8.1 FAA Awareness

United Airlines Flight 93 began its takeoff roll from Newark International Airport at 8:42, some forty minutes late, and checked in with air traffic control at 8:43: “United 93 fourteen hundred [feet] for twenty-five hundred.”[i] All communications with Newark Tower, New York Tracon, and New York Air Route Traffic Center were normal; after reporting experiencing some “light chop” at 35,000 feet, the flight was handed off to Cleveland Center at 9:23.[ii] Several seconds later, United 93 established radio contact with Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center: “Morning Cleveland, United Ninety-three with you at, three-five-oh (35,000 feet), intermittent light chop.[iii] The controller did not respond to this initial transmission as he had sixteen flights under his control, and was issuing new routes to several aircraft based upon the decisions in New York and Boston to ground-stop all aircraft.[iv]

United 93 again radioed Cleveland Center at 9:25, checking in at 35,000 feet. The controller replied, “United ninety-three, Cleveland, roger.”[v] The controller then engaged in conversation with several aircraft about the evolving situation in New York City and the prospects for flights to be allowed to land in Philadelphia; while the controller was extremely discreet, it was clear what he was talking about. The time was 9:26.

092556 Midex 150 Philiadelphia.mp3

The controller, who was moving planes away from each other as the traffic built in his sector from the ground stop in New York and Boston, warned several planes, including United 93: “United 93 that traffic for you is one o’clock twelve miles eastbound three seven zero.” The aircraft acknowledged: “Negative contact we’re looking United Ninety-three.”[vi] Then, at 9:28, the controller and the pilots of several other flights heard “a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin …”[vii] The controller responded: “Somebody call Cleveland?”[viii] This was followed, at 9:29, by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming and someone yelling “Get out of here, get out of here,” again from an unknown source.[ix] The Cleveland Center controllers began to try to identify the possible source of the transmissions, and noticed that United 93 had descended some 700 feet.

0928 UA93 last normal and first trouble.mp3

The controller responsible for United 93 attempted to contact the aircraft. There was no reply. The controller attempted again to raise United 93: “United ninety-three, verify three-five-zero (thirty-five thousand feet).”[x] There was no reply. The controller tried to raise United 93 several more times, with no response. At 9:30, the controller began to poll the other flights on his frequency to determine the source of the noise.

At 9:32, a third radio transmission came over the frequency: “keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board.”[xi]

0932 UA93 bomb on board.mp3

Between 9:34 and 9:38, the controller observed United 93 climbing to forty thousand seven hundred feet. He moved several aircraft out of the way of the non-responsive United 93, including Delta 1989.

0934 UA93 moves other traffic including D1989.mp3

Pilots radioed in confirmation that they had heard that there was a bomb on board.[xii] The controller continued to try to contact United 93, and asked, at 9:36, whether the pilot could confirm that he had been hijacked. There was no response.

As the flight continued to climb and fly erratically, the controller moved decisively to clear the other flights in his sector from United 93’s erratic flight path.

Then, at 9:39, another radio transmission came over the frequency from United 93:

0939 UA93 bomb on board and controller followup.mp3

When the flight did not respond, pilots on other flights confirmed that they had heard the transmission. The controller continued to move traffic out of the flight path of United 93 until, at 9:41, the center lost United 93’s transponder signal:

094106 UA93 lost transponder controller talks to two airplanes.mp3

The controller located the aircraft on primary radar, and matched his reading with visual sightings from other aircraft to follow the flight as it turned east and, ultimately, south.[xiii]

While controllers at FAA’s Cleveland Center tracked the path of United 93 as it headed east, it did not take long for Cleveland Center’s managers to notify all levels of upper management of the grave situation developing on board United 93.

At approximately 9:39, Cleveland Center notified the Great Lakes Regional Operations Center in Chicago of the screams and statements relating to having a “bomb on board” that it believed were coming from United 93. Even before the region received notice of United 93, senior managers at both FAA headquarters and Command Center were notified of the report that United 93 had a bomb on board. Cleveland Center’s notice to upper management was prompted by Command Center’s request for information concerning suspicious aircraft. At approximately 9:18, the Deputy Director of Air Traffic at FAA headquarters established an open line of communication with a manager from the Command Center at Herndon.[xiv] At approximately 9:25, FAA headquarters instructed Command Center to “get an awareness up to all the traffic management coordinators or the traffic management units to report any unusual circumstances direct to the Command Center of loss of identification, or any radio, uh, any unusual radio transmissions.”[xv] At approximately 9:31, the National Traffic Management Officer on duty at Command Center executed the request from FAA Headquarters:

0931 CC inventory order.mp3

Approximately one minute after this request for information was sent to the FAA field facilities, Cleveland Center provided Command Center with the following urgent report:

0934 UA93 ZOB reports bomb on board.mp3/a>

In less than two minutes, at 9:34, Command Center relayed the information concerning United 93 to FAA Headquarters:

0934 UA93 CC report to HQ FAA.mp3

At approximately 9:36, Cleveland Center advised Command Center that they were still tracking United 93 and inquired specifically whether someone had requested the military to launch fighter aircraft to intercept United 93. Cleveland Center even told Command Center they were prepared to contact a nearby military base to request fighter aircraft assistance. Command Center told Cleveland Center that FAA personnel above them in the chain of command had to make the decision to request military assistance.[xvi]

093601 ZOB call re want to scramble military here.mp3

Indeed, from 9:34 to 10:08, a Command Center facility manager provided several updates to the Deputy Administrator and other executives at FAA headquarters as United 93 approached the Washington, DC area. Specifically, at 9:41, Command Center notified headquarters that United 93 had reversed course from its intended flight path and was descending:

0941 UA93 CC to HQ FAA over Akron.mp3

At 9:42, Command Center learned through a television news report that a plane had struck the Pentagon.[xvii] FAA headquarters also knew the Pentagon had been attacked by an aircraft.[xviii] Shortly after Command Center heard about the crash at the Pentagon, Command Center’s National Operations Manager, Ben Sliney, ordered all FAA facilities to instruct all airborne aircraft to land at the nearest airport.[xix] At the time the order was given, there were approximately 4,500 commercial and general aviation aircraft in the skies over the United States. All aircraft landed without incident. This was an unprecedented order. The air traffic control system handled it with great skill.

While Command Center employees informed FAA field facilities of the order to land all aircraft, one of the Command Center managers continued to give FAA headquarters several updates on the progress and location of United 93. In fact, at 9:46, 17 minutes before impact, Command Center gave this update on United 93 to FAA headquarters:

0946 UA93 CC to HQ FAA 29 minutes out.mp3

At 9:48, FAA Command Center told headquarters United 93 was on a course for Washington, DC:

0948 UA93 CC to FAA HQ 23 minutes out.mp3

At 9:49, Command Center suggest[ed] that someone at headquarters should decide whether to request military assistance:

0949 Pulling Jeff away.mp3

[The timing of this conversation is consistent with the FAA Administrator Jane Garvey and her staff’s having joined the Air Threat Conference Call run by Richard Clarke from the White House Situation Room. There is no evidence that the report passed to FAA Headquarters from the Command Center reached the military in a timely fashion.]

At 9:53, FAA headquarters informed Command Center that the Deputy Director for Air Traffic Services was talking to Deputy Administrator Monte Belger about scrambling aircraft.[xx] Then, at 9:56, Command Center informed headquarters they lost track of United 93 over the Pittsburgh area.[xxi] Within seconds, Command Center located United 93 and informed headquarters:

0958 UA93 20 miles Johnstown.mp3

At 10:00, Command Center advised headquarters that “United ninety three was spotted by a VFR at eight thousand feet, eleven, eleven miles south of Indianhead, just north of Cumberland, Maryland.[xxii] At 10:01, just two minutes before United 93 crashed, Command Center provided FAA headquarters with the following update:

1000 UA93 Rocking wings.mp3

At 10:08, five minutes after United 93 crashed in a field in Pennsylvania, Command Center forwarded this update to headquarters:

100744 UA93 Report of black smoke AA77 Q re police report.mp3

At 10:17, Command Center advised headquarters of its belief that United 93 had “crashed fifteen miles south of Johnstown, Pennsylvania”.[xxiii]

No one from FAA headquarters requested military assistance regarding United 93. In fact, the executive level managers at FAA headquarters did not forward the information they received from Command Center regarding United 93 to the military.

8.2 Military Notification and Response

NEADS first received a call about United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center, at 10:07. This call was the first notification the military – at any level – received about United 93. Unaware that the aircraft had already crashed, Cleveland passed to NEADS the aircraft’s last know latitude and longitude. NEADS was never able to locate United 93 on radar because it was already in the ground.

100701 UA93 ZOB to NEADS bomb on board.mp3

When the information that United 93 had turned off its transponder and had a potential bomb on board reached the mission crew commander, he was dealing with the arrival of the Langley fighters over Washington and what their orders were with respect to potential targets. While NEADS searched for the radar track on United 93, the Mission Crew Commander and his Weapons Director engaged in the following conversation shortly after 10:10 concerning the rules of engagement:

100901 UA93 negative clearance to shoot.mp3

As the news of a bomb on board United 93 spread throughout the floor, the NEADS air defenders searched for the primary radar target and the Mission Crew Commander tried to locate assets to scramble toward the plane. At approximately 10:11, the commander got on the phone with an Air National Guard Unit in Syracuse:

101145 NEADS discussion with Syracuse Cdr.mp3

NEADS Identification Technicians called Washington Center to provide a “heads up” to them about United 93, but Washington Center provided NEADS with startling new information on the flight:

101418 ZDC to NEADS UA93 is down.mp3

The time was 10:15 and the call was NEADS’ first notice that United 93 had crashed.[xxiv] The actual time of the crash was 10:03:11.

By 10:15, the NEADS air defenders knew that two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center, a third had crashed into the Pentagon, Delta 1989 had landed safely in Cleveland and was not a hijack, and United 93 had crashed in Pennsylvania.

The minutes after 10:15 were spent on the floor at NEADS attempting to mobilize other fighters from the eastern seaboard, and anticipating the arrival of Air Force Once in the Washington area. The Mission Crew Commander was notified at 10:25 that “Air Force One is airborne out of Florida heading to Washington. We’ve got those four F-15s coming out of Langley. They’re done rolling. Two of them will be diverted to escort at the appropriate time.” [xxv]

Then, at 10:32, the MCC Technician read information that had just come across the Chat Log from CONR in Florida:

103200 chat log shoot-down words.mp3

The NEADS air defenders have expressed considerable confusion over the nature and effect of this order in interviews with Commission staff.[xxvi] Indeed, Colonel Marr indicated to staff that he actually believes he withheld the order from the floor for several minutes because he was unsure of its ramifications,[xxvii] while both the Mission Crew Commander and the Weapons Director indicated that they withheld the order from the pilots flying Combat Air Patrol over Washington, DC and New York City because they were unsure how the pilots would or should proceed with such an order.[xxviii] The Weapons Director [struggled with repeated requests from the pilots and controllers for clarification of the rules of engagement, but ultimately responded:]

1051 Currently at peace.mp3

1053 New direction coming down.mp3

1053 Boston track of interest.mp3

1102 Controller asks for kill direction.mp3

1103 Cleared to engage.mp3

The shoot-down [authorization] order was the first official “rules of engagement” (ROE) of the morning to come down through the chain of command at DOD to NEADS. At virtually the same time, the Department of Defense elevated its alert status to DEFCON 3. This alert posture was suited more to a Cold War conflict than to al Qaeda’s attack. Nonetheless, the shift to an elevated alert status signified the reassertion of authority by the national command structure. The air defense of the United States – subsequently called operation “Noble Eagle” – had at last begun.

8.3 Commission Findings and Assessment

The operational facts of the military response to United 93, as reflected in the tapes and transcripts as corroborated by contemporaneous logs and witness interviews, contrast sharply with the official explanations of that response. The military did not receive notice that United 93 was a hijacking at 9:16, as reported to the Commission, in May 2003, by NORAD; that notice came at 10:07.

At 9:16, the MCC/T Log records: “United tail #N612UA/75 S0B/”[xxix] This tail number corresponds not with United 93 but with United 175, which had crashed into the World Trade Center. A corresponding conversation on the subpoenaed tapes confirms that at 9:16 NEADS was receiving confirmation of the tail number of the United 175 flight.[xxx]

Furthermore, at 9:16, the plane had not yet even been hijacked. In fact, the sounds of the initial struggle on board United 93 that resulted in its hijacking are not audible on the air traffic radio frequency in Cleveland Center until 9:28. As late as 9:25, moreover, according to FAA controller transcripts, the pilot of United 93 radioed in: “United ninety-three checking three-five-oh (35,000 feet).”

The “ground truth” revealed by the tapes, as corroborated by Commission staff, also belies the official version of the response to United 93 that is built on the early notification time. “Air War Over America,” for instance, the 1^st Air Force’s official history of 9/11, offers the following accounts by two of the key NORAD participants:

(Colonel Robert Marr, NEADS Commander): “With all available alert fighters in the air, Marr and his crew were still faced with United Flight 93. The plane was headed west, so controllers began looking for any other fighter jets that might be nearby. `We don’t have fighters that way and we think he’s headed toward Detroit or Chicago,’ Marr says. `I’m thinking Chicago is the target and know that Selfridge Air National Guard Base (Mich.) has F-16s in the air. We contacted them so they could head 93 off at the pass. The idea is to get in there, close in on him and convince him to turn… As United Airlines Flight 93 was going out, we received the clearance to kill if need be. In fact, General Arnold’s words almost verbatim were: `We will take lives in the air to save lives on the ground.’” [xxxi]

(General Larry Arnold, CONR Commander): “…we watched the 93 track as it meandered around the Ohio-Pennsylvania area and started to turn south toward DC. By now the Pentagon has been hit and we have aircraft on orbit… They are now orbiting over Washington, DC, and have been for a while. As United 93 headed toward DC, the desire is to move the fighters toward that aircraft.”[xxxii]

The record demonstrates, however, that no-one at any level in NORAD (or DOD) ever “watched the 93 track” start to turn south toward DC. The only track that NEADS watched was the Delta 1989 track, which turned toward Cleveland. In fact, NORAD never saw United 93 at all. The Selfridge fighters were contacted not regarding United 93, but Delta 1989. Most important, NORAD certainly never “received the clearance to kill if need be” on United 93; indeed, as determined by Commission staff, as late as 10:10 the ROE orders given by the NEADS Mission Crew Commander were “negative clearance to shoot” regarding targets over Washington, DC.[xxxiii]

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