constitution revision. Years before the revision effort formally got underway, a Joint Committee of Parliament debated the merits of constitutional reform and issued a report calling for the formation of a citizen assembly to study the issue.\textsuperscript{469} The major political parties supported these efforts, lending further political legitimacy to the idea of reform.\textsuperscript{470}

The effort in Washington D.C., by contrast, lacked sustained political support for the duration of their convention effort. At the outset, major political leaders, including the District’s non-voting Delegate to Congress, were opposed to the effort.\textsuperscript{471} Eventually, some officials, such as the Mayor, indicated their support.\textsuperscript{472} However, those supporting officials stopped short of taking actions that would more convincingly convey their support to members of the public. This absence “made the venture seem flaky,” which set off a sort of death spiral of doubt—political elites questioned the legitimacy of the convention, and political elites not running for delegate seats reinforced that doubt and made other civic community members question the project, and so on.\textsuperscript{473}

\textsuperscript{465} Id. at 611; see also Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 186 (noting the skepticism of Iceland’s political class).

\textsuperscript{466} See Lousin, supra note 17, at 605.


\textsuperscript{468} See Suteu, supra note 9, at 260–61.

\textsuperscript{469} Id. at 264.

\textsuperscript{470} Id.

\textsuperscript{471} See Schrag, supra note 245, at 842.

\textsuperscript{472} See id. at 843.

\textsuperscript{473} See id. at 847–49.
Of course, the support of the political elite does not guarantee that a convention will produce a high-quality constitution that earns popular support. Research by Gais and Benjamin indicates that high-ranking government officials, such as governors, “have often been the catalyst for constitutional conventions in the past, but their efforts have not fared well in recent years.” Finding the right role for the political elite has become trickier in a world in which distrust of the political class has grown. The popularity of the official, and public faith in their democratic system as a whole, may impact the extent to which engagement by an official can actually propel a convention effort forward. Still, convention organizers should work to obtain some level of engagement from officials and, especially, prevent their active opposition.

Organizers have to worry about more than just politicians undermining their work. Members of academia and other civil society organizations can also throw the process into question. In Iceland, “[m]any well-known political scientists” made repeated appearances on national television and wondered aloud if the Icelandic process was too complicated. Crucially, these assessments came before the election of delegates, which means that the expert skepticism could have diminished electoral turnout, and thus the legitimacy of the results (akin to evidencing a sort of spiral of doubt).

When leaders stop championing the effort or even cease to assist it, the effort may stall. So, the effort to earn the backing of key leaders must be sustained throughout the convention.

C. A Clear Deadline for the Convention

The convention process typically takes up a lot of time and financial resources only to result in no change. One of the pitfalls of the Illinois 1969 Constitutional Convention may have been that voters did not appreciate “delegates simply ’debat[ing]’ instead of preparing for a convention and hammering out proposals during the convention.”

Because a convention “is a serious and expensive business,” Lousin suggests that voters will want to see meaningful progress between iterations of drafts, without spending too much time diving into every comment generated through the review mechanisms. Some states,

474. See Gais & Benjamin, supra note 18, at 1303.
475. Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 186.
476. See id. (stating that the expert comments amount to “damning ahead of time the legitimacy of the process and probably affecting voter turnout”).
477. Colantuono, supra note 69, at 1479.
478. Lousin, supra note 17, at 615.
479. See id.
such as New York, do not place a time limit on the work of their Convention, letting them “remain in session for as long as it takes the delegates to present their recommendations to the people.”

The Washington D.C. Convention attempted to heed Lousin’s advice, limiting itself to ninety days. Washington D.C. organizers also limited the Convention to one revision effort—delegates could return a new draft to the public if the first version did not succeed. Though this might create some questionable incentives (the full scope of which are outside the ambit of this section), this clear limitation may have helped the public and the delegates take their work more seriously.

The Irish Convention specified deadlines for its internal and external processes. Internally, the Convention gave itself sixteen months to complete its work. Externally, “the government committed to respond to the Convention’s reports [on the specified issues] within four months and to . . . indicate” when the Convention’s resolution would go before the public as a referendum. Though the internal deadlines were met, the government struggled to comply with some of its temporal expectations. On some issues, the government failed to respond to the Convention within four months.

Iceland’s processes also neglected to precisely label temporal timelines, which likely had ramifications in terms of public support for the work. The Council had to adhere to a “rushed and arbitrary” timeline of three months, to which a month extension got added. A “clear timetable and delineation of the forthcoming steps” may have resulted in the public taking the process more seriously and grasping at the “meaning and importance of every step.”

V. Next Steps for States with Recurring Constitutional Convention Initiatives

Residents of every state can and should act on the lessons learned by Iceland and Ireland. Every state constitution makes at least one procedure for change possible, setting a pathway for amendments or

480. See Greenberg, supra note 460, at 10.
481. Schrag, supra note 245, at 846.
482. Id. at 847.
483. See Suteu, supra note 9, at 266.
484. See id.
485. See id.
486. See Icelandic Experiment, supra note 178, at 187.
487. Id. at 186.
revisions. For a revision, most states set the bar high—requiring a constitutional convention. Nearly every state has provisions in their constitution for how to initiate and run constitutional conventions. For some states, this opportunity is on the immediate horizon. Voters in Rhode Island, Michigan, and Connecticut will have the chance to vote on the creation of constitutional conventions in their states in 2024, 2026, and 2028, respectively.

This Section will not explore all of the mechanisms for constitutional conventions, but rather encourage readers to see which bodies, and in what manners, political actors in their states can pursue constitutional revision. If after that review, the reader finds no guidance, ambiguous guidance, or guidance that would require reliance on bodies unlikely to ever pursue constitutional change, then the public may consider extra-legal routes to launching a constitutional convention process that incorporates the best aspects of the two aforementioned countries.

Extra-legal action may be especially necessary in states where, despite the “wishes of the people [being] supreme,” only the legislature has the ability to call a convention. In that situation, if the legislature is the body causing some of the constitutional problems in need of resolution, then the people may have to take unprecedented action. This may be true in states with recurring opportunities for voters to call a constitutional convention, but with no self-executing means to start that convention in the event of a successful vote. In such a situation, the state legislature may acknowledge that the people voted to launch a convention but refuse to pass enabling legislation.

Extra-legal justification for crowdsourcing a constitution can come from several sources. A number of states have constitutional provisions that stress the sovereignty of the people and, in some cases, a right to reform the government at any time. Convention advocates may lean on those provisions as they launch their crowdsourcing efforts. Some scholars may justify an extra-legal route on the fact that in many states, their respective state court has identified an implied power within the

488. See Colantuono, supra note 69, at 1478.
489. Id. at 1479.
490. See Permaloff, supra note 7, at 226.
492. See Williams, supra note 33, at 569–70.
493. See Permaloff, supra note 7, at 228.
494. Colantuono, supra note 69, at 1479–80 (referring to the Oregon Constitution and the Kentucky Constitution).
state legislature to propose or call a convention, arguably that power could and should be extended to the people as sovereigns.

Extra-legal changes may also proceed solely by following democratic best practices, even if those are not the practices specified in a state constitution. Extra-legal constitutions were approved in Kentucky and Georgia where the people had “due and proper notice and opportunity to acquaint themselves with any revision, and make their choice directly by a free and popular election,” which meant their decision to approve the constitution had to be respected because the will of the people is “supreme.” Extra-legal means to change constitutions have also been permitted where a sufficient degree of assent from the people was identified. It follows that all convention organizers should strive to find clear signs of public support for their efforts.

Finally, advocates that require extra-legal mechanisms to realize their convention plans can cite historically significant reformers as supporters of their efforts. Teddy Roosevelt, for instance, backed extra-legal mechanisms. He declared it:

[F]alse constitutionalism, a false statesmanship, to endeavor by the exercise of a perverted ingenuity to seem to give to the people full power and at the same time to trick them out of it. Yet this is precisely what is done in every case where the state permits its representatives, whether on the bench or in the legislature or in executive office, to declare that it has not the power to right grave social wrongs.

Whichever justification constitutional convention organizers rely on, they will have their work cut out for them. Still, it is work worth pursuing. State constitutions are underused by state courts, broadly unanalyzed by the legal community, and underappreciated by the public as a means to realize the transformative goals they hope to see in politics. These documents also receive too little attention from the press, and they rely on too many of the same broken tools applied to other aspects of our democracy. A new wave of constitutional conventions can make these

495. See G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Getting From Here to There: Twenty-First Century Mechanisms and Opportunities in State Constitutional Reform, 36 Rutgers L.J. 1075, 1079 (2005); see also Colantuono, supra note 69, at 1480 (Speculating that “[s]ome courts have found an unstated legislative power to call a convention” because “the people, as popular sovereign, [can] give such a proposal constitutional force by adopting it at the polls”).
496. See Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716, 718–21 (Ky. 1966).
497. See Colantuono, supra note 69, at 1491.
documents stronger protectors of key rights and more central components of our democracies and state identities.

For too long, the realm of constitution-making has been viewed as “political business” to be conducted by traditional government stakeholders. 499 This attitude has reduced the public’s appetite for constitutional conventions despite their increasing dissatisfaction with state government. 500 This marks an ironic twist on the historical norm of constitutional conventions evoking fear in politicians and special interests worried about the people seizing revision opportunities. 501

Only by running a constitutional revision through a series of lengthy tests can those changes possess the level of democratic legitimacy required by a constitution. 502 A constitutional convention that incorporates the mechanisms used and lessons learned by the Icelandic and Irish people will likely suffice as such a test. A convention based on these two models will result in a proposal that received substantive participation from across civil society and survived a number of time-consuming tests that ensure a sufficient amount of deliberation. 503

Groundwork must occur to ready these states for the proper use of new deliberative tools. States that want to use these tools have to work on developing a civic culture that is responsive to the opportunity to use such tools. “A number of political observers,” according to Gais and Benjamin, argue that “the real obstacle to a more deliberative democracy in the United States is the decline of civil society.” 504 This argument receives support from a review of constitutional efforts abroad. A reliance on participatory processes has helped fend off communal fragmentation in Switzerland, according to Landemore. 505 Robert Putnam theorized that civic awareness in Italy assisted with that country’s capacity to pursue constitutional reforms. 506

A strong civic culture replete with strong civic institutions, rather than just a homogeneous community, allowed Iceland to experience relative success with these tools. Skeptics of deliberative practices in diverse U.S. states wrongly read the Iceland case study as being only

499. See Williams, supra note 33, at 574.
500. See id.
501. See id.
502. See Scheuerman, supra note 74, at 373. But cf. Colantuono, supra note 69, at 1480–81 (describing the steps required to achieve constitutional change through a convention as a “cumbersome means of constitutional amendment and revision,” suggesting that lower hurdles may be a positive).
503. See Scheuerman, supra note 74, at 373.
504. Gais & Benjamin, supra note 18, at 1313.
505. See Landemore, supra note 61, at 203.
applicable to small islands. Landemore contests this interpretation by pointing out that Iceland’s perceived homogeneity is the result of focused efforts to bring a diverse community, perhaps not as diverse as some U.S. states (certainly not as racially diverse), around shared processes and goals.\textsuperscript{507} Nevertheless, even in defending Iceland as less of an outlier than made out by critics, she acknowledges that the work done there was only possible after decades of cultural work.\textsuperscript{508}

Once such a civic culture exists and after one crowdsourced constitutional convention has occurred, leaders should also think about means to make sure their constitutions do not again become insufficiently functional and aspirational. Scheuerman convincingly shows that constitutions must do a better job of keeping pace with the rapidly accelerating changes to our social and economic environments.\textsuperscript{509} By specifying automatic triggers for when constitutional conventions must occur, contemporary political leaders can ensure that the people of tomorrow have a way to update their constitution when necessary, without expending too much time, money, and energy just to get the process started.

Relying on less democratic means of constitutional alteration will hinder the democratic legitimacy of the state constitution. That is why states ought to think through not only how to host a constitutional convention in the near future but, in doing so, how that process can be replicated again when required by social and economic changes. By way of example, once the Irish identified that its convention mechanism could produce quality reforms, it did not close down the effort merely because the Convention finished its initial agenda.\textsuperscript{510} Instead, the Irish empowered their Convention and public to continue the improvement effort and bring new issues before the Convention,\textsuperscript{511} perhaps giving rise to a new phrase: if it’s broke, keep fixing it.

Ultimately, the push for a constitutional convention hinges on hope versus fear.\textsuperscript{512} Fear has generally won the day in recent decades. Interests fearful of losing the few advantages they have enshrined in the constitution do not want to risk a constitution that could contain unknown harms. Hope, though, has been on the verge of victory elsewhere and can take place in the states. The people can hope for a more responsive document as well as for a revival of their civic culture.

\textsuperscript{507} See Landemore, supra note 61, at 201–05.
\textsuperscript{508} See id.
\textsuperscript{509} See Scheuerman, supra note 74, at 390.
\textsuperscript{510} See Suteu, supra note 9, at 266–67.
\textsuperscript{511} See id. at 267.
\textsuperscript{512} See Greenberg, supra note 460, at 12.