Traditional prosecution begot mass incarceration, racial disparities in sentencing, excessive punishment and wrongful convictions, while failing to reduce recidivism, enhance trust in the criminal legal system or promote safety. Advocates and scholars have debated whether progressive prosecution provides a means to enhance the legal system or whether it merely legitimizes the carceral state. Proponents of progressive prosecution have argued that it can address the excesses of traditional prosecution. Abolitionist critics have suggested that prosecutors can provide no legitimate answer to address flaws in the criminal legal system. Others have argued that prosecutors have little power to achieve reform that addresses problems like mass incarceration, racial discrimination, and wrongful convictions.

This Article focuses on the promise and challenges of progressive prosecution through the lens of the election of Jason R. Williams to Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Orleans Parish was the epicenter of mass incarceration, wrongful convictions, violence, and racism over the last thirty years. The election of Jason Williams as District Attorney in 2021 resulted in policy changes in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. In the first two years of the administration, incarceration rates dropped by one-third, impacting over one thousand people. Dozens of individuals serving draconian punishments for low- level offenses were resentenced. Eighteen individuals were exonerated. But as well, compromises were made. Policies articulated in a vacuum were difficult to maintain. Criticism came from progressives and conservatives alike. Many of the salient challenges and possibilities of this reform are detailed to allow participants, practitioners, advocates and scholars to assess the promise of progressive prosecution.

This Article presents categorical clemency as an underused yet necessary mechanism to address excessive sentences in New Jersey. By discussing philosophical justifications for clemency and its historical context, we begin to examine the ad hoc nature of clemency practices. We describe some of the major flaws in New Jersey’s sentencing structures that have contributed to the crisis of mass incarceration. After discussing these issues, we then explore the solutions by critiquing federal and state clemency initiatives across the country. We propose categorical clemency as a tool to reduce the prison population and improve the quality of justice in New Jersey. We assert that a sustainable clemency practice is consistent with building safer and stronger communities.

Those who have studied the Chicken Little folk tale say there are three main moral messages to the story: “(1) don’t form incorrect conclusions from insufficient data; (2) don’t stoke fear in others without good cause to do so; and (3) don’t take other people’s word for things, especially when those other people are making extraordinary claims (which should require extraordinary evidence).”7 In other words—facts matter. The history and politicization surrounding the establishment of no- fault injunctive relief to prevent access to illegal/criminal websites (otherwise known as site blocking) stands as a classic example of those morals gone awry. In 2010–2011, when the idea of judicial site blocking was first introduced to America, the loudest response was not a fact- based analysis and discussion of the legal and technical issues implicated by the legislation, but a sound bite designed to strike fear into the hearts of everyone with a computer or mobile phone: it will “break the internet.”8 In other words, “the sky is falling.” Every moral of the Chicken Little fable was on prominent display during the discussion of this legislation . . . . .

Can American courts meaningfully act to prevent election violence? This question has never been seriously asked but is becoming urgent in a new era of election-related violence, much of which has been encouraged by former President Trump. This Article begins the process of exploring answers to that question. The author examines failed attempts at lawsuits against Trump for provoking violence at campaign rallies from 2015 until January 6th, 2021, including the case of Nwanguma v. Trump, and offers explanations as to why the courts were reluctant to hold the former President accountable. This Article will demonstrate that inaction by the courts is best understood using models of assessing judicial attitudes rather than First Amendment jurisprudence or any other legalistic explanation. Furthermore, political science research into the role the courts play in preventing election violence in Africa provides a framework for understanding the ability of our own judiciary to stop election violence before it becomes insurrection—or worse.

AI-driven processes dominate today’s consumer interactions.The integration of sophisticated AI technologies into search and e-commerce platforms has transformed the marketplace, posing novel challenges for trademark law. The modern ‘algorithmic marketplace’ departs from the reactive and human-centric consumption models upon which trademark jurisprudence is based. The predictive nature of emerging technologies, coupled with the growing use of innovative AI-driven search methods—such as conversational, voice-activated, visual, and multimodal search—has drastically altered the informational contexts that consumers operate in. Moreover, human involvement in purchasing decisions is increasingly being supplanted by autonomous AI intermediaries (such as smart shopping assistants, appliances, and replenishment services), which independently assess need, navigate marketplaces, weigh options, and execute purchases—replicating decision-making traditionally attributed to human shoppers. Given the reduced human involvement in and control over transactions in the algorithmic marketplace, trademark law’s archetypal ‘average consumer’ must be adapted when applied to the ‘artificially intelligent’ consumer—those whose consumption patterns are heavily influenced or entirely facilitated by AI agents. This Article explores these challenges and proposes amendments to the Lanham Act that address the impact of the artificially intelligent consumer on traditional trademark law principles.

Owning a home is one of the major facets of the American Dream. Despite various modern barriers to owning a house, once you own it, you typically get to keep it. Only in extreme circumstances, like when the government invokes the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, may someone’s property be unwillingly taken from them. Even then, the property owner’s equity is preserved as the government must give just compensation in exchange for the property. Until recently, however, the government was allowed to seize and sell property for delinquent property taxes without returning the homeowner’s surplus equity after the sale. This is called home equity theft, and it was permitted in ten states, including New Jersey.

Healthcare fraud is a billion-dollar industry in the United States. Because healthcare fraud is varied in method and often subtle, it is difficult to catch. The federal government’s main tool for fighting this fraud is the False Claims Act (“FCA”). One of the most important ways the government enforces the FCA is through its connection with the Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”). This connection provides that if a claim results from a violation of the AKS, it is false for FCA purposes. The difficulties of proof in this context have given rise to a circuit split about how to prove this causal connection. There are three main theories, each with its own problems. The taint theory, which holds that a claim is false if it is so much as tainted by a kickback scheme, has the potential to hold defendants liable for lawful conduct. The but-for cause theory holds plaintiffs to a standard of proof that is difficult to meet in healthcare fraud cases. Under the link theory, a plaintiff can prove a class of claims is false if plaintiff can prove that one of the claims is linked to a kickback scheme. The link theory seeks to ameliorate the plaintiff’s difficulty in proving causation. However, it does not give the defendant a chance to contest the claims the theory allows plaintiff to skip. A new causation rule is required. It must be flexible but also fair to defendants. It should also be calibrated to account for healthcare fraud cases’ factual variety and complexity. This Note proposes a new causation rule: if plaintiff can show that a kickback scheme is the kind of scheme that plausibly gives rise to the kinds of claims plaintiff alleges, the burden should shift to defendant to show that the kickback scheme was not the but-for cause of the claims.

January 6, 2021. To a majority of Americans, it was an assault on the very foundations of democracy. “[A] landmark stain on American democracy,” as one analyst described it. To others, the date elicits memories of the “beautiful day” that many “patriots” and “peaceful people” were forced into action to save their country. As Donald Trump put it in a speech given at a rally outside the White House, the patriots of the day needed to “fight like hell,” warning them, “if you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country anymore.” The January 6 insurrection is an event that will live in infamy—a lasting reminder of the deep political division that has infected this country in recent years.5 In fact, one need not look any further than the data regarding American opinion on the January 6 insurrection. According to one poll, eighty-six percent of Democrats believe the insurrection should never be forgotten, while seventy-two percent of Republicans believe that it’s “time to move on” from the day rioters stormed the Capitol and threatened the lives of our elected representatives . . . . .