Articles

THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE CONFLICTS: IDEOLOGICAL BIASES AND EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
Konnor Woodburn

Courts have long held that significant conflicts of interest can create both ethical and constitutional problems in the criminal context. They invoke major issues of effective assistance of counsel by making it difficult to determine whether the attorney is acting on behalf of their client or someone else. It follows that there should also be significant concern if the defense attorney is being paid to represent a client as part of an ideological or political group whose interests might not be the same as the individual who is on trial, even if that third party does not have a criminal interest in the proceedings. In a society where attorneys are taking clients merely to make a political statement, standards of ethics and competence must be even more explicit in prohibiting conflicts of interest. Simply put, a defense attorney should be severely restricted from accepting payments from third parties intent on pushing a specific message, especially when doing so would risk damaging their client’s chances of a favorable resolution to their criminal proceedings.

This Commentary explores the problems inherent in allowing third-party fee payments as part of pushing an overall message. Specifically, how these payments relate to effective representation in criminal proceedings. Part I will discuss Strickland v. Washington and the origin of effective assistance of counsel, as well as an analysis of third-party fee payments and conflicts of interest. Part II will continue with several modern examples of ideology and politics interfering with the role of a criminal defense attorney. This Part will also include the argument that third-party fee payments based on ideology or other means are outside the scope of professional conduct and should be curtailed except in extremely limited circumstances, with ineffective assistance claims and other remedies in place to deal with significant violations.

WHO IS THE REAL CRIMINAL? IMPOSING SPECIFIC CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR POLICE MISCONDUCT IN FALSE CONFESSION CASES UNDER NEW YORK LAW
Anna Maria Giblin

False confessions, and subsequent wrongful convictions, present a serious problem in the criminal justice system as a whole, but especially in New York State. Since 1989, New York has ranked “third in the nation in confirmed wrongful convictions.” Furthermore, police-induced false confessions “are among the leading causes of wrongful convictions.”

This Commentary argues that New York should adopt a statute imposing specific criminal liability on police officers for intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently obtaining a false confession from an individual who is later wrongly convicted of and imprisoned for a crime for which the false confession was obtained. Part I provides background information on false confessions and the police misconduct that often give rise to them. It also analyzes current civil remedies for exonerees, arguing that an individual cannot fully achieve justice through compensation alone. Part II describes New York’s penal law, asserting that the interrogation tactics police routinely utilize to obtain false confessions do not fit neatly within the current definitions of official misconduct or obstruction of governmental administration. Part III lays out a legislative proposal that imposes specific criminal liability for obtaining a false confession in the first and second degrees. Part IV discusses the implications likely to arise from the proposal, anticipated objections to the proposal, and responses to those concerns.